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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
CONTEXT AND AIM OF THE DISSERTATION- Studies on the tobacco industry 
mainly focus on the negative aspects that the products commercialised by this industry 
have on health. However this industry, as all the firms which are related to it – as 
tobacco shops – are mainly characterized by a stigma, which is a negative belief or 
opinion that a society or group of people have about them. This stigmatization makes 
this industry as any other which commercialise unhealthy products (alcohol, weapons, 
gambling and so on) to be identified as contested. As a consequence of this, firms that 
operate in such contested and stigmatized industries suffer from legitimacy problems 
since their activities are not in line with their surrounding institutional context. In order 
to have a better understanding, it is necessary to divide this work according to the main 
theories used to analyse family run tobacco shops. The possibility to analyse Agency 
theory dynamics in small and medium family enterprises is related to the curiosity of 
understanding in which direction goes the main debate on agency costs. In fact authors 
as Jensen and Meckling (1976) maintain that family firms are the only organizational 
forms in which agency costs are less since there is an interest alignment and also 
because there is the direct involvement of owners, while contrarily Shulze et al. (2001) 
affirms that the family’s altruism toward its members determine higher agency costs in 
family firms.  
The other theoretical approach on which the thesis focuses is relatively recent and 
has been developed under the umbrella of the institutional theory and it is the 
Institutional logics approach. The chance of exploring how different logics interact 
within family run tobacco shops together with the opportunity to give a contribution in 
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this field have addressed the study of these theoretical approaches on these particular 
family businesses.  
However even if has not been dedicated a specific chapter on the concept of 
Socioemotional Wealth (Gomez-Mejia, 2007) in this thesis, it has been treated in a 
transversal way since it is rooted in family firms. 
Socioemotional wealth (SEW) is a construct introduced by Gomez-Mejia et al.(2007) 
that tries to capture all the particular and affective aspects that make family firms 
behave in a specific way. In fact SEW is the affective endowment of a firm, which 
comprises non-financial aspects related to the family's emotional needs; these needs can 
be identity, belonging, the family's desire to exercise authority and the continuation of 
the family dynasty, while preserving family's values and social capital. In sum it's "the 
stock of affect-related value that a family derives from its controlling position in a 
particular firm" and its preservation comes to be an end for family firms (Berrone, Cruz 
and Gomez-Mejia, 2012) as SEW is one of their main uniqueness factors. The owners 
of these kinds of firms, do not care only about financial results, as non-family firms 
usually do, but they also care about keeping family control, and so about their SEW. 
According to the aforementioned authors, this SEW preservation prevails over the firm's 
financial performance. In fact, family owners in general are more willing than 
nonfamily ones to make strategic decisions which sacrifice economic performances but 
that allow the SEW preservation thus making family firms loss (of emotional aspects) 
averse, meaning that  that they do not take risky decisions that threat their SEW.  
So, how do Agency and Insitutional logics approaches apply in Italian family run tobac-
co shops? How to arrange SEW elements with agency and institutional logics 
approaches? How do institutional logics affect the controversial inclinations of tobacco 
shops? Each chapter will help us. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY- Given that the study objective is to explore how 
the aforementioned theories actualize within tobacco shops’ sector, after having 
conducted a literature review and framed a theoretical background, the adoption of a 
cross-case analysis approach was used to obtain some findings. A semi-structured 
protocol of interview has been proposed to four tobacco shops located in the area of 
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Padua which presented more or less controversial inclinations (controversial industry 
logics). Finally the analysis of the results has been used to come up with some key 
propositions. A creative tool (the means-ends cone) was also used during the interviews 
to obtain results about the institutional logics approach in order to understand the 
relationship existing between family and business logics on one side, and controversial 
and non-controversial industry logics on the other side since all these logics coexist 
within family run tobacco shops. 
CHAPTER ONE- The starting point of this work is a deep analysis of the Agency 
theory. This theory is a cornerstone in the organizational literature because its 
development is not recent, and also because many other theories have their basis on the 
agency framework,and this is true for the behavioural agency model and for some 
aspects concerning the risk conception developed under the SEW construct. 
Furthermore this chapter clarifies which are the main assumptions of the agency 
approach and tries to give an idea of what the literature says about the agency costs in 
family firm and in SMEs, with these two representing both the main characteristics of 
family run tobacco shops. 
CHAPTER TWO- This chapter, instead, focuses its attention on a recent approach 
which is expressly based on the conception of firms as open systems and that for this 
reason constantly interact with the surrounding environment that can be defined as the 
institutional environment. This approach is the Institutional logics one, whose main 
purpose is to give the definition of meaning and content of  institutions: this approach  
allow us to understand the effects that rules, practices and beliefs – that is to say 
differentiated institutional logics - have on individual and organizations in a larger 
variety of contexts, including markets, industries, and different organizational forms. 
Institutional logics shape rational, mindful behaviour and by being part of the 
institutions, individual and organizations have some hands in shaping and changing 
institutional logics: in this way we have a deeper understanding on how institutions 
affect individual and organizational (choices) and behaviours, so having a link between 
institutions and actions which was not specified by prior institutional theorists. Since 
family firms are characterized by an institutional overlap – the family institution and the 
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business institution - (Lansberg, 1983) the chapter tries to give some theoretical 
suggestions on this aspect that will be practically analysed in chapter four. 
CHAPTER THREE- Still remaining under the umbrella of the institutional theory 
and under the open system perspective of the firm, in this chapter an analysis of the 
main issues related to controversial firms and their external environment is considered. 
The chapter starts with the theoretical definition of the main aspects of legitimacy, 
which represent one of the most important problems for companies which work in 
controversial and contested industries as the tobacco shops. The opposite situation of 
legitimacy - which represents in a banal way the social acceptance of a firm’s activity - 
is the concept of stigma, already mentioned. The description of these two elements is 
important and preparatory for the analysis developed in family run tobacco shops. 
Moreover the chapter illustrates the main trends and evolutions of the global tobacco 
market and of the Italian one with a definition of the specific characteristics and nature 
of Italian tobacco shops. 
CHPTER FOUR- This chapter reports the main findings and propositions about the 
research done on the family run tobacco shops. The results, deriving from the semi-
structured protocol of interview and deriving from the use of the “means-ends cone” 
have been divided according to five areas and, for each area, are reported parts of the 
answers of the tobacconists, some propositions and some considerations that have led to 
the specific proposition. The main areas in which results are divided are: family 
business institutional overlap, the role that the co-existence of the business and family 
logics (institutional overlap) have on product portfolio and innovation path pursued, 
institutional logics as a construct that fosters legitimacy, environmental legitimacy and 
stigma and finally, agency considerations in family run tobacco shops. It is important to 
highlight that the interviews were proposed to four tobacco shops but since one (the 
pilot case) lacked the family presence element, the related results have not been 
considered. However among the three family run tobacco shops analysed, only two 
presented controversial characteristics whose nature have been analysed using  an 
institutional logics approach. 
RESULTS SUMMARY- About the institutional overlap between the two 
institutional logics (family and business) and its effects on product portfolio and 
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innovation paths, the results from the case study highlight that the institutional overlap 
and the related logics are strongly nested and this is determinant in the decision of 
families to invest in tobacco shops’ sector and to sell and introduce products and 
services which follow the family logics (allowing the enjoyment of the family 
influence) and the business logics (related to the possibility of increasing revenues) 
irrespective of their controversial nature. Moreover, a self-reinforcing effect between 
the two logics which is given by the fact that in family run tobacco shops the family 
logic is satisfied by the business and vice versa, is emphasized by results. 
Regarding the institutional logics as a construct that fosters the legitimacy of the 
controversial products and services offered, the family logics legitimates the offering of 
more controversial products and services for those tobacco shops which were deemed to 
be the most controversial. Differently, for what concerns environmental legitimacy and 
stigma results show that tobacconists feel to be legitimated because they operate under a 
concession given by the State. For the same reason they do not perceive any stigma. 
Finally for what concerns agency considerations, agency costs in family run tobacco 
shops are not significant since there is not a division between ownership and control 
since all family members are involved in the business equally, and even if there are 
external people working inside the shop, the lack of a formal organizational structure 
allows them to exercise a direct control without implying any cost. For the loss aversion 
concept results show that tobacconists tend to be more risk averse (thus taking the slots 
machines off the shop) when their business is performing well, while they exhibit risk 
neutral behaviours (thus increasing the number of slots within the shop) when their 
business is not performing well. This means that in this last case they exhibit a certain 
degree of loss aversion which, however, mainly regards the business rather than the 
socioemotional aspects. 
 
  
1. CHAPTER 
AGENCY THEORY LITERATURE REVIEW: 
INSIGHTS AND SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH 
UNDERSTANDING 
1.1 Premise 
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and most controversial modes of 
interaction among individuals within the organizational and social context. The 
literature on organizational theory often views agency theory as a reference point since 
it represents a cornerstone of organizations’ internal relationship. The borne of this 
theory can be attributed to the separation between ownership and control which was 
seen by authors as Berle and Means (1932) as the most efficient way to govern big 
companies. However the contribution of Jensen and Meckling (1976) - which define the 
company as a set of contracts which rule the relationship among individuals operating in 
the firm – have allowed the possibility to extend the principal-agent relationship to all 
kind of organizational forms, ranging from the bigger to the smaller ones. This 
relationship is not so easy because of the divergent objectives of the contracting 
individuals, which inevitably creates costs. 
In this chapter a deep analysis of the main facets of this theory has been made in order 
to understand its main assumptions, the outcomes of this agency relationship such as the 
costs and the risk conception (March and Shapira, 1987) of contracting parties and to do 
this a “black box” perspective of firms has been employed. The aspects of the agency 
costs have been analysed within the family businesses context and within the 
framework of  the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) in order to understand if the 
existing debate on the prevalence of these agency costs in management-controlled firms 
with respect to owner-controlled (for us family firms) firms holds true.   
A Study of Family Firms: context and theories 
12 
Nonetheless since the final objective of the analysis is to understand the agency theory 
within family firms, an outlook on the Socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Gomez and 
Mejia, 2007) construct has been kept, thus highlighting the main congruencies between 
the Agency theory and the Behavioural agency Model (BAM) – which is the root of the 
SEW construct - concerning the risk concept (Wisemann, Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
 
1.2 Agency Theory: origins and implications of the controversial 
principal-agent interaction 
The principal-agent problem in the corporate frame became important around the 18th 
century thanks to the contribution of Adam Smith. In order to better define the agency 
problem it is necessary to identify the real source of this phenomenon which is common 
to big companies: the separation between ownership and control. 
The classic economics literature, with the intent of defining a “Theory of the firm”, has 
identified the firm as a “Black box”, which is operated in order to obtain the 
maximization of profits by transforming inputs (e.g., raw materials) in outputs (e.g., end 
products or services). However this neoclassical definition of the firm has met some 
limitations in the moment in which several studies - the most important in this field was 
developed by Berle and Means during 30s- focusing on large corporations and on their 
corporate governance, maintained that the best way to efficiently manage a firm, and 
thus maximizing profits, is through the separation between ownership and control. In 
this new framework, the behaviour and the relationship between two subjects, the agent 
(manager) and the principal (owner or shareholders in the case of a limited liability 
company),were central. 
Their (agency) relationship is quite complex and it is characterized by delegation: the 
owner delegates the manager to behave, manage and conduct the company on his 
behalf, therefore satisfying his own interests, among which predominates the 
maximization of the firm’s profit. Starting form this point it is easy to understand that 
the “Black box model” of the firm, based on profit maximization is no more adequate to 
capture the essence of this relationship that grasps a cooperative effort between the 
agent and the principal.  
An important contribution for the Agency theory has been given by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). The authors, in making attempts to develop a theory of the ownership 
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structure through the analysis of the capital structure of the company (equity and debt 
financing), although rejecting the classical model of the firm as a Black box because 
unable to explain the managerial behaviour in large corporations, argue that the firm can 
be seen as a connection of a set of contracting relationships among individuals, with 
each individual motivated by his own self-interest. 
According to this vision they maintain that firms are simply a legal fiction, which is an 
artificial construct under the law which allows organizations to be treated as individuals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). So the ultimate scope of firms, as a nexus of implicit and 
explicit contracts,  is to put in effect, and so fostering, contracting relationships among 
individuals which are owners, managers, suppliers, customers, creditors and so on. The 
firm is not considered to be a stand-alone individual, but it is a legal fiction which 
serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of 
individuals are brought into equilibrium within the framework of contractual relations. 
So the agency relationship could exist in many different contracts. But why is the 
agency relationship a complex and controversial interaction among agents within the 
firm?  
In addition to the definition of Agency relationship stated above, now it can be better 
defined, using this contracting perspective, as a contract between two (or more) parties 
in which one, designated as the agent- who have the necessary skills, knowledges and 
experience for a specific roles or tasks- acts for, on behalf of or as representative for the 
other, designated as the principal, in a particular domain of decisions problems (Ross, 
1973). So we could derive that examples of agency relationship are universal and that 
all contractual arrangements may contain potential elements of agency.  
Following what has been said until now, the main problem of the agency concept- as 
will be specified later in defining the assumptions of the agency theory- derives 
precisely from this contractual framework. In fact, contract theory literature withstands 
that contracts are incomplete. Oliver Hart and his co-authors (1999), emphasize the 
parties' inability to write complete contingent contracts (i.e. agreements that include 
provisions that would cover all possible events that might occur during bounded 
relationships). Since we have this strong assumption on contracts, agency theory is 
concerned with resolving two agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989)that can occur 
because of this contract incompleteness: (a) the desires or goals of the principal and the 
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agent may conflict and, even more,  it is difficult and expensive for the principal to 
verify what the agent is actually doing, thus if he is acting to satisfy his interests. The 
problem here is that the principal cannot always be in a position to verify (concurrently) 
that the agent is behaving appropriately; this is because this sort of check can definitely 
be easily performed only ex-post. (b) The second is the problem of risk sharing that 
arises when the principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk and this may 
lead the principal and agent alike to undertake different actions, because different are 
their risk preferences.  
Although Eisenhardt in her Review of Agency Theory (1989), as most part of the 
literature of agency, asserts that the information economics is the “cardinal root” of the 
agency theory - even if there could be compelling reasons to believe that contributions 
from neoclassical, behavioural and contact theory are valid too- it has been developed 
along two lines, notwithstanding they share the same unit of analysis which is the 
contract. They are the positive agency theory and the principal-agent theory.  
The focus of the positivist researchers, who follow a less mathematical but more 
descriptive and empirical trajectory, is on identifying situations in which the principal 
and the agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance 
mechanism that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Eisenhardt,1989). They have 
mainly focused on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners 
and managers of large corporations and so, they seem to be the precursor of the agency 
theory since this stream is based on the separation between ownership and control in 
large corporation (Berle & Means, 1932), as stated above. The main authors that can be 
categorized in this stream are Jensen and Meckling (1967) and Fama (1980). From a 
theoretical perspective, the governance mechanism that are identified by the positivist 
are based on two propositions: the first is that the outcome-based contracts are effective 
in curbing agent opportunism, because these types of contracts are able to coalign the 
preferences of the agent with those of the principal, as the reward for both depends on 
same actions (verifiable ex-post). The second proposition is that information systems 
also curb opportunism, since information asymmetry is at the basis of incompleteness of 
contracts and thus of the agency theory. Given that thanks to the information systems 
the principal can be informed about what the agent is actually doing, even if information 
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can never be completely perfect, these systems are likely to curb the agent opportunism 
because he will realize that the principal cannot be cheated anymore. 
Differently from the previous stream, principal-agent researchers are concerned with a 
general theory of the principal agent relationship, a theory that can be applied to 
employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier and other agency relationships 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Here we have a more mathematical bent and a broader focus- which 
contrasts the narrow focus of positivists- on the special case of the owner-manager 
relationship in large corporations. Despite these different approaches we have to say 
that the two streams are complementary: in fact, positive agency theory identifies 
various contract alternatives, while principal-agent theory indicates the most efficient 
contract (behaviour-based or outcome-based) between the principal and the agent under 
different circumstances. Following this course, Eisenhardt (1989) has defined a specific 
number of propositions that categorize situations in which one contract (e.g. 
behavioural-based) is better than the other (e.g. outcome-based).  
Even if the agency literature is divided in these two streams, the most important aspect- 
that will be analysed in the following pages- is that they share common assumptions 
which represent the pillars on which the agency theory stands on. 
1.2.1 The core assumptions of Agency theory 
As it always occurs, in order to give foundation to a theory, authors use to describe a 
series of assumptions which represent the cornerstones of that theory. The agency 
theory is not the exception to this rule. However we need to define those assumptions 
that allow us to understand the agency problem- the problem of inducing an agent to 
behave as if it were maximizing the principal’s welfare- and why it is originated from 
the separation between ownership and control which, alone, is not able to explain the 
agency relationship. 
Since the unit of analysis in the agency framework is the contract governing the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, the focus of the theory is on 
determining the most efficient contract (behaviour-oriented or outcome-oriented) 
between the two parties given some conventions about people, information, 
organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989) and about contracts themselves. 
For what concerns the assumptions on people we have: self-interest, bounded rationality 
and risk aversion conventions. 
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Self-interest is a psychological concept related to the human mental egoism. It affirms 
that individuals are always motivated by self-interest and narcissism because of their 
willing to carry out actions that elicit the most personal benefit. However this should not 
constitute a problem because according to Adam Smith (1776), the father of modern 
economics, the best economic benefit for all can be accomplished when individuals act 
in their own self-interest. His explanation of the invisible hand reveals that when many 
people act in their own self-interest, unintentionally, they generate social benefits to the 
whole market, thus leading the market into a situation of general equilibrium; 
The concept of bounded rationality contrasts the rational choice and the perfect 
information hypothesis typical of the neoclassical economists, including William 
Stanley Jevons, who assume that agents make consumption choices so as to maximize 
their happiness, or utility. However in the real world this is not totally possible because 
when individuals make decisions, their rationality is limited by the available 
information, the tractability of the decision problem (Cyert and March, 1963), the 
cognitive limitations of their minds, and the time available to make the decision. So the 
strong relationship between rationality, contingency and information can be highlighted. 
The main exponent of this human limited rationality is Simon (1955), who emphasizes 
that most people are partly rational and are irrational in the remaining part during the 
decisions-making process hence acting as satisficers, seeking a solution that may satisfy 
their needs, rather than an optimal one (Cyert and March, 1963); 
The assumption of risk aversion is a typical behaviour of humans when they are in a 
situation of uncertainty. However people have different risk preferences (risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-seeker or risk-lover) and according to these, which depend on 
personality and on circumstances, make decisions regarding the actions to be taken. 
Assumptions about information are related primarily to its asymmetric distribution and 
to its commodity features. 
As stated in the prior paragraph, a large part of the agency literature maintains that 
information economics plays an important role for the agency theory so to be 
considered as its roots. 
Much of the literature in information economics was originally inspired by Friedrich 
Hayek (1945), who studied how information and information systems affect an 
economy and economic decisions. Information has special characteristics: it is easy to 
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create but hard to trust and it is easy to spread but hard to control. So it is costly because 
it necessitates ways (instruments) to understand (and thus allowing) it to influence the 
decisions of an individual. However, in the agency relationship, parities often have 
different information of the same topic and this is attributable to the different extent of 
involvement in running the company: surely the owner, once he has delegated the 
decisional authority to the manager, is less incentivized to be strictly involved in the day 
by day operations, which are instead performed by the manager. This asymmetric 
information is a green field for creating agency costs. However it is necessary to say 
that even if the principal would be willing to assume a proactive behaviour in 
monitoring the management to avoid these costs, this would not be totally possible 
because information completeness is expensive and hard to be achieved. So this 
asymmetry causes misinforming and this has a negative impact in the communication 
process firstly and in the decision process later with a consequent effect on the firm’s 
performance.  
Moreover, this information asymmetry is in contrast with perfect information, which is 
a paramount in neoclassical economics- other assumptions are that individuals have 
rational preferences between outcomes and that they maximize their utility (as firms 
maximize their profits)-. In order to overcome this problem, information can be bought, 
thus considering it as a commodity even if, however, buying and selling information is 
not the same as buying and selling other traditional goods. There are three factors that 
make the economics of buying and selling information different from physical goods: 
First of all, information is non-rivalrous, which means that consuming information does 
not exclude someone else from consuming it too. Second, exclusion is not a natural 
property of information goods, in fact, following the non-rivalry concept, it is possible 
to “construct” exclusion only artificially. So, the nature of information is that if it is 
known, it is difficult to exclude others from its use. Third is that the information market 
does not exhibit high degrees of transparency. That is, to evaluate the information, it 
must be known, so you have to invest in learning it to evaluate it, and this may be costly 
(Allen, 1990).  
Goal conflict is the predominant assumption about organizations, which agency 
theorists have formulated. This hypothesis has a strong connection with the assumption 
of self-interest behaviour of humans and is rooted in utility theory- and thus is a 
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neoclassical view- which requires that individuals make choices that maximize their 
own utility. So if both parties in a relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good 
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), mostly when there is strong asymmetric information. As a 
result of this, the main concern of the principal becomes to limit this goal divergence 
via incentive and controlling mechanisms which, however, are not costs exempt.   
The last assumptions on agency theory are related to contracts which are deemed to be 
incomplete and thus allowing problems of risk sharing (this aspect will be explained in 
depth in paragraph 1.2.3 due to its complexity). Contract theory, which can be 
encompassed in information economics, studies how economic actors can and do 
construct contractual arrangements, generally in the presence of asymmetric 
information. The first scholar that has treated formally this topic has been Kenneth 
Arrow in the 1960s. 
Contract theory’s focus is on the completeness of contracts which is related to the 
specification (in the contract) of all the legal consequences of every possible state of the 
world. However in recent years, an important part of the contract literature, pioneered 
by Oliver Hart and his co-authors, have advanced the incomplete contracts viewpoint, 
based on the assumption that parties are unable to write complete contingent contracts, 
and this is true mainly in the agency. 
Hart (1995) argue that in practice, contracts cannot specify what is to be done in every 
possible contingency. The point is that at the time of contracting, future contingencies 
may not be describable. Moreover, parties can never commit themselves to engage in 
mutually beneficial renegotiation later on, in their relationship. Even more it would 
never be possible for the principal to keep away the agent to perform some activities, 
because of the impossibility to include a large variety of provisions in the contract, 
which is aggravated by the information asymmetry. 
As described above an important role is played by the information asymmetry, which is 
the fundamental aspect present in each of these assumptions at the basis of the agency 
theory. 
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Table 1      Agency theory assumptions 
 
1.2.2  Agency problem: an outlook on its costs 
The explanation of the assumptions has been necessary in order to treat in an exhaustive 
and complete way the two remaining aspects of agency theory, that’s to say those 
constituting the so called agency problem. These are the agency costs and the risk 
preferences (these ones will be treated separately in the next subparagraph). 
Once assessed the existence of an agency problem in a cooperative relationship, it 
becomes necessary to know what type of costs this problem implies and under which 
specific circumstance these costs arise. 
As already said, the owner is seen as a principal who contract with and is dependent on 
the actions of the agent (which is the manager). The term “contract” is used to connote 
the agreement between the two subjects and clarifies the rights held by each one during 
this relationship. However, cost may be generated in this relationship , and they are 
called agency costs (Tosi, Gomez-Mejia, 1989), because exists an information 
asymmetry that could give an advantage to one party (agent) in spite of the other 
  
EXPLANATION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
 
THE IDEA 
 
Principal- agent relationship should reflect an efficient organization deriving 
from the separation between ownership and control within the firm.  
 
THE PROBLEM 
 
This relationship leads to inefficiencies because the principal and the agent 
are utility maximizers so they have partly different goals,different risk prefer-
ences and the information asymmetry intensify these individuals’ attitudes. 
They adopt contracts to overcome these problems but… 
 
INDIVIDUAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk preferences (risk averse or risk neutral) 
 
INFORMATION 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Information asymmetry 
Information as a commodity 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Partial conflicting goals 
Firm as nexus of contracts 
 
CONTRACTING 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Delegation of power 
Incompleteness of contracts 
Risk sharing between contracting parties 
Source: adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) 
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(principal) (see Fig.1.). Agency costs are a sort of internal costs borne by the principal 
to limit divergences from his interests, by the establishing an adequate incentive system. 
But he bears other costs, called monitoring costs, in order to reduce the aberrant 
activities of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These monitoring costs do not 
include only those costs involved in measuring or observing the behaviour of the agent, 
but they encompass the costs incurred in appointing a board of directors, in including 
provisions within contracts, in establishing budget restrictions and so on. Another form 
of agency cost is the residual loss, that’s to say the reduction of each unit of money 
experienced by the principal as a welfare loss, due to the divergence of goals. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) sustain that the principal is not the only one that bears those 
agency costs in fact the agent, in some situations, will pay costs to ensure that he will 
not accomplish certain actions that would endanger the principal’s interests or to ensure 
that the principal will be rewarded if he takes those actions. These are called bonding 
costs. 
The extent of agency costs is not equal to all firms but vary among each one. It depends 
on some factors such as the tastes of managers,  and on how easy they can exercise their 
own preferences as opposed to the profit maximization in decision making process. 
Together with these factors, the cost of measuring the agent performance and evaluating 
it, the cost of replacing the manager and the length of the relationship (Eisenhardt, 
1989), affect the scale of agency costs too. 
In this framework, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) see the agency theory as an 
alternative explanation of how owners controls managers to operate the firm in their 
interests, when there is such different informational endowment. But it is impossible for 
the owner to shrink this informative gap with the agent- hence ensuring that he will 
make the optimal decision for the principal- at zero costs and this is because, as 
abovementioned, information is obtained by paying a cost. 
Again here information plays an important role because when there is such information 
asymmetry, the parties of a relationship have different knowledges (e.g. one party has 
more or better information than the other) and this translates into self-interest 
behaviours from the agent, who may take advantage from this situation thus causing 
inefficiency. So agency costs are created in order to surmount this inefficiency. 
Agency Theory literature review: insights and socioemotional wealth understanding 
21 
Examples of the informational problem described above are adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
The adverse selection problem was developed by Akerlof (1970) who analysed the 
market of automobiles and specifically the case of the market of used cars. Later this 
problem was mostly developed in the insurance field.  
In this case, the agent that has the best information has clearly an advantage. We say 
that this advantage is ex-ante because, contrary to moral hazard, the advantage occurs 
before the contract is signed. And this is what happens with the insurance premiums. 
The person asking an insurance coverage is at an advantage versus the insurer, who 
therefore charges a premium for the risk derived from their imperfect information. This 
is also what happens within the agency relation scheme: the agent has some private 
information- from which he takes advantage- before signing the contract with the 
principal.  
The moral hazard problem, instead, determines that the behaviour of the agent changes 
ex-post, after the contract is signed because it can have an advantage in exploiting the 
private information he has. Paul Krugman (2009) refers to moral hazard as “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while 
someone else bears the cost if things go badly”. 
Nevertheless, moral hazard and adverse selection are not the only source of agency 
costs. In fact Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that these particular kinds of costs arise 
when firms try to get financial resources from the market.  So the authors first analyse 
the agency costs of outside equity, and then the agency costs of debt by creating two 
sets of assumptions: permanent assumptions and Temporary assumptions (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p.13) 
For what concerns the effect of outside equity on agency costs, the authors compare the 
behaviour of the owner-manager when he has the 100 percent of the residual claims on 
the firm- which is the right of a shareholder to the profit of a company after the payment 
of all prior obligations, meaning the right over the dividends- with his behaviour when 
he sells a fraction of those rights to outsiders. When he owns 100 percent, the owner-
manager is able to fully maximize his own utility because he is entitled to take egoistic 
decisions, even more satisfying non pecuniary aspects (we will find these when we’ll 
talk about the socioemotional wealth theory) since there are no other owners. 
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If the owner-manager sells a portion of his equity claims on the corporation, agency 
costs will be generated because interests of outside owners (outside shareholders) must 
be considered and definitely satisfied. The agency problem, then, worsens as the owner-
managers fraction of equity falls. This means that his rights on dividend distribution 
lessen and, for this, he is encouraged to appropriate large amounts of corporate 
resources in the form of perquisites, or more explicitly, benefits gained from his 
manager position. Since this situation in sub-optimal for outside shareholders, they 
attempt to reduce this opportunistic behaviour of the owner-manager by monitoring his 
behaviour (through auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions and incentive 
compensation systems) to identify his interests more closely. However this means 
expending economic resources, which correspond to agency costs. 
Nonetheless, this is not the only situation that creates agency costs. In fact an important 
issue to be considered when the owner-manager’s rights to dividend falls, is that his 
incentives to bestow effort to create activities, such as searching out new profitable 
ventures, falls (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This may happen because the owner-
manager has no more the same power of before, so he may lose those incentives that a 
prior pivotal position gave to him. 
Suppose that the owner-manager wants to reduce the incurrence of agency costs since 
doing so, the firm’s efficiency upsurge and as a consequence, its value too. To do this 
he has to expend resources to guarantee to the outside equity holders that he would limit 
those activities that pursue his own interests. These expenditures are the 
abovementioned bonding costs, which encompass contractual guarantees to have 
financial accounts audited by a public account, explicit bonding against malfeasance on 
the part of the manager, and contractual limitations on the manager’s decision-making 
power.  
The result that we obtain through bonding costs is the same of that related to the 
monitoring ones: we have a reduction of the agency problem, which represents a 
corporate inefficiency, with a person (the manager or the shareholder) that bears them. 
Despite the hypothetical result is this one, the reduced value of the firm caused by the 
owner-manager’s consumption of perquisites is inefficient only when we take into 
account a world in which we could obtain compliance of the agent to the principal’s 
wishes at zero costs or in comparison to a theoretical world in which agency costs were 
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lower or inexistent. So we can conclude that information symmetry is never perfect and, 
for this, there is argument to sustain that agency costs are an unavoidable result of the 
agency relationship and that through monitoring and bonding activities a firm attempts 
to improve its efficiency. 
By exploring this particular corporate structure- the limited liability- and seeing that 
costs associated with agency relationships are unavoidable, one could ask why this 
organizational form of financing is so widely spread, although debt financing does not 
allow other investors to join the business. In this way, there will be only a single owner 
manager and so the inefficiency (costs) associated with the agency problem will be no 
more there. Despite this, as underlined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), diffuse-owner 
corporate firm financed by equity claims are prevalent as organizational form and there 
must be compelling reasons for this, which goes beyond the sole limited liability 
justification.  
Following all that has been said until now on agency costs, companies should be 
financed mainly by debt and so by borrowing money but, however, the two authors 
sustain that there are a number of reasons for not choosing this latter alternative: (1) the 
incentive effects associated with highly leveraged firms, (2) the monitoring costs these 
incentive effects engender and (3) bankruptcy costs. All these costs can be defined as 
particular kind of agency costs which are associated with the existence of debt claims on 
the firm. 
The incentive effects associated with debt are related to the impact that a completely 
debt financed firm have on the owner-manager’s behaviour. With this type of financial 
structure he is incentivized to engage in investments which promise very high payoffs if 
they turn out to be successful, despite they have very low probability of success : if they 
success, the owner-manager capture the greatest part of the success, while in the 
opposite case, the most of the costs are borne by the creditors. 
The second reason that makes firms financed mainly by equity claims are the 
monitoring and bonding expenditures. Bondholders, to protect themselves from the 
incentive effects that debt financing have on the manger’s behaviour, they include 
various covenants and provisions in contracts. These, nevertheless, must be absolutely 
detailed in order to wrap most operating aspect of the enterprise, including limitations to 
undertake risky actions. The costs of those covenants, however, are not trivial because 
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management is a dynamic and ongoing decision-making process, whose all possible 
implications cannot be anticipated within provisions. 
Bankruptcy is the third major component of the agency costs associated with debt. It 
occurs when the firm cannot meet a current payment , a debt obligation, or when one or 
more of the other provisions providing for bankruptcy is not respected by the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this case debtholders’ claims on the firm are lost and so 
they bear the costs associated with the difference between the face value of the debt and 
the market value of the firm. Obviously if, in this case, the face value of the debt and the 
market value of the firm were equal, bankruptcy would have not any cost. 
The agency costs associated with debt lately discussed tend to discourage the exclusive 
use of corporate debt, thus fostering mainly the use of equity financing structure. 
 
Figure 1    Description of the Agency problem 
 
 
1.2.3 Agency perspective on risk 
As stated in the subparagraph related to the assumptions, the matter of risk is really 
complex and has been studied a lot in the agency literature. The concept of risk became 
important during the 60s and early 70s, when economists of the calibre of Arrow, 
Source: personal elaboration of the Agency relationship 
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explored the risk sharing among individual or groups (Eisenhardt, 1989). This literature 
described the risk-sharing problem as one that occurs when two or more cooperating 
parties have different attitudes toward risk, because they prefer to bear different degree 
of risk in making choices. Later, agency theorists have enlarged this risk-sharing 
concept to include the agency problem that, as already anticipated, occurs when 
cooperating parties have different goals. 
Starting from the model used before to describe the existence of minority shareholders 
and bondholders in the capital structure of the firm, it implicitly assumes that an owner-
manager has invested all his money in the firm. This is because it is clear that to apply 
for outside forms of founding the owner-manager’s wealth must not be available 
anymore to be injected in the firm. So the problems of risk bearing and risk preferences 
in agency relationship, are anchored on the specific situation in which an individual has 
all is wealth invested in the firm and so all his prosperity is related to the firm 
performance, with this situation not true for another individual. Before clarifying this 
aspect it is necessary to specify the notion of risk.  
In classical risk theory, risk is commonly conceived as a variation in the distribution of 
possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their subjective values (March and Shapira, 
1987). So the concept of risk is embedded in the larger idea that choice is affected by 
the expected return of an alternative. Usually theories on choices, sustain that people, in 
making decisions prefer choices that provide larger expected returns to smaller ones, 
assuming the risk as a constant. When the risk is not a constant but is a variable that 
have to be taken into account, people formulate some risk preferences. 
Risk preference identifies the tendency of an individual to choose a risky or less risky 
option. Generally, this concept of risk preference is often applied to investors and to the 
market dynamics related to securities, although the main field in which this notion is 
operated is in agency relationships.  
Despite it is possible that risk preference - and so attitudes toward risk - may be a stable 
feature of an individual personality, there are different variables that can affect it. These 
can be, for example, mood, feelings, way in which problems are framed (which is a 
cornerstone of the behavioural agency model), experience and the context in which the 
individual find itself in the moment of the decision. The point is that there is always a 
A Study of Family Firms: context and theories 
26 
trade-off between risk and expected returns which individuals have to take into account 
when they formulate their own preferences. 
The literature on risk recognizes three main “inclinations” of individuals in expressing a 
choice: risk seeking/ risk lover preferences, risk neutral preferences and risk averse 
preferences. 
A risk seeking/ lover preference can be applied to a person who is willing to take higher 
risks to achieve above-average returns. The person making this type of decision should 
weigh all the factors involved in the risk and assess these risks against the probabilities 
of different outcomes. These people are those who prefer gambles over secure 
investments or choices, meaning that they prefer relatively high risks sacrificing some 
expected returns in order to increase the variation (March and Shapira, 1987). 
An individual with risk-neutral preference does not care about the risks involved in the 
decision making. His only concern is about the end result. A risk-neutral individual will 
choose the assets with the highest possible gains or returns without taking into account 
possible outcomes. This means that for him the risk variable acts as a constant that 
allow him to choose only by taking in to account the highest outcome. 
A person who is reluctant to take on a risk is risk averse. This kind of personality 
almost always chooses the safer investment instead of taking a chance on the probability 
of failure. Risk averse decision makers prefer relatively low risks and are willing to 
sacrifice some expected return in order to reduce the variation in possible outcomes 
(March and Shapira, 1987) so, differently from the risk lover individual, he dislikes 
gambling and searches for the safest decision. 
As maintained by Eisenhardt (1989) the assumption on risk, within the agency 
perspective, is that the principal and the agent have different risk preferences. These 
different preferences are the main reason why parties may have conflicting goals even if 
they cooperate within the same organization. Surely the presence of the asymmetric 
information aggravates this “distance” among parties, hence creating agency costs. 
It is assumed, by agency supporters, that the principal is risk neutral while the agent is 
risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989), and this is a strong assumption which is influenced 
mainly by portfolio theory. 
The argument behind this assumption is that agents, who are unable to diversify their 
employment, should be risk averse and principals, who are capable of diversifying their 
Agency Theory literature review: insights and socioemotional wealth understanding 
27 
investments, should be risk neutral. This is consistent with portfolio theory which 
maintains that the optimal portfolio (i.e. the one that has an optimal allocation of risk for 
any investor) is likely to be diversified across the securities of many firms (Fama, 
1980).    
According to this idea, stockholders (in the case of an equity financed firm) or the 
owner in general, can achieve the desired level of risk through portfolio diversification. 
Their main concern is to avoid having all their wealth entirely dependent on one firm 
and this is done by diversifying their investment. 
On the other hand managers rent a substantial lump of wealth from the firm (Fama, 
1980) which is the only source of their revenues. Since the manager’s prosperity is tied 
to the firm performance, there is a compelling reason to believe that they will choose 
actions that will have a positive impact on firm performance (or conservative actions) in 
order to increase (preserve) their wealth. This is because the manager of a firm may not 
suffer any immediate gain or loss in current wages from the current performances of the 
firm, but the success or the failure of the firm impacts his future wages, which represent 
his wealth. For all these arguments it is evident how risk preferences are different 
between the principal and the agent: the former does not care about risk because is able 
to diversify his wealth, while the latter is not able to diversify and so he becomes risk 
averse and this, finally, creates agency costs. 
March and Shapira (1987) compared the theoretical conceptions of risk studied by 
decision theory, and the conceptions of risk held by executives (which are the agents in 
the agency theory). The end result of their work is that managers take risks and exhibit 
risk preference through a process which is different from the classical process of 
choosing among alternative actions in quantitative terms, that’s to say in terms of mean 
(expected value) and variance (risk) of the probability distributions of possible 
outcomes. In fact they assume that managers are quite insensitive to estimates of the 
probabilities of possible outcomes; actually their decisions are mainly affected by the 
way their attention is focused on critical performance targets (March and Shapira, 
1987). 
They have based their work on the studies conducted by MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1986) (who proposed questionnaires in 1973-1974 to 509 high-level executives in 
Canadian and American firms) and those of Shapira (on managerial perceptions of risk, 
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conducted between 1984- 1985). In order to affirm that manager see risk differently 
from what the decision theory says, they have found three dissimilarities: first, most 
managers do not deal with uncertainty about positive outcomes, but possibilities for 
gain are of primary significance in assessing the attractiveness of alternatives and risk is 
seen as associated with negative outcomes (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986). 
Second, for the interviewed managers, risk is not only a probability concept, but a 
majority felt that risk could be better defined in terms of amount to lose (or expected to 
be lost) than in probabilistic terms (March and Shapira, 1987). 
Third, even if probability is used in discussing risk and managers base their decisions on 
information which are precisely based on risk estimates, many of them reject the option 
to reduce risk to a mere quantitative analysis.. 
In other words, managers have a negative attitude toward risk taking (risk aversion) 
because they interpret risk not much in terms of the magnitude weighted by its 
likelihood (unpredictability of outcomes), but rather in terms of the potential and the 
magnitude of a projected loss (costs) (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986). 
 
 Table 2 Comparison between the two conceptions of risk 
Source: personal elaboration inspired from Amihud and Lev (1981) 
CONCEPTION OF RISK HELD BY EXECUTIVES RISK IN CLASSICAL DECISION THEORY 
 
Let’s consider a situation in which a manager of a firm is facing two alternative projects, X1 and X2, 
which  have identical expected return but the risk associated with X1 is smaller than X2 
 
In this case the manager will prefer X1 since he is 
risk averse. This means that if he evaluates the risk 
in terms of something to lose, less risk means less 
wealth to be lost 
 
In this case the manager is indifferent between 
the two alternatives, since here the concept of 
risk is mainly affected by the expected return of 
an alternative, and the two alternatives give the 
same expected return 
 
Now let the expected return of X1 be smaller than that of X2. Even if X1 is still less risky than X2, how-
ever, choosing X1 would also mean bearing some opportunity cost 
 
In this case the manager choice is unclear since he 
is facing a trade-off between risk and return. The 
manager, however, may chose X1 when the avoid-
ance of loss (or increase in his income) due to risk 
reduction outweighs the reduction in his certainty 
equivalent outcome due to smaller expected return 
of project X1 
 
In this case the manager choice is clear: he will 
prefer X2 since it has an expected value which 
is higher than X2 and this means that X2 has a 
higher probability, with respect to X1, to give a 
greater outcome 
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This “reverse way of risk thinking” is important because has opened new path for 
exploring the decision making process of managers and how they frame problems, 
which is the main concern of the behavioural agency model, but I will talk later about 
this in paragraph 1.3. 
Still remaining under the agency theory umbrella, one could ask why a great part of the 
agency literature has devoted effort in order to study the risk phenomenon. How can the 
risk contribute to determine organizational inefficiencies (i.e. due to agency costs)?  
This “different” risk conception of managers - defined in terms of amount to lose - 
supported by March-Shapira and MacCrimmon-Wehrung can be found also in a 
precedent work developed by Amihud and Lev (1981). These two authors maintain that 
conglomerate mergers, which are a way through which a firm can diversify, are used 
with the purpose of reducing risk for an organization. Although this is true, however, 
this is not beneficial for stockholders (principals) in perfect markets, because since they 
are risk neutral, they can diversify directly on their own by managing their portfolio of 
stocks, hence choosing the preferred level of risk to bear. Even with market 
imperfections the benefits for owners deriving from conglomerate mergers seem to be 
questionable. But if this is the situation, that would create costs inexorably, why 
conglomerate mergers- and diversification in general- are put in place? Because of the 
agency problem that stem from managers’ risk aversion assumption. 
As stated above, managers’ (agents) income that derives from the employment in a 
specific firm, constitutes the major- if not the only- portion of their wealth. The critical 
aspect of this scenario is that income is closely related to the firm’s performance 
through profit-sharing schemes, bonuses and, sometimes, through the value of stock 
options held by the manager as incentive form (Amihud and Lev, 1986). Hence it is 
understandable that the risk associated with a manager’s income is closely related to the 
firm’s risk (performance).When a firm fails to reach the planned performance targets or 
is too much financed by debts hence collapsing in bankruptcy, the result is that the 
manager may lose his employment and so his main source of wealth. From this Amihud 
and Lev sustain that such “employment risk” cannot be diversified by managers in their 
personal portfolio, as stockholder may do, differently, in the case of firm’s low 
performance. A way to diversify their wealth could be by having many employers to 
work for, but this is an absurdity, firstly because there’s not the physical chance for a 
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manager to do this in a corporate context and second because this supposes that the 
labour market is completely perfect functioning.  
Since this option is not concretely feasible, managers are intended to be risk averse and 
so they are expected to diversify their employment risk in another manner, that is to say 
by engaging their firms in conglomerate mergers which, as sustained at the beginning, 
generally stabilize the income stream of the firm and consequently, that of managers. 
This implies that the main reason at the basis of conglomerate mergers- and 
diversification in general- is that managers are loss averse more than risk averse with 
respect to their employment - losing job means losing their wealth -. This way of 
diversifying- induced by the managers’ behaviour- is not easy to be distinguished from 
synergistical mergers and acquisitions (by stockholders), and this generates the agency 
problem with the annex costs for solving it, which are borne by both the principal and 
the agent. 
Summarizing what has been said up to now, we have that: first, since managers are 
utility maximizers, there’s a compelling reason to expect them to engage in risk 
reduction activities in order to diversify their employment risk. Those activities, 
however, might be in conflict with the interests of the stockholders (owners) and this 
creates agency (costs) problem (Amihud and Lev, 1986). Second, since contracts are 
essentially incomplete, it would be difficult for stockholders to foresee such 
opportunistic behaviours of managers and, since there is the asymmetric information 
variable, they are not able to distinguish between the risk reduction and synergistic 
motives for a potential merger or acquisition. 
Since previously has been recognized that the magnitude of agency costs is not equal 
for all the firms, now we can include this managers’ loss aversion among the already 
mentioned reasons that allow this agency costs unevenness. According to this way of 
thinking, all firms in which there is the separation between management and control 
should have this specific agency problem, but it is reasonable to say that managers can 
exercise their risk preferences differently across firms, so two categories of firms can be 
recognized: management-controlled and owner-controlled firms. 
In management-controlled firms the ownership is widely dispersed across many 
stockholders. Big public corporations that are listed are part of this category. Here 
managers are relatively free to exercise their own discretion, thus their risk preferences, 
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because the greater risk is borne by stockholders who do not have enough power to 
contrast managers. Owner-controlled firms, instead, encompasses all those firms where 
the ownership is concentrated – for Amihud and Lev the threshold is up to 10%) and for 
this, the owner-stockholder is able to exert a strict control over the managers’ decisions, 
retaining the rights to hire, fire and set the compensation of executives (Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989). In these firms owners, often are also involved in the management 
of the company thus having the complete knowledge of management’s activities. This 
reduces agency costs related to the monitoring activities put in practice in order to 
prevent risk avoidant choices of managers. Empirical results obtained by Amihud and 
Lev (1986) confirm what said above, that is to say that management controlled firms 
engage in more conglomerate acquisitions (or more diversification in general) than 
owner controlled firms.  
Figure 2    Summary on the risk concept 
 
 Source: personal elaboration
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Agreeing with those results, one can think that those firms in which agency cost appear 
the most are manger-controlled. Despite this argument is as much valid as obvious, a 
part of the agency literature is doubtful about the low level of agency costs in owner-
controlled firms and this is still an open debate. 
 
1.3 Behavioural Agency model, a new perspective or an agency 
review?  
The choice of discussing about risk in agency theory as a final argument has been made 
in order to create a ceaseless speech with the behavioural agency model, because the 
risk is a pivotal variable mostly in this theoretical approach. 
With the intent of determining how executives face the risk taking problem, Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia (1998) have enlarged and enriched the agency-based perspective on 
risk. 
In fact the authors sustain that the formulation of risk in the agency theory perspective 
has been too restrictive and this has prevented a fuller understanding on how executives 
make decisions and how they frame problems (or situations) in making such decisions. 
Another critique that they have formulated is that agency scholars assume stable risk 
preferences and this ultimately limits the agency theory’s contribution in explaining 
how managerial risk taking affects firm performances (Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia, 
1998). To overcome these limitations, these scholars sustain that agents have risk 
preferences – as in the agency theory - and that they use a contingent approach from 
behavioural research on risk taking, to allow a possible variation of agents’ risk 
preferences (e.g., increasing or decreasing risk aversion) in a corporate governance 
context. 
The starting point of this new approach is, however, the agency theory. As already said, 
agency theory sees the principal-agent relationship as a conflicting one. This is because 
the two parties have conflicting goals because of conflicting risk preferences that stem 
from the fact that they are utility maximizers. Principals are assumed to be is risk-
neutral for firm actions, because they can diversify their shareholdings across different 
firms. Contrarily agents are assumed to be risk averse ( as mentioned in the paragraph 
1.2.3) in decisions regarding the firm (i.e. joining conglomerate mergers) because they 
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attempt to reduce the performance risk of the firm (and thus the risk on their income) 
even if this creates costs for the principal due to this opportunistic behaviour. 
Nevertheless, Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia affirm, also considering other streams than 
agency theory such as behavioural theory of the firm (Kahneman and Traversky, 1979; 
Cyert and March, 1963), that exist a more complex relation between performance and 
managers’ choices of risk than that described by agency . In sum, the agency theory 
contribution to corporate governance has been limited by its simplistic assumptions of 
consistent risk aversion among agents. Thus what the two authors have tried to do is to 
overcome these limitations through the contribution of behavioural decision models in 
executive risk taking. 
Scholars of behavioural models of decisions advance that risk preferences of decision 
makers, as their risk taking behaviour, change in accordance on how they frame 
problems. Conversely, agency theorists assume that decision makers formulate their 
choices simply according to the rational expectation and utility theory- that have been 
already analysed- without considering the importance of how the problem is framed.  
In behavioural decision models, agents take decisions by making a comparison between 
anticipated outcomes from available options and a reference point which can be, for 
example, their wealth or their employment. After this evaluation, decision makers could 
frame problems positively that occur when available options, with a certain level of risk 
and returns, promise acceptable expected values. Negatively framed problems, instead, 
occur when available options generally promise unacceptable expected results 
(Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The most important aspect here is that in framing 
the problem, the decision-maker makes a comparison between outcome and reference 
point. A reference point can be defined as a fact or element forming the basis of an 
evaluation or assessment, in our case it can be the current wealth, the aspiration of the 
manager or, as sustained by Amihud and Lev (1981), his employment. Having in mind 
these points for framing problems, as gain or loss, behavioural models predict that 
decision makers (agents in our case) exhibit risk averse preferences when selecting 
among positively framed problems and exhibit risk seeking preferences when selecting 
among identical but negatively framed problems (Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
This way of framing and deciding appears, however, to be opposite to what it should be 
for a normal decision maker, that is to say that when problems are negatively framed he 
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should exhibit risk averse preferences and when problems are positively framed, the 
decision maker should exhibit risk neutral preferences. We will return to this point 
because it is really interesting and peculiar.  
What stems out of this shift of preferences between the two ways of framing problems 
is the concept of loss aversion- which is different from the classical risk conception-, 
already mentioned in the previous paragraph. This concept is based on the decision-
maker’s (executives) willingness to avoid losses (e.g. loosing their wage), even if this 
means accepting higher risk for the firm. Loss averse agents are particular sensitive to 
loosing wealth than to increasing it, and this is the same aspect described by March and 
Shapira  (1987, pg 1407) ten years before but under the agency perspective.  
So this loss aversion framework (which is at the basis of the Behavioural Agency 
model) suggests that risk preferences of loss averse decision makers will vary with the 
framing of problems, in order to prevent or reverse losses and thus preserving their 
utility. 
Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia (1998) affirm that “risk bearing”- which is the perception 
that an agent have on his wealth that can result from employment risk (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981) or other threats to his wealth - may have a mediation role in the problem 
framing process. This risk perception (together with loss aversion) is at the basis of the 
problem framing process and on the related risk preferences. It is what justifies the 
apparently opposite risk preferences formulation, according to this theory, when 
problems are structured. In fact under positively framed problems - when facing gains- 
decision makers perceive more risk to wealth since now they have something to lose 
(employment, salary, and so on). Differently, when they construct a problem negatively 
(because they are facing a loss condition), they perceive less risk to wealth since it is 
already lost. In this case their preference is to be neutral to risk because there is nothing 
more to lose and this is the same concept expressed by March and Shapira (1986). 
By extending this Behavioural Agency theory perspective in the principal-agent setting 
applied when describing risk according to agency - according to which the wealth (and 
so risk neutrality) of the agent depends on the firm performance – it can be said that on 
the extent to which executives’ wealth is impacted by firm performance, they are likely 
to perceive more risk to personal wealth (risk bearing) under conditions of gain, but less 
risk to that wealth under conditions of loss. This counterintuitive argument provides a 
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cognitive explanation for why the framing of problems as losses or gains may influence 
a decision-maker’s risk preferences (Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
Even if the authors sustain that their contribution is aimed to overcome the limitations 
of agency theory, the same construct can be found in March and Shapira (1987). In this 
case the authors refer to a situation in which performance targets are met or not, still 
taking into account the risk (loss) aversion of the agent. The authors talk about the 
performance target of the manager, but since they are only measurable in terms of firm 
results, one can expect - and deduce from their paper - to have the same reasoning 
applied to firm performances.  In general, if firm performances are above the target 
planned by the manager (as in positively framed problem), his primary focus is on 
avoiding actions that may place the firm below it. The point is that the dangers of falling 
more below the performance target reached, dominates the attention of the agent. The 
risk perception here determines a risk averse behaviour of the manager but since there is 
something to loose (e.g., the revenues coming from this above performance target in the 
form of rewards) he is, in a certain sense, loss averse. 
For agents who experience or expect firm performance below the target, the desire to 
reach it focuses the attention in a way that leads generally to risk taking behaviours (as 
in the case of negatively framed problems). This is because the opportunities for gaining 
or reaching the target receive more attention than dangers. So if the firm performance is 
above the survival point the attention of the manager will be focused on preferring less 
risky alternatives because in this way they do not loose what they already have. If, 
instead, the firm performance is really close to the survival point, the emphasis is on 
more risky alternative, since there is more to lose than to gain. (March and 
Shapira,1987). 
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Table 3         Comparison of the concept of risk aversion between Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia; 
and March and Shapira 
 
    
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Risk taking is affected by 
the relation between cur-
rent position and some crit-
ical reference points 
 
 
Concluding can be said that even  if supporters of the behavioural agency model sustain 
that this model has been created in order to overcome the agency limitations with the 
contribution of the behavioural decision theory, it seems that this model - our main 
focus is on the first proposition developed by Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia (1998) - has 
“grasped” some agency fundamentals on risk already analysed by March and Shapira on 
one side and by Amhud and Lev on the other side, revising them into a more 
behavioural perspective, without leading to a complete twist of the agency theory.  
This conclusion has important implication mostly for the main argument of family 
businesses which is the Socioemotional wealth, considering that it is deemed to be 
rooted in the behavioural agency model. 
 
 
RISK 
AVERSION 
IDEA 
 
WISEMANN AND GOMEZ- MEJIA (1998) 
  
RISK AVERSION 
IDEA 
 
MARCH AND SHAPIRA 
(1987) 
 
 
POSITIVELY 
FRAMED 
PROBLEMS 
 
Under conditions of expected gain 
(with respect to their reference point 
e.g. salary), managers perceive 
more risk to wealth since now they 
have something to lose so they be-
come risk averse, or even better,  
loss averse 
  
 
WHEN THINGS ARE 
GOING WELL 
 
The interviewed manag-
ers believe that fewer 
risks should, and would, 
be taken when things are 
going well 
 
 
 
 
NEGATIVELY 
FRAMED 
PROBLEMS 
 
When facing a loss condition (with 
respect to their reference point, e.g. 
salary), managers perceive less risk 
to wealth, since they perceive that it 
is already lost so they take more 
risk 
  
 
WHEN THINGS ARE 
GOING BAD 
 
The interviewed manag-
ers expect to take riskier 
choice when the organi-
zation is failing 
 
Source: personal elaboration taken from Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia; and March and Shapira  
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Table 4      Agency theory assumptions vs. Behavioural Agency theory assumptions 
 AGENCY THEORY BEHAVIOURAL AGENCY THEORY 
 
 
IDEA 
 
Agents tend toward opportunism 
because have interests which are 
different from those of the princi-
pals, this occur unless they are very 
closely monitored and significantly 
incentivized to act in the interests of 
shareholders 
 
Agents have interests which are 
different from those of the princi-
pals but the agents’ risk prefer-
ences are displayed through his or 
her choice behaviour on behalf of 
the firm and these choices hold 
implications for the firm perfor-
mance and the agent’s employ-
ment and compensation 
  
ASSUMPTIONS ON THE 
AGENT 
 
Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk preference: risk averse  
 
Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk preferences: risk averse, risk 
neutral or risk seeker 
 
ASSUMPTIONS ON THE 
PRINCIPAL 
 
Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk preferences or risk neutral 
 
We apply those of the agency 
since the Behavioural agency con-
cerns only agents 
 
 
ASSUMPTIONS ON RISK 
BEARING OF MANAGERS 
 
The manager (agent is deem to be 
always risk neutral since he cannot 
diversify). However, the extent to 
which executives’ wealth is impact-
ed by firm performance, they are 
likely to perceive more risk to per-
sonal wealth (risk bearing) so they 
join conglomerate mergers 
 
The manager (agent) may have 
risk-averse preferences when 
problems are framed positively 
risk-seeking preferences when 
problems are framed negatively 
 
 
PROBLEM FRAMING 
 
Agency theorists assume that deci-
sion makers formulate their choices 
simply according to the rational ex-
pectation and utility theory- without 
considering the importance of how 
the problem is framed (but March 
and Shapira seem to “introduce” the 
concept of loss aversion) 
 
In behavioural agency model, The 
most important aspect is that in 
framing the problem, the decision-
maker makes a comparison be-
tween outcome and a reference 
point and then takes risks accord-
ingly. So they take risks taking into 
account the loss aversion with re-
spect to their reference point 
 
 
THE ARGUMENT  
 
Decision-makers (executives) are willing to avoid losses (e.g. loosing their 
wage), even if this means accepting higher risk for the firm. Loss averse 
agents are particular sensitive to loosing wealth than to increasing it, and 
this is the same aspect described by March and Shapira  (1987, pg 1407) 
but under the agency perspective 
Source: personal elaboration inspired from March and Shapira, 1987 and Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998 
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1.4 Family firms: a governance “panacea” for agency costs? 
What has been written until now on Agency theory is what the literature calls the 
“Jensen and Meckling model on agency theory”. As already mentioned this model, also 
considering the works of Berle and Means (1932) and Fama (1980), views the Limited 
liability concept - a corporate structure that allows the separation between ownership 
and control - as the most efficient way to manage the company. This is not only because 
there it allows a better division of labour and attribution of responsibility, but mainly 
because if shareholders had a full liability with respect to the debt of a company, only 
few individuals would join a company. Despite this, the efficiency assumed for the 
limited liability construct is obscured by the opportunity of self-serving (opportunistic 
behaviours) for managers, thus by the agency problem. As stated above to overwhelm 
this agency problem (goal conflict, different risk preferences and information 
asymmetry) existing between the manager (agent) and the owner (principal) agency 
costs (in the form of incentives and monitoring activities) are borne by this one.  
By saying this, Shulze et al. (2001 and 2003) affirms that the focal assumption in the 
Jensen and Meckling model is that the separation of ownership and control is the main 
source of agency costs and that, as a consequence, the more concentrated ownership and 
control are- as in owner-managed firms- the lesser are these agency costs. 
Likewise, Amihud and Lev (1986) in describing the motivations that lead companies to 
join conglomerate mergers, they maintain that in management-controlled firms (those in 
which the separation of the ownership and control is emphasized) agents are quite free 
to exercise their discretion and pursue their own preferences. This contrasts with owner-
controlled firms (in which the owner-stockholder is able to exert a strict control over the 
managers’ decisions) where owners could also have an active role in the management, 
thus knowing all about the managers’ activities. This implies that in the second 
typology of firms agency costs are less because there is a better alignment among the 
manager and owner’s interests and in this category of firms can be encompassed family 
owned and managed firms. Before going further it is necessary to analyse what family 
businesses are. According to Miller, Le-Breton Miller (2007), Family firms are those in 
which multiple members of the same family are involved as major owners or managers, 
either contemporaneously or over time. Within this framework it is clear that the family 
is able to influence the firm and they do this through their ownership control, their 
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managerial participation, the strategic preferences of shareholders, and the culture and 
the values that family shareholders impart to the firm. So what differentiate family firms 
from management-controlled firms are the intentions, values and strategy-influencing 
interaction of owners who are members of the same family (Poza, E, 2009).  
Despite Family-owned firms account for approximately 90 percent of all incorporated 
businesses in the United Sates, they represent approximately the 80 percent of all 
companies in Spain and France and the 90 percent of all the companies in Italy, India 
and Latin America, this phenomenon has been understudied in the past. For this it has 
been deemed by agency theorists, until recent years, that family firms are composed by 
simple and less complex organizational structures that nullify those agency costs 
deriving from monitoring the agents (Shulze et al, 2001). 
The point is that the Jensen and Meckling model on agency theory suggests that agent- 
principals such as family member-CEOs of family firms incur reduced costs due to the 
alignment of their interests with those of other owners, and thus will outperform agents 
who are at arm’s length from principals (Fama and Jensen, 1983), that is to say 
management-controlled firms. 
In sum, agency theorists argue that agents always tend to opportunism unless they are 
very closely monitored and significantly incentivized to act in the best interests of 
shareholders (Miller, Le Breton Miller, et al., 2014). Following this logic, it can be 
underlined that since family managers (or CEO) are also shareholders of their firms, 
their interest are aligned with those of the other owners and so with those of the other 
family members. In the case of non-family managers (or non-family CEO) things, 
however, do not change since family members are involved in the management of the 
company and for this they are able to closely monitor and influence them. It seems that 
classical agency theorists conceive firms only under two perspectives: the stewardship 
perspective- that sees family owners and managers acting ad farsighted stewards of their 
business (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2011) - that, according to them, dominates 
family-controlled firms and in contrast to this one, there is agency theory that can be 
mainly found in the management-controlled firms. Is it really like this? What about the 
concept of loss aversion mentioned when discussing about the Behavioural agency 
theory (paragraph 1.3)? Let’s see now how things change under this perspective. 
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Behavioral agency theorists predict something more than what Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) proposed about risk taking which, they maintain, is a function of existing 
endowments (reference points). In fact, a family CEO (or family managers in general) 
in order to preserve the socioemotional wealth - which refers to nonfinancial aspects or 
“affective endowments” of family owners (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickell, 
Jacobson and Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) - they derive from their business, will eschew 
intelligent business risks and thus sacrificing economic performance. Socioemotional 
goals include preserving control of the firm for the family, hiring family managers, 
using business resources and avoiding risk-bearing initiatives to reach these goals 
(Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta and Pittino, 2014). Following this idea, 
family CEOs or family managers, in general, have an incentive to pursue more these 
SEW objectives at the expenses of economic performances, since they are driven by 
altruism toward the family, which - for Shulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) - is the aspect 
that creates agency costs also in family firms, given that the agency relationship in these 
organizations are embedded in the parent-child relationship found in the household. 
These authors posit that altruism induces parents to care for their children, encourages 
family members to be considerate of one another, and fosters loyalty and commitment to 
the family and firm. Under this perspective of altruism, it is reasonable to believe that 
family firms have not agency costs and that, furthermore, a stewardship (fare un box 
sulla stewardship)  perspective can be adopted as Jensen and Meckling model seems to 
implicitly sustain. But what contradicts this as justifiable as questionable assumption, is 
that altruism, despite its benefits, has a negative side too. In fact it can give both parents 
and children incentive to take actions that can threaten the welfare of the family and the 
firm alike (Shulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003). The thing is that according to the 
abovementioned authors, agency relationships in family firs are embedded - this concept 
of embeddedness is sustained mainly by Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2011) - by the 
past on going parent-child relationship which is characterized by altruism. Altruism 
makes each member employed by the family- as a birthright- a de facto owner of the 
firm and for this they act to pursue self-interest also in the form of privileges, 
perquisites and other altruistic transfers.  
Shulze et al.(2003) say that, in harmony with agency theory, ownership should align the 
interests among family agents toward growth opportunities and risk thereby reducing 
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the cost of reaching, monitoring, and enforcing agreements. Thus, there should be little 
need to monitor family agent performance. 
Altruism should also increase communication and cooperation within the family firm 
thereby reducing information asymmetries among family agents and increase their use 
of informal agreements. Finally, altruism should create a heightened sense of 
interdependence among family agents, since employment links their welfare directly to 
firm performance. In short, the agency benefits of altruism should be pronounced in 
family firms. However, agency problems rooted in altruism are the entrenchment- 
which occurs when managers gain so much power that they are able to use the firm to 
foster their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders- and the self-control- 
which arise whenever parties involved into a contract have both the incentive and the 
ability to take actions that put in danger themselves and those around them. These are 
exacerbated when the privileges of ownership place control of the firm’s resources at 
the CEO’s or family managers’ discretion. This broadens their capacity to make 
altruistic transfers (like employment, perquisites, and privileges), and entitles family 
members to benefits that would not have been received if they were employed 
elsewhere. These privileges can create a variety of agency costs (Shulze, let al., 2003). 
First, they increase the need to monitor the work of family agents, and this is because 
their hire is determined more for their family membership, rather than their professional 
qualifications. So, as in the case of management-controlled firms, altruism exposes 
family firms to adverse selection which is the agency threat associated with lack of 
ability as opposed to lack of effort (moral hazard). Again here to overwhelm this 
problem, agency costs in the form of monitoring activity are generated.  
Second, altruism reduces the owners’ ability to effectively monitor and discipline family 
agents. This occurs because altruism systematically biases the family owners’ or family 
CEOs’ perceptions and hence the information that they filter and process, about 
employed children- this is the reason why it is often hard for family firms to 
professionalize-.  
Moreover, altruism reduces the effectiveness of a family CEO’s supervision because 
family agents, since they well know how to behave toward family members, tend to free 
ride on the CEO whenever the responsibilities of this one and of the family agent 
overlap (this overlapping problem will be treated deeply in the paragraph 2.6) 
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Finally, the CEO’s ability to discipline family agents is compromised by the potential 
damage that such action might have on familial relationships inside the firm and among 
the extended family outside the firm. 
Concluding differently from what agency theorists says on family firms, a different 
proposition can be deducted as sustained by Shulze et al.(2003): the desire to maximize 
family welfare can compel family firm CEOs, or owner-managers in general, to take 
actions that create agency costs. However, because altruism compromises the owners’ 
ability to monitor and discipline family agents, these authors have found that the 
majority of U.S. family firms offer to employed family members short and long term 
performance-based incentive pay. Consequently, and contrary to the prediction of 
agency models that do not account for altruism, family ownership does not appear to 
represent the kind of governance panace - for agency costs - that Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and later Fama and Jensen (1983) attribute to (family) owner-managed firms. 
Rather, family firms seem to experience agency problems that are costly to mitigate as it 
is for management-controlled firms. 
 
1.5 The Agency problem in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
The study of family firms is one of the most complex in economic literature since it is 
characterized by many contrasting opinions among authors. This tendency is generally 
exacerbated in the studies of theories that could, as better as possible, capture the 
construct of family firms phenomenon, and this is what has been done by agency 
theorists. As affirmed in the previous paragraph, Shulze et al. (2001) retains that 
obviously agency problems exist in family business, but it still remains unclear whether 
they are less prevalent in family businesses than in non-family businesses. Certain 
studies (Jensen andMeckling, 1976, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001) have suggested that 
family firms outperform their non-family counterparts, while others maintain that the 
opposite is true (Shulze et al. 2001, Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008). However I can say 
that these contrasting and mixed opinions will still exist if a distinction among different 
contexts is not done in making these studies. The problem is that the concept of family 
firms could be misleading, in the sense that family businesses are often intended as a 
synonymous of Small and Medium Enterprises (from now SMEs). In fact I can not say 
that many agency authors in writing about the family firm phenomoenon often, 
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implicitly, have in mind SMEs. The thing is that in reality family businesses may have 
higher or equal agency costs simply because they are not so different from their non-
family counterparts in terms of size, organizational structure, management processes. 
Surely the influence of the family in the firm has an important impact, but this does not 
mean that the presence of the family automatically leads to lesser or non-existent 
agency costs. In fact larger public family businesses exist too and due to their 
dimensions, they need a separation between ownership and control for a more efficient 
management that, with either the presence of family or non-family managers - 
inevitably creates agency cost deriving from monitoring activities and from the use of 
incentive systems. Although most family firms are very small and simple, many studies 
of agency in family businesses have been done preferably on large and quoted 
companies or public corporations because of the difficulty in finding data for SMEs and 
in particular for family SMEs. But it must be taken into account that in family SMEs, 
the sense of family extends across the entire family and all the family members may feel 
as though they are part of the family business, since these firms have, often, a very 
simple structure (Herrero, I, 2011). So now the focus of this paragraph is to understand 
if the agency problem- with the related costs- exists in SMEs and when they emerge the 
most. 
The description of agency theory in family firms of the previous paragraph, can based 
on two assumptions on family firms: firstly it refers mainly to large and “growing” 
family firms; this means that the family owner’s desire to make the business growing is 
predominant because it allows to accommodate family members (Kotey, B, 2005) and 
this practice increases the possibilities of altruistic behaviours. Second the perspective 
used by many authors in describing agency theory in family firms is, in my opinion, 
anchored too much in the idea that the aim of owners is the mere maximization of the 
profit of their firms, thus implying that the achievement of a different objective- such as 
familiar ones- is seen as a sure source of such altruism that entail agency costs. 
These two non-declared assumptions, that I dare to deduce, are clear in the moment in 
which family and non-family SMEs are deeply analysed. 
Herrero (2011) considers small firm to be a family firm if the manager and/or some of 
the employees have familial ties to the owner and - differently from big family 
businesses - they often have a single owner, which means that the presence of 
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shareholder is rare. Despite some authors (Jensen and meckling, 1976, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) affirm that family businesses are better performers than non-family firms 
in “agency terms”, others argue that since managers are not chosen in a competitive 
context but within the family- through unfair advantages because of family ties- maybe 
they are not the best candidates for that position, thus leading to inefficiencies in the 
form of weaker performances (Shulze et al., 2001, Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008) and of 
altruism. This problem, as said previously, is known as adverse selection. These authors 
sustain that family managers may lack the education and the professionalism needed for 
their specific role. However, in some activities, not related to knowledge intensive 
firms, like high tech firms - where, however small family firms do not operate so much 
because this sector is highly risky - experience is considered an alternative to education 
in the development of skills, competences and abilities (Herreo, 2011). The main idea is 
that small family firms benefit from an age-related learning process (Cucculelli, 
Mannarino, Pulpo, Ricotta, 2014) that help them to improve efficiency overtime. For 
example, the hired CEO in non-family firms usually starts with a series of competencies 
and abilities already structured, whereas family CEOs do not. Founders and family 
successors learn how to run the business over time and their experience- which is 
conditional to the firm survival- grows with age. 
So what Herrero (2011) sustains is that in small firms (with the exception of those in 
sectors that are knowledge intensive) the qualifications needed to manage the firm do 
not need to be extensive and this means that family SMEs do not need external 
managers that could have different objectives or risk preferences. This implies that if the 
family manager takes his experience in the firm and mixes it with the family values and 
traditions, there is a compelling reason to believe that small family firms exhibit high 
efficiency due to less agency costs. In fact, if the family manager is appropriate for the 
post in small firms, then the executive entrenchment should not represent an important 
source of agency costs as it occurs in large firms. Moreover, for those incompetent 
offspring in the context of small businesses, there is not the same lucrative or 
prestigious ambition of big family firms and so there may be no pressure on fathers to 
promote them as managers, unless the latter actually want to take them. This reduction 
of agency costs in family SMEs can be observed also when there are non-family 
managers since in these firms there is not a formal management structure (Kotey, B., 
Agency Theory literature review: insights and socioemotional wealth understanding 
45 
2005), they work closely to the family owners and this allows the alignment of their 
interest with those of the family. 
Another argument that Shulze et al. (2001) argues is that in family firms it is difficult 
for owners to impartially monitor relatives who work in the firm. Again in small family 
firms it is not like this: the control exerted by managers is very strong since people work 
very closely one another since there is not a complex organizational structure. 
Furthermore, the absence of a hierarchy may encourage family employees to experience 
a sense of belonging to the family business thus allowing an appropriate behaviour. This 
contrasts with large family firms in which if family members are not employed at 
managerial level, they may assume contrasting behaviours that lead to conflicts or 
altruistic behaviours from parents to cease them. Here the sense of “being in the same 
boat” is very strong and so conflicts – as agency costs - potentiality may be reduced 
(Herrero, I, 2005). 
Kotey (2005) in conducting a study on Australian family and non-fmily SMEs affirms 
that the former differs from these latter in their goals, management and performance. 
The authoress asserts that there is, in general, a close link between the personal goals of 
managers, management practices and performance of their firms. By dictating the goals 
of the firm the managers (or the owners) are able to influence the strategies of the firm 
and as a consequence the performance of the firm itself. This however is strong in small 
family firms where business goals are inseparable from the personal goals of the owners 
(which are also managers) and that reflect the personal needs, values, structure or 
beliefs of the owners. These goals, are not necessarily optimal or economically rational 
(profit maximization) but they may provide to give the priority to the socioemotional 
wealth that they obtain by controlling the firm, thus representing the best for the family. 
So, in this sense, they are more likely to accept greater performance hazard to mitigate 
the loss of this socioemotional wealth endowment and, for this, small family firms are 
less likely to take on risky projects that may lead to change the status quo (Cucculelli, 
2012). But as said before, this changes the perspective (objectives of family firms) 
without entailing a necessary loss of efficiency in the form of agency costs. In fact, in 
family SMEs there is typically one owner-manager whose personal goals dominates 
business goals and who prefer to keep the firm small in order to maintain ownership and 
control in the long term (Kotey, B, 2005). So business longevity and the well-being of 
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the family members are placed ahead of growth and wealth maximization as business 
goals and this, however does not mean losing efficiency. In fact, in general the 
performances of family firms (on profits and firm value) are better than non-family 
firms despite these latter have higher growth rates because they try to expand rapidly to 
attract outside resources. This practice is not applied by family firms which grow less to 
maintain the ownership within the family. 
For what concerns management practices Kotey (2005) sustains that in family SMEs 
these are conservative, informal and centralized, with one (the founder) or few 
individuals dominating the decision making process so this reduces the need for formal 
monitoring and control systems. This inevitably makes agency costs less or inexistent 
because the organizational structure is flat. This is true unless the owner’s willing to 
grow predominates, thus leading the firm to become larger: in this case a more formal 
organizational structure is needed and it may even require the separation of ownership 
and control with the annex procedures (costs) to reduce the agency problem. 
In sum, there is a general preference among owner-managers of SME to limit growth of 
their firms in order to maintain ownership and control in the long term thus preserving 
also non-financial endowments (Gomez-Mejia, 2007). Moreover majority of ownership 
and control by owner-managers enable small firms to persist with informal basic 
management practices. But this situation changes when proprietors of small firms 
(either family and non-family) desire to grow in order to attract outside resources 
(particularly for small non-family firms) or to accommodate other family units (for 
small family firms) (Kotey, 2005). As a consequence, to effectively manage the growth, 
formal management practices are necessary and this creates agency costs mainly in the 
non-family firms because in these firms the desire to grow is more urgent. 
In conclusion it could be stated that while at the beginning the presence of very low or 
inexistent agency costs could be the same within family and non-family SMEs, they 
tend experience them with growth. Surely non-family firms tend to grow more than 
non-family firms because the former tend to follow more a profit maximizing approach, 
while the latter tend to maintain the ownership of the firm to mainly satisfy non-
economic goals (socioemotional wealth) even generating profits. 
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1.6 Conclusions 
The explanation of all the aspects related to the agency approach was developed in this 
chapter. This was done in order to have a deep understanding of the agency assumptions 
and consequences (costs, deriving from differences in interests and in risk preferences 
among agents) to better track their existence within the framework of Italian tobacco 
shops, which exhibit the two main settings under which the analysis of agency theory 
has been developed in this chapter: they are family firms and they are small and 
medium enterprises. As already mentioned, in family firms the Socioemotional wealth 
concept is really important since it is a construct that encompasses all the different 
facets of family firms and according to this reason, a comparison between the risk 
concept studied by agency theorists (March and Shapira, 1987), and the risk concept 
analysed by behavioural agency model (Wisemann and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) - which is 
the root of the SEW construct-, was made. From this comparison, some congruencies 
have emerged, which have stimulated the possibility to see and verify this aspect 
through the case study reported in chapter four.  
For what concerns the aspects related to the agency costs, deriving from all the 
assumptions that this kind of relationship implies, there are different perspectives 
adopted by the principal agency theorists. Despite these costs are inevitably in certain 
organizations – which see a separation between ownership and control (management) of 
the firm – Jensen and Meckling (1976) affirm that for those organizations in which the 
separation between ownership and control is mild or inexistent since the owner is 
directly involved in the business’ management, suffer obviously less agency costs. 
These firms intended by authors are mainly family firms – or ownership-controlled 
firms as defined in their work – in which agency costs should be lesser since there is a 
strong alignment between individuals’ interests. However Shulze et al. (2001) 
underlines the existence of agency costs within family firms because of the altruistic 
attitudes that family members have toward each other. This contrasts with what is 
maintained by Herrero, I, (2011) and Kotey (2005) who state that even if this altruistic 
attitudes can be true for big family firms since there is not a close control over family 
members, the strong ties and the lack of a complex and sophisticated organizational 
structure in family run SMEs, allows the possibility to reduce agency costs. Moreover 
the fact that Shulze (2001) identifies the agency costs due to altruistic behaviours in 
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family firms, means according to Cucculelli (2012), that family firms – irrespective of 
their dimension – have also other goals which are not rooted on the mere profit 
maximization, and which have not been taken into consideration by Shulze (2001), thus 
allowing goals different from profit maximization to be seen as a source of agency. 
These goals are inseparable from the personal objectives of the owners and they reflect 
their personal needs, values, structure or beliefs. So they are not necessarily optimal or 
economically rational but they may provide to give the priority to the socioemotional 
wealth that owners and the family obtain by controlling the firm, without implying a 
loss of efficiency. Under this perspective the problem of altruistic attitudes in family 
firms – and of agency costs - in SMEs should be not significant. This aspect, however, 
will be analysed through the case study proposed in this study in chapter four.
  
2. CHAPTER 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS APPROACH: AN 
EXPLANATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
ACTIONS 
2.1 Premise 
The focus of this second chapter is on the analysis of a (relatively) recent approach 
developed in organizational theory, which is the Institutional logics approach. In order 
to do this, however, it is necessary to move from an internal perspective of firms, to a 
more extensive perspective which takes into account the external (institutional) 
environment of firms. Institutions, intended as the rules of the game of a society (North, 
1990) becomes important in shaping organizational and individual action mostly when 
the firm is considered as an open system. So analysing institutions and the related 
institutional logics it became possible to understand why organizations are structured in 
a specific way and why they behave in a certain manner. In order to better understand 
what are institutional logics, whose meaning is often used not properly, the chapter 
starts with the definition and the description of what institutions are and how 
institutional theory has evolved, thus arriving to its “third wave” which is represented 
by the institutional logic approach. Then an analysis of the principles underlying this 
recent approach is reported in order to better understand the conflict among different 
and coexisting logics within a specific context. Later an analysis of the Institutional 
overlap (Lansberg, 1983) existing in family firms is done in order to understand which 
are the main logics that exist in family firms. 
 
 
A Study of Family Firms: context and theories 
50 
2.2 The open system perspective of the firm: an introduction to 
institutions 
As stated in the previous chapter, it can be recognized that the initial (or starting) 
perspective about firms which is used in for my proposition is that assumed by the 
neoclassical economics literature - that’s to say the “Black Box” perspective - according 
to which the firm is operated in order to obtain the maximization of profits by 
transforming inputs (e.g., raw materials) in outputs (e.g., end products or services). This 
view, clearly, is more concerned with internal processes of the firm since profit 
maximization through the input transformation is a salient aspect – but not the only one- 
of the internal management of the firm. 
 
Figure 3    The firm as a Black Box  
 
However, as already said, this conception has met some limitations that firstly have 
been emphasized within the Agency theory sphere and then by the more recent models 
that look on the firm as an Open and Social System which no more falls back only on 
internal practices, but is also able to interact with, be aware of and be influenced by the 
surrounding environment. Again the neoclassical model is no more adequate to define 
and capture the essence and the highlights of the firm relatively to its external 
environment. So under this umbrella there is room for theories related to institutions.  
The modern open system view (Scott and Davis, 2007) considers the organization as a 
productive system which interacts with its environment, drawing certain inputs from the 
environment and converting these to outputs that are offered to the environment. 
Through its production process the firm can gain utilities, allowing, meanwhile, other 
agents who have relationships with it to obtain benefits too. 
Source: personal elaboration 
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However, the firm is not alone but operates within an environment which is composed 
by other economic systems (or forces) with which the firm interacts, from which is 
influenced (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) and with which it competes (Porter, 1979). So 
as a “social and open system”, the firm is strongly swayed by the external environment 
in which it operates: in fact all the resources (material or immaterial and also 
relationships) that it needs are taken from this external environment, and something is 
given back to the environment in the form of products and services. So the “Black box” 
conception remains as a pivotal structure but it is integrated within a bigger context 
which is the surrounding environment. 
 
Figure 4    Firm as an open system 
 
In this way the firm interacts internally and externally thus making it necessary to take 
into account the aspects of the social environment in order to survive in the long run. 
This adaptation is necessary in order to create the equilibrium between internal and 
external factors that concern or have a connection with the firm. With social 
environment I mean what North (1990) defines as Institutions.  
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society (or social environment) or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 
Source: personal elaboration 
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1990). For a society institutions are really important because they reduce uncertainty by 
providing a structure to everyday life, in the sense that they are a sort of guide to human 
interaction. In fact institutions are able to tell us how to greet friends, drive, buy stuffs, 
form a business, or whatever we know and, if not known, how to perform all these 
tasks. It is necessary to observe that institutions are specific to a certain area: if we 
perform the same transactions of before but in a different country, surely the rules differ 
(e.g. left-hand drive in UK). 
Institutions can be intended as any form of constraint that shape human interaction 
(North, 1990), and they can be both formal constraints – such as rules that human 
beings devise – and informal constraints – such as conventions, values, and codes of 
behaviour. Institutions may be created, as in the case of law, or can simply evolve over 
time as culture. Institutional constraints, in sum, include both what individuals are 
prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are 
allowed to undertake certain actions. According to North organizations provide a 
structure (arrangement) to human interaction, since they are a group composed by 
individuals which are bounded by some common purpose to achieve objectives. 
However, how organizations come into existence and how they evolve is fundamentally 
influenced by the institutional framework and, in turn, organizations influence how the 
institutional framework evolves. The core idea is that organizations are deeply 
embedded in social and political environments suggested that organizational practices 
and structures are often either reflections of or responses to rules, beliefs, and 
conventions built into the wider environment (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). So what 
North maintains is that while institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are 
created with the purposive intent to pursue opportunities “lavished” by the existing set 
of constraints (institution) and in this way they become the agents of the institutional 
change that, surely, takes time to occur (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  
 
2.3 Approaching the institutional logics perspective, as a wave of 
the institutional theory development 
Recently, a large number of scholars have started to use the concept of Institutional 
logics in their research. But seldom is this concept not used properly so, in order to 
avoid misinterpretations, I deem that before defining the institutional logics perspective 
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it is necessary to place it within the broader context of institutional theory to better 
understand the enlargement that this theory has taken to the institutional view. In fact, 
the institutional logics approach is part of a broader of complexity studies on 
institutions, which could be identified as the “third wave” of institutional theory 
(Johansen and Waldorff, 2015). 
As sustained in the previous paragraph, the core idea of institutional theory is that 
organizations are definitely connected with the surrounding environment (social and 
political) so that not so rarely organizational practices or structures are a reflection or a 
response to the wider environment and its rules, codes, values, norms and conventions 
(institutions). In line with this it can be said that organizations act not only according to 
an economic reasoning and rational strategic goals, so a variety of social norms and 
values put organizations constantly under pressure.  
2.3.1 The “first wave” of institutional theory: the “old institutionalism” 
Making some steps back in time, the first wave of “old institutionalism”, whose main 
exponent is Philip Selznick, distinguished “institution” from “organization” and placed 
the organization in larger contexts, that is to say institutional environments.  
In his paper “Foundations of the Theory of organization” (1948) Selznick notes that "the 
most important thing about organizations is that, though they are tools, each 
nevertheless has a life of its own". For him, organizations (trades unions, governments, 
business corporations, political parties, and so on) are all formal structures since they 
represent rationally ordered instruments for the achievement of goals which are 
established at its basis.  
Despite the rational view of organizations is strong, Selznick notes that these formal 
structures can never be able to overcome non rational dimensions since they are mainly 
composed by persons who generate a persistent pressure for the institutionalization of 
relationships within them (Selznick, 1948). This means that the focus is on the 
purposeful efforts of individuals to respond to environmental pressures in way 
consistent with the institution’s rituals and formality and based on values that are 
important to the institution (Leaptrott, 2005). In line with this perspective he concludes 
that organizations do not act purely based on formal structures because individuals do 
not act purely based on their formal roles within the company, but they bring other 
commitments to the organization that can restrict rational decision-making. In this sense 
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the individual raises new problems for the organization, partly because of the needs of 
his personality, partly because he brings with him a set of established habits as well as 
commitments to special groups outside the organization (Selznick, 1948). In this way 
the needs of individuals (as his values and habits), do not permit a single-minded 
attention to the stated goals of the system, so  the organization strikes with the 
environment that can restrict its current goals or limit future possibilities, since  being  
based on individual actions and environmental pressures.  
As a consequence, deviations from the formal system tend to become institutionalized 
within the organizations (Selznick, 1948). However, these deviations tend to force a 
shift away from the purely formal system in order to embrace the informal patterns and 
this will (at the end) result in the formalization of these last, thus changing the original 
structure. In sum, he defines institutionalization as "the process,” as something “that 
happens to the organization overtime” (Scott, 1987), thus being an adaptive process that 
infuses value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand (Selznick, 1957). 
2.3.2 The “second wave” of institutional theory: the “new institutionalism” 
The second wave arrived around the late 70’s, with a strong focus on the socializing 
effects of institutions, contrasting what was deemed to be a “rationalistic” and overly 
action-oriented approach – of the first wave -  to organizations’ ability to adapt to their 
institutional environments (Johansen and Waldorff, 2015).  
The articles of Meyer & Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977) and Di Maggio & Powell (1983) 
are at the foundation of this new view on institutions. 
The above mentioned Institutional theorists - albeit in different ways - assert that the 
institutional environment can strongly influence the development of formal structures in 
an organization, so the relation institutions-organizations is no more seen as a 
problematic one as Selznick’s approach suggested. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue- adopting a macro-perspective - that many formal 
organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional rules and that 
these one, function as myths which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, 
resources, stability and enhanced survival prospects.  
The starting point for the authors is that in modern societies formal organizational 
structures arise in highly institutionalized contexts so this permits many new 
organizations (as well as the existing ones) to incorporate the practices and procedures, 
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which are defined by the prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and 
institutionalized in society. By doing this, organizations increase their legitimacy and so 
their survival prospects, independently from the immediate efficacy of the acquired 
practices and procedures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). So this new institutionalism added a 
greater consideration on legitimacy (which will be analysed better in chapter three) 
Institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies and programs function as 
powerful myths, and this is why many organizations adopt them ceremonially. However 
adopting these myths give the impression to be a double-edged sword: on one side, 
conforming to institutionalized rules often conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria and, 
on the other side, coordination and controlling activities that promote efficiency 
undermines an organization’s ceremonial conformation (meaning the conformity to the 
institutional environment) thus, sacrificing its support and legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). The two authors give a meaning to institutions which is different from that given 
by Selznick, in fact for them institutionalization involves the process by which social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take a rulelike status in social thought and 
action (Johansen and Waldorff, 2015). 
Meyer & Rowan underline that the main problem of the prevailing theories in 
organizational theory is that they have neglected the legitimacy as an alternative 
explanation to the source of formal structure of organizations. In fact, in prevailing 
theories, legitimacy is a given, but this represent a sort of limitation because for the 
authors, in modern societies the elements of rationalized formal structures are deeply 
rooted in and reflect the widespread understandings of social reality (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). So in line with this thinking, the elements of formal structures (positions, 
policies, programs and procedures) are manifestations (or reflection) of powerful 
institutional rules which function as highly rationalized myths that are binding on 
particular organizations. These institutional rules – and the adaptation of organizations 
to them- ensure the legitimation of the organization and the consequent survival in the 
long run, even eliminating the liability of newness - theorized by Stinchcombe - for 
young or even new organizations.  
There is a clear and strong relationship, according to Meyer & Rowan, between 
organizations and their institutional environments: the former are structured by 
phenomena which are present in the latter, hence tending to become isomorphic to 
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them. An explanation of this isomorphism - which is also at the basis of the Di Maggio 
and Powell’s understanding of institutionalization – is that formal organizations become 
matched with their environments by technical and exchange interdependencies, thus 
reflecting socially constructed realities. 
In sum this isomorphism promotes the success, the stability and, as a consequence, the 
survival of the company, even putting aside the efficiency of the company in stricto 
sensu. So according to the institutional conception developed by Meyer & Rowan 
(1977), organizations tend to disappear as distinct and bounded/ closed units, but they 
are implicitly thought as open systems involved in exchanges with their environments, 
as stated in paragraph 2.2. 
Differently from the work of Meyer & Rowan is that of Zucker (1977), which 
emphasizes – from a micro perspective - the taken-for-granted nature of institutions, and 
the role of cultural persistence as a measure of institutionalization. In Zucker’s 
approach, the focus is on a single pattern or mode of organizational behaviour and the 
emphasis is placed on the rationale for (or nature of) the process underlying adoption of 
(or) conformity to the pattern. The author defines institutionalization as the process by 
which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the same time, 
at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less a taken-
for-granted part of this social reality. These institutional acts, however, must be 
perceived both as objective and exterior, meaning that they are repeatable by other 
actors without changing the common understanding of the act (acts objectivity) and 
their subjective understanding of acts make them interpret the acts as part of the external 
world (acts exteriority) (Zucker, 1977). 
For what concerns the last authors, whose work is at the heart of this “new 
institutionalism”, they are Di Maggio and Powell (1983). These authors have extended 
the Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) focus on isomorphism from the societal level to the 
level of organizational fields (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). This extension of the focus 
on isomorphism, has lead them to term this new pattern as the “new institutionalism” 
which rejects the rationality to explain the organizational structure, hence emphasizing 
legitimacy rather than efficiency as an explanation for the success and survival of 
organizations in the long run, which were already introduced by Mayer and Rowan. 
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Starting from the description of the causes that for Weber are the determinants of 
bureaucratization (competition among capitalist firms in the marketplace; competition 
among states and bourgeois demands for equal protection under the law), Di Maggio 
and Powell (1983) argue that the causes of bureaucratization (as a widespread and most 
efficient and – formally -  rational way in which human activity can be organized, inthe 
modern world) were changed: in fact, the bureaucratization of the state and of the 
corporations was achieved, but despite this organization were still becoming 
homogeneous. Analogously, what they observed was that structural change in 
organizations seemed less and less driven by competition or by the need of efficiency. 
So they maintain that the change of any organizational form (as, for example, the 
bureaucratization) occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar 
without necessarily making them more efficient (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). Once 
reached this result, the authors have tried to give an answer to explain homogeneity in 
structure and culture.  
They argue that at the beginning of their life cycle, organizations – which are in the 
same organizational field – perform considerably divergent approaches and forms, but 
as soon as an organizational field – defined as those organizations that, in aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life - becomes well established, this leads to 
pressure towards homogenization of the organizational structures and approaches of the 
diverse set of the existing as well as the new organizations within it. Here the thing is 
that organizations in a structured field, respond to an environment that consists of other 
organizations responding to their environment, which consists of organizations 
responding to an environment of organizations’ responses (Di Maggio and Powell, 
1983). 
Following what has been said until now, the concept that best captures the process of 
homogenization is the isomorphism. Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions. Such approach suggests that organizational characteristics are modified 
following the route of increasing the compatibility with environmental characteristics 
(Hawley, 1968). Di Maggio and Powell argue that isomorphism can result because 
organizational decision makers learn appropriate responses and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. The two authors identify three mechanisms through which institutional 
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isomorphic change occurs: a) coercitive isomorphism that is generated by political 
influence and the problem of legitimacy; b) mimetic isomorphism which is a result of 
standard responses to uncertainty – it is necessary here to remember that institutions are 
able to reduce uncertainty by establishing shared and consolidated norms, values and 
habits -; c) normative isomorphism which is associated with professionalization. 
Despite these three types of isomorphism are combined in empirical setting, they tend to 
derive from different conditions, hence leading to different outcomes. 
Organizations may become more effective because they are rewarded for being similar 
to other organizations in the same field, thus making for each single organization easier 
to transact with the others. In this way they are legitimated by the surrounding 
environment (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). 
2.3.3 The “third wave” of institutional theory: the institutional logics per-
spective. 
The second wave of institutional theory has been deemed to be functionalistic and 
abstract, suffering the lack of an explanation of the causes or the actions that determine 
the institutional change (Johansen and Waldorff, 2015). 
For this reason the evolution of the institutional theory has led starting from 90’s to the 
third wave of institutionalism - called by Johansen and Waldroff  “change and 
complexity institutionalism” - whose main objective is to understand how 
organizational individuals and groups are active agents in institutional change. This 
highly agentic approach is based on the Institutional logics approach. Friedland and 
Alford’s (1991) and Thornton and Ocasio (1999) created a new approach to institutional 
analysis which posited institutional logics as defining content and meaning of 
institutions. Despite this new approach shares the concern with how cultural rules and 
cognitive structures shape organizational structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977; Di Maggio and Powell, 1983), the focus is no longer on isomorphism but on the 
effects that different institutional logics have on individuals and organizations in a large 
variety of contexts, including markets and industries (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
Institutional logics shape rational, mindful behaviour, and individual and organizational 
actors have some hand in shaping and changing institutional logics (Thornton, 2004). 
So this third wave of institutional logics approach provides a link between institutions 
and action, thus representing a bridge between the macro, structural perspectives of 
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Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Di Maggio and Powell (1983) and Zucker’s more micro 
approaches. 
 
Table 5     Institutional waves comparison 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
2.4 Some introductory and preparatory considerations on the 
Institutional logics approach 
Before discussing about this ultimate wave which has provided institutional theory with 
a deeper perspective, it is necessary to point out an aspect of the “new institutionalism”, 
which has been very important in delineating the institutional logic approach:  the 
rejection of the rationality as an explanation for organizational structure (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008). 
This forsake of rationality, is strongly accentuated in the work of Friedland and Alford 
(1991), which represents the “opening oeuvre” of the institutional logics topic. 
The authors argue that theories which “retreat from society” – that emphasize market 
mechanism that allow to aggregate individual utilities and preferences, organizational 
competition and resource dependence – begin to fail since it is  impossible to 
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understand individual or organizations’ behaviours without locating them into a social 
context. This is what the evolution of the institutional logics, and the institutional theory 
as a general umbrella, has tried to do.  
According to this, the most radical retreat from society has been through the 
instrumental and rational individual, whose choices in myriad of exchange are seen as 
the primary cause of societal arrangements: the society changes because of specific 
choices taken by individual actors (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Rational choice theory 
and agency theory – previously analysed – reflect this premise. 
Rational choice theorists derive organizational arrangements – party, state, family or 
firms – from the rationality of individuals in attempting to maximize his or her utility by 
exchanging scarce and usually material resources. Similarly agency theorists analyse 
organizations as a network of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Here the thing is 
that organizational structures derive as solutions to problems of opportunism where self-
interest and the costs of monitoring might otherwise interact to produce shirking (the 
avoidance of a duty or a responsibility) (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
As already said in the previous chapter, this line of analysis has been strongly 
influenced by neoclassical economics, which has in turn marginalized institutional 
analysis, and so focusing on the way individuals takes preferences. In fact, one 
neoclassical economic theory’s assumption is that preferences are deemed to be 
exogenous (from the social context), ordered and stable, thus being solely influenced by 
the individual’s egoism that consents the individual’s utility maximization. But the 
problem, according to Friedland and Alford (1991), is that once one moves away from 
material goods or the mere material gain, the neoclassical framework is in “dangerous 
waters” since it does not have a theory that explains how the utilities are formed 
anymore. Without priced commodities, the assumptions of rational utility maximization 
become tautological since the one cannot maximize what is not quantifiable. 
Conversely, Friedland and Alford (1991) sustain that the market is not simply an 
allocative mechanism but also an institutionally specific cultural system for generating 
and measuring value. So in a certain sense, utilities are formed because of the 
institutionalization of the market.  
Moreover, without a theory of utility formation (we are beyond the pure materialistic 
view), it can be said that a market cannot operate efficiently because it would not be 
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understandable how activities are coordinated, since individuals are instrumentally 
egoistic only. This is a failure because this framework assumes that individuals interact 
solely through exchanges. But the evidence that people form preferences taking into 
account the options open to them, explodes neoclassical welfare from the inside out: 
utility formation is institutionally specific since the individual is not isolated by the 
institutional context to which it belongs. Like the market institution, Friedland and 
Alford (1991) identify other institutional realms – families, states and religions – which 
are more likely to generate values and hence utilities as absolutes which cannot be 
traded off against alternatives. So individuals formulate preferences within each of these 
institutional realms or “institutional orders” and within which, the exercise of a choice 
expresses a different kind of individuality. 
2.4.1 Institutional logics meaning and definition 
While institutionalists have studied the fact of organizational homogeneity as a result of 
isomorphism, they have not studied why specific institutional arenas are patterned in the 
way that they are or the conditions under which the new institutional forms develop 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). This implies that they have not developed a tool that 
explains and understands the content of an institution, which instead is the ingredient 
that shapes the mechanisms by which organizations are able to conform or deviate from 
established patterns (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
In harmony with all which has been said until now with the institutional logics approach 
there is the definition of the content and meaning of institutions or more precisely, the 
definition of the effects that differentiated (institutional) logics have on individual and 
organizations in a larger variety of contexts, including markets, industries, and different 
organizational forms. Institutional logics shape rational, mindful behaviour and by 
being part of the institutions, individual and organizations have some hands in shaping 
and changing institutional logics: in this way we have a deeper understanding on how 
institutions affect individual and organizational (choices) and behaviours, so having a 
link between institutions and actions which was not specified by prior institutional 
theorists. It is attributed to Friedland and Alford’s work of 1985 the introduction of the 
term institutional logics. Later, the same authors further have developed the concept of 
institutional logics within the context of exploring the interrelationships that occurred 
between individuals, organizations and society (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). They view 
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institutions as “both supraorganizational patterns of activity by which individuals and 
organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and organize time and 
space. They are also symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, thereby rendering 
experience of time and space meaningful" (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Focusing on 
macro-societal phenomena, the authors identify several key institutions (or institutional 
orders) – the capitalistic market, the bureaucratic state, families, democracy, and 
religion –each guided by a distinct and central logic that guides its organizing principles 
and provides social actors, within them, with a sense of self, that is to say a sense of 
identity.  
The central logic of each of the institutional orders (or core institutions of society) shape 
both the means and the ends of individual behaviour and, as a consequence, are 
constitutive of individuals, organizations and society (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). In a 
nutshell, institutional logic is the way in which a particular social world works, and 
they are embodied in practices and symbols available to individuals within society. 
Institutional logics are socially constructed, coherent, and integrated sets of 
‘‘assumptions, values, beliefs and rules’’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804) that give 
actors ‘‘organizing principles’’ prescribing legitimate ends and ‘‘the means by which 
those ends are achieved’’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248). In a nutshell, institutional 
logic is the way in which a particular social world works, and they are embodied in 
practices and symbols available to individuals within society. 
These practices and symbols are available to individuals and organizations, which can 
use them to their own advantage (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
Thereafter the important works developed by Friedland and Alford (1985, 1991), the 
institutional logics concept has been deeply treated and further developed by Thornton 
and Ocasio (1999). In this oeuvre they define institutional logics as “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and 
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize 
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality”. As can be seen, this 
definition appears to be deeper and more complete, thus providing a link between 
individual agency and cognition ad socially constructed institutional practices and rule 
structures. So differently from the approach used by the new institutionalism authors - 
Di Maggio and Powell – the focus is no more on the isomorphism and so on the 
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explanation of how institutions affect organizational structures and processes into a 
specific organizational field, but the institutional logics approach offers a way to 
understand how individual and organizational behaviour is located in a social context 
and the social mechanisms that influence that behaviour. However, the aim of stressing 
on the main definitions of institutional logics is to emphasize one important 
preconception of this approach that is to say a core meta-theory: this means that in order 
to understand individual and organizational behaviour, it is necessary to locate them 
into a social and institutional context, and all at once, this institutional context both 
regularizes behaviour and provides opportunity for agency and change (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008), this will be treated later in the paragraph “five principles underlying the 
meta-theory of institutional logics”. 
Box 1          Agency and Structure concepts 
It is important to specify that in the social sciences there is a standing debate over the primacy of structure 
or agency in shaping human behaviour.  
Structure refers to those factors (social class, religion, gender ethnicity or customs) which influence or limit 
the choices of an agent and opportunities available for him. 
Agency, instead, is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices and 
this ability is affected by the cognitive belief structure which one has formed through one’s exper iences, 
and the perceptions hold by the individual. The structure versus agency debate may be understood as an 
issue of socialization against autonomy in determining whether an individual acts as a free agent or in a 
manner dictated by social structure. 
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia. 
 
2.4.2 Institutional logics mechanisms for shaping individuals and organi-
zations actions 
As stated above one of the news offered by the institutional logics approach is that it 
offers a means, once the individual or the organization is placed within a social context, 
to define how logics shape their behaviours and actions. According to Thornton and 
Ocasio (2008), mechanisms through which institutional logics exert their effects on 
individuals and organizations, thus shaping their actions, are four: Collective identities 
and Identification, Contests for status and power, Classification and categorization and 
finally Attention.   
 A Collective identity is the shared sense of belonging to a group and it represent the  
cognitive, normative, and emotional connection which is experienced by the mem-
bers of a social group due to their perceived common status with other members of 
the social group (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). This collective identity is developed 
among individuals thanks to the social interactions and communications among 
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them and the other members of the social group to which they belong. As a result of 
the identification with the collective identity of their social group, individuals are 
more likely to cooperate with the social group, accepting and thus obeying to the 
group (social) norms and prescriptions, seeking to protect the interests of the collec-
tive and its mem movement, professions and so on (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
The most important aspect is that once the collective identities emerge and become 
institutionalized, they develop their own institutional logic which, in turn, prevails 
within the social group (Jackall, 1998) and this means that the identification with the 
respective institutional logics occurs directly, since the identification with the col-
lective is a synonymous of  identification with the institutional logic prevailing in 
the collective, regardless they are organizational forms, market competitors or any 
other social group (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
 Other mechanisms for understanding how institutional logics shape individual and 
organizational actions are the Contests for status and power. These two mechanisms 
are present, with some differences, in every context in which two or more people 
come to have a relationship or, however, are in close contact. It is important to iden-
tify the sources of power and status to better know their meaning and their implica-
tions, and this can be done only by understanding how these power and status dif-
ferences are associated with the prevailing institutional logic, by which these two 
mechanisms are conditioned. Status can be identified with the prestige, respect and 
esteem that a party has in the eyes of the others; it is an index of the social worth 
that others ascribe to an individual or a group. Status originates externally and is 
rooted in the evaluations of others through status-conferral processes. Differently, 
power is best conceptualized as control over critical resources.  
Interestingly, "although power and status are often thought of as two sides of the 
same coin, they in fact have opposite effects on the fairness of people’s behaviour. 
(Blader and Chen, 2012). The association of the status and power with the prevail-
ing institutional logic occurs since social actors rely on how they understand and 
conceive the institutional logics in the competition for power and status and, in do-
ing so they create the conditions that allow the reproduction of the prevailing institu-
tional logics. This means that logics determine how status and power are gained, 
maintained and lost. 
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 Classification and categorization is another way through which institutional logics 
shapes individual cognition and as a consequence individual actions, so given the 
institutionalization of categories, individuals tend to take for granted a specific cate-
gory of organizing activity. Institutional logics approach, provide agents within or-
ganizations with socially constructed systems of classifications that constitute cate-
gories of social actors, organizational firms, products and so on. This means that 
changes in institutional logics lead to the creation of new categories, thus determin-
ing also changes in meaning of the existing ones (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
 The last mechanism through which institutional logics shape individual and organi-
zational actions is the Attention. The emphasis here is on organizational attention 
that is to say how organizational decision makers mediate and affect organizational 
responses to economic and social factors. Institutional logics theorists – Ocasio 
(1995) in the specific case – argued that institutional logics are able to affect the at-
tention that individual poses to alternative schemas to perceive, interpret, evaluate 
and respond to environmental situations. Here an important theory that is behind this 
mechanism is the Attention allocation theory. Starting from the work of Gabaix et 
al. (2002) - which in my opinion clarifies why this attention allocation is strictly 
connected with economics even if it has psychological facets – it can be highlighted 
that economic models assume that all thinking is instantaneous. However, real peo-
ple have limited processing speeds and consequently make most decisions under 
various pressure. Like players in a chess tournament or students taking a test, indi-
viduals do not have the luxury of taking much time to make decisions. So there is 
the necessity to stop thinking about most problems before we have a perfect solu-
tion. The combination of limited processing speed and scarce time bounds the quali-
ty of the decision-making and defines a fundamental resource allocation problem: 
decision makers need to continuously decide what to think about. This attention al-
location process has numerous intuitive implications. Economics is often defined as 
the study of the allocation of scarce resources. So the allocation of attention, and its 
consequences for decision-making, seems like a natural topic for economic research.  
Following this reasoning, the institutional logics approach offers to individuals and 
organizations a set of rules and conventions that help them to decide on which prob-
lems focus their attention, which solutions to consider and which solutions are 
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linked with the specific situation. So briefly, institutional logics allow decision mak-
ers to focus their attention on issues and solutions that are consistent with the pre-
vailing institutional logics, thus determining the appropriateness and legitimacy of 
the attention (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
 
Table 6      How logics determine individual and organizational action 
Source: personal adaptation from Thornton and Ocasio, 2008. 
Box 2 Classification and categorization 
The term “classification” is used to refer to a system of classes, ordered according to a predetermined set 
of principles and used to organize a set of entities. Classification is a  tool used to organize a collection of 
information resources, thus involving the orderly and systematic assignment of each entity to one and only 
one class within a system of mutually exclusive and nonoverlapping classes.  
Categorization refers to the process of dividing the world into groups of entities whose members are in 
some way similar to each other. Recognition of resemblance across entities and the subsequent aggrega-
tion of like entities into categories lead the individual to discover order in a complex environment. 
 
2.4.3 Five principles underlying the meta-theory of institutional logics 
In accordance with what has been said until now, institutional logics – both symbolic 
and material - provide the formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and 
interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers in accomplishing the 
organization’s tasks in obtaining social status and rewards (Thornton and Ocasio,1999). 
These rules constitute a set of assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to 
 
MECHANISM  EXPLANATION 
 
COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND 
IDENTIFICATION 
 
Collective identity is the shared sense of belonging to a group and it de-
velops among within a social group and once institutionalized, the collec-
tive identities develop their own prevailing institutional logic. So identifying 
with the collective is a synonymous of identification with the institutional 
logic prevailing in the collective. 
CONTESTS FOR STATUS AND 
POWER 
To better know the meaning and the implications of power and status to it 
is necessary to first understand how these power and status differences 
are associated with the prevailing institutional logic. This means that 
logics determine how status and power are gained, maintained and lost. 
CLASSIFICATION AND 
CATEGORIZATION 
Institutional logics approach, provide agents within organizations with so-
cially constructed systems of classifications that constitute categories of 
social actors, organizational firms, products and so on. This implies that 
changes in institutional logics lead to the creation of new categories 
ATTENTION Since individuals cannot take much time to make decisions, institutional 
logics are able to affect the attention that individual poses to alternative 
schemas to perceive, interpret, evaluate and respond to environmental 
situations. It is a matter of conformity of the decision with the logic 
Source: Jacob, 2004. 
Institutional logics approach: an explanation of organizational actions 
67 
interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to 
succeed (Jackall, 1988) and more general, as already sustained previously, institutional 
logics define the content and the meaning of institutions or more precisely the effects 
that differentiated (institutional) logics have on individual and organizations in a larger 
variety of institutional contexts. 
However what said until now is not sufficient to explain entirely how institutional logics 
approach works. In fact it is important to say that the institutional logics approach 
incorporates a broad meta-theory (it means a theory which has for object other theories 
which are defined as object-theories) on how institutions, through their underlying 
logics of action, shape heterogeneity, stability and change in individuals and 
organizations. This meta-theory is based on five principles: Embedded agency, society 
as an inter-institutional system, the material and cultural foundations of institutions, 
institutions at multiple levels and finally, historical contingency. 
 Embedded agency is maybe the core assumption of the institutional logics approach 
since interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations 
are embedded within the prevailing institutional logics. This means that decisions 
and outcomes are a result of the interplay between individual agency and structure 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). So while individual and organizations may seek pow-
er and status or any other kind of advantage, the means and ends of their interests 
are enabled and constrained by the prevailing institutional logics.  
According to Friedland and Alford (1991) in order to better understand society – 
and as a consequence institutions – an adequate (social) theory must take into ac-
count the three levels of society: individual competing and negotiating, organiza-
tions in conflict and coordination, and institutions in contradiction and interdepend-
ency. So theories that focus only on institutions, as those that focuses only on indi-
viduals and organizations, are not adequate to understand society, and this is be-
cause all the three levels of analysis are necessary to understand the society because 
they are nested (embedded). But in which way are these three levers nested? Well, 
surely individual and organizational actions can be explained only within an institu-
tional context, and since institutions are socially constructed they are constituted by 
the action of individuals and organizations (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008). However Thornton and Ocasio in their work of 1999 examined 
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another additional level at which institutional logics operate and it is the industry. 
The authors, in analysing the change from an editorial logic to a market logic within 
the Education Publishing industry, suggest that an industry is a relevant boundary 
for identifying institutional logics because industry producers develop common 
identities that structure the decision making and the practices of the players in a 
product market (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). 
Box 3         The  paradox of embedded Agency 
Within institutional theory, this broader structure-agency debate is often referred to the paradox of embed-
ded agency. The theoretical puzzle is as follows: if actors are embedded in an institutional field that de-
fines their interests and produce their identities, how are they able to envision new practices and then sub-
sequently get others to adopt them?  
One answer to this puzzle lies in conceptualizing agency as being distributed within the structures that ac-
tors themselves have created. Consequently, embedding  structures do not simply generate constraints on 
agency but, instead, provide a platform for the unfolding of entrepreneurial activities. According to this 
view, actors are knowledgeable agents with a capacity to reflect and act in ways other than those pre-
scribed by taken-for-granted social rules and technological artefacts. 
 
 The innovative aspect that makes the institutional logics approach different from the 
theorists of the new institutionalism is the conceptualization – formulated by Fried-
land and Alford (1991) - of the society as an inter-institutional system. Before ana-
lysing in deep this assumption, it is necessary to remember two things: a) differently 
form the other and past waves of the institutional theory, now the focus is on under-
standing the content of institutions and, as a consequence, on what affect individuals 
and organizations’ behaviour; b) and that rather than focusing on homogeneity and 
isomorphism in organizational fields (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983), the institution-
al logics approach views any context as potentially influenced by contending logics 
of different societal sectors. So, as maintained by Friedland and Alford, to locate 
behaviour in a context requires theorizing an inter-institutional system of social sec-
tors in which each sector represents a different set of expectations and human and 
organizational behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Following the authors’ as-
sumption, the central institutions of the contemporary capitalist West are the capital-
ist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion - 
later Thornton (2004) will include six sectors  markets, corporations, professions, 
states, families and religion -, each of which has a proper distinct institutional logic 
that’s to say the set of material practices and symbolic constructions which allows 
for heterogeneity since they are potentially contradicting, thus making available 
Source: R. Garud, C. Hardy, S . Maguire, 2007 
Institutional logics approach: an explanation of organizational actions 
69 
multiple logics to individuals and organizations. These central institutions are sym-
bolic systems which have nonobservable, absolute, transrational referents and ob-
servable social relations which concretize them (Friedland and Alford, 1991). This 
occurs through concrete social relations that allow individuals and organizations to 
achieve their ends, thus making life meaningful and creating institutional specific 
routines  which are connected to rituals which define the order of world, and the po-
sition that each have within it. To make some examples, According to the aforemen-
tioned authors, the institutional logic of capitalism is accumulation an commodifica-
tion of human activity; that of the state is rationalization and regulation of human 
activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies;  that of democracy is participation and 
the extension of popular control over human activity; that of family is community 
and the motivation of human activity by unconditional loyalty to its members and 
their reproductive needs; finally, the institutional logic of religion is truth, and the 
symbolic construction of reality within which all human activities take place. 
  The other assumption at the basis of the institutional logics approach is that each of 
the institutional orders of the society has both material and cultural characteristics 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). In fact, traditionally mar-
kets have not been considered part of the cultural sphere despite them, instead, are 
shaped by culture and social structure (i.e. networks of social relationships). The 
same, but in a reverse fashion, can be said for family and religion institutions since 
they are directly involved in the production, distribution and consumption of goods 
and services. 
Following this path, Thornton and Ocasio specify that the institutional logics ap-
proach recognizes that institutions develop and change as a result of the interaction 
between cultural and material aspects of institutions, rather than focusing on one of 
these two forces. 
 In addition to the other assumptions, the institutional logics approach, conceived as 
a metatheory, allows the possibility to develop theories and research at a variety of 
different levels of analysis regarding a specific institution. In fact, to make the insti-
tutional logics approach more precise, it is necessary to specify the level of analysis 
(e.g. individual, organizational, societal, markets, industries, inter-organizational 
networks, geographic communities, or organizational fields) with respect to the in-
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stitution which is analysed (organizations or groups). So the level of analysis at 
which institutionalization occurs should be clarified, whether a societal level or at 
other levels in order to better understand it (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
 The last assumption of institutional logics as a metatheory is the historical contin-
gency. This assumption is consistent with the institutional theory in the sense that it 
focuses attention on how lager environments affect individual and organizational 
behaviours. The objective of recognizing historical contingency as a metatheory as-
sumption is to explore if the effects of economic, political, structural and normative 
forces that affect individuals and organizations (logics) are historically contingent, 
that is to say are particular to an historical time. So logics may change overtime 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
The metatheory approach is really helpful because on one side it captures all the main 
aspects and assumptions of the institutional logics view, and on the other side it makes 
us understand how this view is not trivial, since based on assumptions that are based on 
sociological aspects. Moreover it makes us understand that institutional logics are more 
than strategies or logics of action, since they provide legitimacy, a sense of order and an 
ontological security.  
Box 4         Ontological security 
Ontological security is a stable mental state that derives from a sense of continuity in regard to the events 
in one's life. Ontological security can be viewed as a sense of order and continuity with regard to an indi-
vidual's experiences.  Meaning in one’s own life is found by experiencing positive and stable emotions, and 
by avoiding chaos and anxiety. If an event, which is not consistent with the meaning of an individual's life 
occurs, this will threaten that individual's ontological security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adaptation from Wikipedia and Giddens (1991)
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Table 7      Institutional logics metatheory assumptions 
 
 
2.5 Conflicting institutional logics as main determinants of the 
institutional change 
Most of the studies about conflicting and competing institutional logics have been de-
veloped in order to explain what guides the institutional change. However, the compet-
ing/conflicting logics are not an explanation of the institutional change per se, but they 
are an antecedent or a consequence of the change (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), and in 
this paragraph I will try to explain why. 
Institutional logics provide the “master principles of society” and guide social action. 
They are taken-for granted resilient social prescriptions that enable actors to make sense 
of their situation by providing “assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to 
interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour and how to 
succeed” (Thornton 2004, p. 70). As previously said, and starting now with this 
definition, Institutional logics are important because they are organizing principles that 
Source: personal adaptation from Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 
 ASSUMPTION EXPLANATION 
 
EMBEDDED AGENCY 
 
individuals and organizations are embedded within the prevailing institution-
al logics. This means that decisions and outcomes are a result of the inter-
play between individual agency and structure: this  means and ends of indi-
viduals and organizations’ interests are enabled and constrained by the pre-
vailing institutional logics. 
SOCIETY AS AN INTER-
INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
The institutional logics approach views any context as potentially influenced 
by contending logics of the different societal sectors Son to locate behaviour 
in a context requires theorizing an inter-institutional system of social sectors 
in which each sector represents a different set of expectations and human 
and organizational behaviour. 
THE MATERIAL AND 
CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF INSTITUTIONS 
The institutional logics approach recognizes that institutions develop and 
change as a result of the interaction between cultural and material aspects 
of institutions 
INSTITUTIONS AT MULTIPLE 
LEVELS 
To make the institutional logics approach more precise, it is necessary to 
specify the level of analysis (e.g. individual, organizational, societal, mar-
kets, industries, inter-organizational networks, geographic communities, or 
organizational fields) with respect to the institution which is analysed (organ-
izations or groups). 
HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY Understand if the effects of economic, political, structural and normative 
forces that affect individuals and organizations are historically contingent, 
that is to say are particular to an historical time. Institutional logics may 
change overtime 
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shape the behaviours of participants of a specific context (organizational field, industry 
and so on). 
 As a consequence of this, organizational forms, strategies and managerial practices 
adopted are manifestations of, and legitimated by, institutional logics. Thus, to under-
stand how and why organizations exhibit similarity and variation in their use of such 
forms and practices it is necessary to trace the relationship between organizations and 
the logics that constitute their institutional context (Green et al., 2010). 
For Friedland and Alford (1991), organizational fields and industries may have their 
own logics but these are nested within the “central institutions of the contemporary 
capitalist West” which are potentially contradictory and hence make multiple logics 
available to individual and organizations. The same is maintained by Thornton (2004), 
who, in the most developed application of the nested hierarchy framework, states that 
Western society is comprised of multiple institutional orders or societal sectors, each of 
which has a central logic both material practices and symbols that comprise its ongoing 
principles and that are available to individuals and organizations to elaborate. The main 
institutional orders, according to Thornton (2004, p. 12), are “the market, the corpora-
tion, the professions, the family, the religions, and the state.” This means that a specific 
organizational field or industry since is nested within the central institutional orders, 
may feel the influence of any of the central institutions. This means that the presence of 
different institutions in the same field determines the presence of different conflicting or 
complementary institutional logics in the same field. As a general rule, describing the 
institutional logic that shapes/guides actors’ behaviours is useful in order to define the 
specific field of reference, but when multiple and conflicting logics “temporarily” co-
exist within the same field, this is difficult to do (Reay and Hinings, 2009). I use the 
term temporarily because in general, two or more conflicting logics cannot survive 
overtime, since actors of the specific field (context) tend to adopt and legitimate the 
values and beliefs of the dominant institutional logic, so that this logic affects their fo-
cus of attention on specific solutions and, consequently, the decisions of organizations 
which are consistent with the dominant logic. As an implication, the shift from a domi-
nant logic to another leads to an institutional change (Greenwood et al. 2010). Shifts in 
institutional logics are able to affect which economic conditions are viewed as problem-
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atic and how they can be adopted by a change in the strategy and structure of an organi-
zation (Thornton, 2002).  
It is important to mention the role that powerful actors (such as institutional entrepre-
neurs) have in determining the institutional change since they are better able to exploit 
the contradictions existing between different institutional logics in order to fulfil their 
self-interest.  So if an institutional logic is supported by the powerful actors, this con-
tributes to maintaining the status quo (Reay and Hinings, 2009) but when a new logic is 
introduced in an established field, rivalry among key actors occurs because some of 
them support the new logic and others the old one. However these conflict logics coex-
ist temporarily, that is to say only during transition times until one of the two prevails 
thus allowing the reformation of the field around the dominant logic, or around a new 
logic which is a hybrid version of the previous logics.   
A clear example of what is the conflict between institutional logics and the change in 
the dominant logic is that of Thornton (2002) about the shift from an “editorial logic” to 
a “market logic” in the U.S. publishing industry that lead to a structural change of or-
ganizations. 
The work of the author describes that until 1960s the prevalent logic in higher education 
publishing was the editorial logic (which adopts a professions logic) while starting from 
1970s, the prevalent logic becomes the market one (see table 5). However, this shift in 
logics is the result of some factors (change in market demand, need for new sources of 
capital, fast growing industry, and increase in competition) that lead to conflicting insti-
tutional logics that created pressure for the change in the organizations’ structure. So 
once one institutional logic becomes dominant, it affects a firm’s strategy and structure 
by focusing the attention of decision makers toward those issues that are consistent with 
the logic (Thornton, 2002; Thornton, 2004). 
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Table 8      Two types of institutional logics in Higher Education Publishing 
 
2.6 A Systemic and Socioemotional wealth outlook for determining 
family firms’ institutional logics 
Analysing family businesses with a focus on institutions is not a new practice in 
literature but, however, is not an easier one. Despite this, adopting an institutional 
outlook and an institutional logic viewpoint may help the field of family firms in 
understanding, respectively, family firm’s culture – intending it as the unique way that a 
family forms itself in terms of rules, roles, habits, activities, beliefs, practices - (Vallejo, 
2007) and mostly if there exist a dominant logic or a conflict among multiple logics 
(Lansberg, 1983, Bhappu, 2000). In order to explain all these aspects it is necessary to 
remain linked with the Socioemotional wealth (SEW) approach, which acts as a 
construct that tries to encompass the multiple facets that characterize family firms. In 
fact this approach give us an explanation, that I take for granted, of how family firms 
act, behave and why they are different from non-family firms. 
Despite many different typologies of family firms do exist (they range from SMEs, to 
big public companies) and operate in different industries (from the most widespread and 
recognised to the less appreciated and so controversial) one common trait holds true for 
all of them: these types of organizations exist on the boundaries of two institutional 
CHARACTERISTIC EDITORIAL LOGIC (UNTIL 60S) MARKET LOGIC (FROM 70S) 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM Personal capitalism Market capitalism 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY Publishing as a profession Publishing as a business 
LEGITIMACY Personal reputation Market position of the firm 
AUTHORITY STRUCTURES Founder-editor 
Personal networks 
Private ownership 
CEO 
Corporate parent firm 
Public ownership 
MISSION Build prestige of house 
Increase sales 
Build competitive position 
Increase profits and cash flow 
FOCUS OF ATTENTION Author-editor networks Resource competition 
STRATEGY Organic growth 
Build personal imprints 
Acquisition growth 
Build market channels 
LOGIC OF INVESTMENT Capital committed to firm Capital committed to market re-
turn 
GOVERNANCE Family ownership 
Trade association 
Market for corporate control 
HISTORICAL REASONS 
(CONTINGENCY) 
 
Source: personal adaptation from Thornton, 2002. 
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orders of society, that is to say the family and the business, each of which has its own 
norms, material practices and symbolic structures that constitute their organizing 
principles (Bhappu, 200), in one world its own institutional logics. 
Lansberg (1983) without adopting an institutional logics approach – since it was not 
introduced yet – sustains that there is an institutional difference between family and 
business, based essentially on the difference between the reason for their existence. 
Family exists because its primary social function is to assure the care and nurturance of 
its members, so social relations in the family are structured in order to satisfy family 
members’ needs. Differently from the family, the primary reason for the business 
existence is the generation of goods and services via organized task behaviour and, 
consequently, social relations within firms are structured to facilitate (improve) the 
productive process (Lansberg, 1983).  
In accordance with Lansberg, but following the approach followed by Friedland and 
Alford (1991) – so using the institutional logics which are proper of the central 
institutional orders of the society– it can be highlighted that family and capitalism are 
the prevalent institutions within the family businesses. The central logic of the family is 
“to convert all social relations into reciprocal and unconditional obligations oriented 
to the reproduction of family members” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 249). Instead, 
the central logic of capitalism – which relates to the business institutional order - is the 
“accumulation and the commodification of human activity” (1991, p. 284). However 
today the family and business have logics which goes beyond to those described by 
Fridland and Alford, in fact family of today offers a broader function than the simply 
protection of the family reproductive process and, similarly the businesses of today 
serves to provide more than the accumulation of wealth under a system of capitalism. In 
fact this broader logic of the family institutional order is witnessed by the possibility of 
families to conduct and extend their positive and strict relationships through the 
(family) business, thus providing the potential to enhance the fulfilment of higher-order 
needs such as identity, security, and self-actualization for all family members involved 
in the business or, mostly, the family tries to satisfy its members’ needs through 
participation and implementation of succession practices within family businesses, thus 
changing also the function that the business have, which reflects on a different logic 
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with respect to the capitalistic one (Leaptrott,2005). So this occurs thanks to the 
presence of the institutional logics of the family. 
Lansberg defines the coexistence of these two different institutions (family and 
business) as the institutional overlap (see the figure 5) that characterizes family firms, 
and the person who mainly experiences these institutional contradictions is the founder 
since he sits at the head of both the family and the business.  
Figure 5    The institutional overlap in family firms 
 
 
 
 
This institutional overlap implicitly implies that there is the compresence of two 
different institutional logics that, following the reasoning applied in the previous 
paragraph, are conflicting at a specific time. However if the conflicting institutional 
logics perspective is followed, it can be said that there is a moment in which one logic 
should prevail on the other, and this is what Lansberg sustains too. In fact the author 
maintains that while the institutional overlap is helpful at the introduction and growing 
phase of a  
Source: Lansberg, 1983
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company’s lifecycle, it can be problematic during the maturity phase. This can be 
explained by the fact that during the first stages of the firm’s life, the family logics 
(practices and symbols) allows the development of a sense of commitment and 
identification within the firm while when the business matures, new organizational 
forms and practices are necessary to survive and business logics (capitalistic logics) 
emerge, thus creating an institutional overlap problem that concretises in a conflict of 
logics.  
Tagiuri and Davis, by introducing the “three circle model” (see the figure 6) (1982) 
maintain a systemic view of family businesses, which are composed by three 
subsystems: ownership, family and business. 
This systemic approach is in line with the historical contingency assumption proper of 
the institutional logics as a metatheory. In fact, as a logic prevails in a specific period of 
time due to some specific institutional events, in the same way a specific subsystem (or 
logic) may prevail in family businesses – thus having Ownership-first businesses, 
Family-first business or Business/management-first businesses (Poza, 2010) – that may 
develop in a specific filed according to specific reasons, as occurred in the case of the 
organizations’ structural change occurred in the U.S. publishing industry described by 
Thornton (2002). 
So, the conflict between the two dominant institutional logics occurs and one dominates 
the other at a specific time by applying the view of Lansberg and the systemic approach 
(Davis, 1983). 
But if a different view of family businesses is followed, that is the SEW construct, what 
about the conflicting institutional logics? Does one prevail over the other into a specific 
time or do they coexist? 
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Figure 6     The System’s Theory Model of Family Busines 
Socioemotional wealth is a latent explanatory construct that tries to capture the most 
important traits of family businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Simply put, the SEW model suggests that family firms are typically motivated by, and 
committed to, the preservation of their SEW, referring to nonfinancial aspects or 
“affective endowments” of family owners. In this formulation, gains or losses in SEW 
represent the pivotal frame of reference that family-controlled firms use to make major 
strategic choices and policy decisions (Berrone et al., 2012). So this came to be in line 
with what said before: the institutional logics of the family and of the business become 
brader - going beyond those described by Friedland and Alford (1983) about family and 
capitalism -. This occurs because these logics tend to become strictly connected and 
interdependent since the business becomes the means through which the family logic 
can be supported, and the family becomes the reason of the (family) business existence. 
This diagram is referred to as the Three Circle Model by Tagiuri and Davis. This diagram illustrates the unique dynamics 
and proper balance of family businesses as a unique system composed by three subsystems (Ownership, Family and 
Business). There are 7 unique interwoven and interdependent groups all with their own perspective, needs, and goals. 
Source: Renato Tagiuri and John A. Davis. Found in “Bivalent Attributes of the Family Firm.” 1982 
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  In this perspective, the logic of the family business - despite the wealth creation 
remains influent - becomes the value creation, since also the pursuit of non-economic 
goals remains pivotal (Chrisman et al., 2003), while the logic of the family becomes the 
desire to exercise authority, enjoyment of family influence, maintenance of clan 
membership within the firm, appointment of trusted family members to important posts, 
retention of a strong family identity, continuation of the family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007) – the socioemotional wealth model.  
However it is impossible to track a boundary between these two logics within family 
firms because they are “nested”, meaning that they feed off each other and this affects 
the organization’s goals, strategies and structure, thus allowing legitimacy by the family 
and by the business logics and survival in the long run. 
This seems to be in line with what is sustained by Bhappu (2000) who focuses her work 
on identifying the reasons at the basis of the persistence of Japanese organizational 
models - corporate networks or keiretsu – despite there is a pressure to emulate of 
Western organizational models in Japan. The authoress in describing the historical 
evolution of Japanese organizations, defines the ie – which was the basic unit of the 
Japanese society until the second world war and which identifies people within the same 
roof – as the foundation of the Japanese industrial organizations. This system is based 
on the ko and on – ko refers to duty to parents and on refers to the reciprocal obligations 
between family members. This system of duties and rights (ko and on) was adopted by 
merchant households to regulate their groups of companies (the parent was the honke 
while the branch was the bunke) that they began to establish. These groups of 
companies were identified as dozuku which became the structural template for the 
family firms conglomerate in Japan, which during the industrialization period brought 
the name of zaibatsu (Bhappu, 2000). After the Second World War, there were 
pressures from Western occupants to make Japanese industrial organizations to abandon 
this zaibatsu structure. Today Japanese corporate networks are called keiretsu which are 
not only composed by family members, but whose structure still remains embedded in 
family honke-bunke arrangement typical of the dozuku which is the institutional logic 
for Japanese firms (Bhappu,2008).  
All this supports and reinforce the embeddedness between the business and family 
logics in family businesses and, actually confirms that since the more the two 
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institutional logics become nested, the more they survive in a specific organizational 
field even if one institutional order (as the family in the Japanese evidence of keiretsu) 
comes to be less present with the course of time. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The main aspects resulting from this chapter is that institutions are in a situation of 
complementarity with the choice and decision-making aspects of agents. This 
complementarity is based on the fact that institutional theory is at the basis of individual 
choices in the sense that these ones may be taken considering the influence that some 
constraint or values may have on the individual agent: for example, considering  the 
assumptions of Agency theory “self-interest” and “risk-aversion” I could say that maybe 
they exist because the agent is influenced by specific rules, norms or values in 
expressing his own preferences, thus implying a behaviour which is opportunistic with 
respect to that of the principal. These constraint, values beliefs and norms are 
Institutions. 
What is really important to understand is that it is not possible to comprehend individual 
or even organizational structures and behaviours without locating them into a societal 
context, which is the institutional context. According to what has been said, the 
attention on this chapter has been put in the analysis of how institutions through their 
logics, shape organizations’ behaviours, actions and structures. Although as a general 
case it can be said that in all organizations exists a conflict among institutional logics – 
since, in general, they co-exist overtime since the organization is always put under 
pressure from the external environment –, family firms experience according to 
Lansberg (1983) the so called “institutional overlap” problem, this meaning that there is 
the co-existence of two different logics, that of the family and that of the business. Even 
thought, in general, the conflict among different institutional logics is limited in time 
since one logic defeats the other, in family businesses there is not such scenario, but the 
coexistence of these two logics makes these type of businesses to behave or to take 
actions in specific ways that do not take into account only profit maximization but 
which consider also more socioemotional aspects which are mainly related to the family 
logic. However the possibility to track a boundary between these two institutional logics 
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is really impossible since they are nested and in chapter four will be reported the results 
that witness this particular overlap, and the role that it has in family run tobacco shop. 
  
3. CHAPTER 
LEGITIMACY AND STIGMATIZATION OF 
CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRIES: A FOCUS ON 
GLOBAL AND ITALIAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
3.1 Premise 
The analysis of his chapter about legitimacy on one side and on stigma on the other side 
is done in order to underline the condition in which controversial firms or firms 
operating in controversial industries find themselves: they strive to gain legitimacy 
(Reast et al., 2013) in order to survive in the long run. Legitimacy can be defined in a 
nutshell as a sort of “social acceptance” of organizations and their activities since they 
are fully compliant with the surrounding institutional context. Controversial industries – 
as companies which commercialize goods like tobacco, weapons or alcohol - are seen in 
a negative way by external people and for this reason, these are contested organizations 
or, even better, stigmatized organizations. Using a simple definition, stigma can be 
intended as a set of negative and often unfair beliefs that a society or group of people 
have about something (Merriam-Webster). Since this problem of stigma exits also in 
tobacco shops – which are at the basis of this study – it is necessary to understand if 
they feel a stigma and what are the elements that legitimate their activity.  
So the analysis of legitimacy and stigma is done in order to track the characteristics of a 
sector, that of the tobacco shops, which is at the basis of this work. 
Moreover an overview of the tobacco market is done, firstly at global level and later at 
the Italian level, in order to better understand the market of tobacco and the sector of 
tobacco shops since they are important for the Italian economy and for the family 
business literature in particular due to their specific nature that make them to be only 
family run.  
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3.2 Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy, as stated in the previous chapter, emerged between ‘70s and 
’80, when “new institutionalists” reconceptualised the excessive and no more adequate 
rational view of institutions. Surely also the abandon of the rationalistic perspective 
(Black  Box), and the acceptance of the open system perspective on organizations 
(Scott, 1987; Maurer 1971) contributed to the widening of the firms’ boundaries, thus 
allowing a focus on legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995) and 
isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). 
Meyer and Rowan (10977) affirm that since organization exist in highly 
institutionalized contexts, they incorporate practices and procedures – or logics -  which 
allow legitimization. By doing this, organizations increase their likelihood to survive 
since they are socially accepted. So legitimacy can be intended as an alternative 
explanation to the sources of formal structure of organizations : formal structures 
(positions, policies, programs and procedures) are manifestations (or reflection) of 
powerful institutional rules which function as highly rationalized myths that are binding 
on particular organizations.  
According to Suchman (1995) legitimacy can be defined as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” – which 
means appropriate with respect to institutions. 
According to Suchman, organizations seek legitimacy for many reasons, but the most 
important are essentially the attainment of continuity and/or credibility, and the 
attainment of passive and/or active support. 
However, in general legitimacy enhances the stability and also the comprehensibility of 
the organization and, specifically, of the organizational activities. These two aspects, 
however, often enhance each other – mutually reinforcing - even if organizational 
behaviours do not foster them in equal degrees (Suchman, 1995). So if an organization 
is legitimated, it would appear desirable and proper in the eyes of the external audience, 
and this improves its understanding and persistence.  
Studies on organizational legitimacy can be divided on two camps: the strategic 
legitimacy – which depicts legitimacy as an operational resource that organizations 
extract, competitively, form their cultural environment and that they exploit through 
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managerial practices in order to achieve their goals -, and the institutional legitimacy – 
which depicts legitimacy as an institutionalization process – abundantly analysed. 
However Suchman in his article (1995) by extending the meaning of 'legitimacy', 
without referring to the strategic or the institutional legitimacy but rather to the 
organizational one, distinguishes also among three broad types of legitimacy - which are 
not mutually exclusive and often coexist -, considered as a perception and response by 
external audiences to an organization. They are the pragmatic, the moral and the 
cognitive legitimacy. 
 Pragmatic legitimacy relies upon the self-interests of an organization’s immediate 
stakeholders and their think about actions and behaviours taken by the organization 
and their effects. This immediacy involves direct exchanges between the organiza-
tion and the stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). 
 Moral legitimacy, differently from the pragmatic legitimacy, is “sociotropic” in the 
sense that relies on the judgement about whether the activity performed by the or-
ganization is the right thing to, that is to say moral. This legitimacy focuses more on 
if the social impact of an organization’s activity is positive (Suchman,1995).  
 The last type of legitimacy is the cognitive legitimacy. This is created when an or-
ganization pursues goals that society deems to be proper and desirable (Suchman, 
1995). Stakeholders support the organization because of its taken-for-granted cultur-
al character, so in a certain sense its adequacy with institutions. So with cognitive 
legitimacy organizations are deemed necessary or inevitable. 
These three types of legitimacy are interrelated and they do not constitute a strict 
hierarchy. It should be pointed out that while moral and pragmatic legitimacy deal with 
some form of evaluation, cognitive legitimacy does not. However since pragmatic 
legitimacy is based on audience’s self-regarding utility while moral and cognitive 
legitimacy imply more cultural aspects, according to Suchman these last two types of  
legitimacy are more difficult to obtain and to manipulate because they are  more 
profound and rooted in cognitive aspects. 
The existence of these different types of legitimacy dynamics allows room for 
organizations to implement different strategies to challenge legitimacy gaining, 
legitimacy maintaining and legitimacy repairing. 
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Table 9      Legitimacy challenges and strategies 
 
 
3.3 Legitimacy seeking strives for controversial and stigmatized 
organizations. 
Organizational legitimacy in an important requisite for an organization, to survive in 
long run. However, the social acceptance of every organization operating in a specific 
institutional context is not guaranteed, especially for those organizations which are 
deemed to be controversial or operate in a controversial industry. These types of 
organizations suffer from illegitimacy, meaning that they are socially negatively 
evaluated because of their attributes, thus being categorized with a spoiled image or 
stigma (Hudson, 2008).  
3.3.1 Stigma and organizational responses for its avoidance 
An organization social acceptance cannot be taken for granted. Despite many 
organizations operating in a specific industry or sector, they may be disapproved by 
some audience while being approved by others. Those organizations which do not or 
cannot experience legitimacy are stigmatized. Hudson (2008) identifies two types of 
stigma on the basis of its persistence over time, so that the stigma (or illegitimacy) 
resulting from anomalous and episodic events can be referred as event-stigma, while if 
illegitimacy – that can be intended as stigmatization – is attributed because of the nature 
of the organization’s activities or attributes, we have the core-stigma. Core-stigma – 
Source: Adapted from Suchman, 1995 
 
CHALLENGES STRATEGIES 
Gaining: obtaining acceptance among the public 
 Conform to environments 
 Select among environments that will 
grant legitimacy 
 Manipulate environments according to 
organizational needs (usually through 
product advertising) 
Maintaining: coping with shocks and problems 
that undermine legitimacy 
 Perceive changes and foresee future 
challenges 
 Protect past accomplishments  
Repairing: restoring legitimacy after an unex-
pected crisis 
 Offer normalizing accounts (denying, jus-
tifying or explaining the problem) 
 Do a strategic restructuring 
 Avoid panic and act patiently instead of 
desperately trying to recover legitimacy 
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which is the main stigma that affects controversial organizations – is an “evaluation 
held and often expressed by some audiences (stakeholders) that an organization or set 
of organization is discounted, discredited, and/or tainted in some way owing to some 
core attribute or attributes” (Hudson, 2008). So given this distinction, organizations as 
abortion service providers, strip clubs, pornographers, multinational companies and 
gambling and tobacco companies are all organizations that suffer some degree of core-
stigma because of their very controversial nature.  
According to what has been said, for an organization being stigmatized indicates that 
there is something of its aspects that others in the environment deem incompatible with 
their own values, thus leading the organization to be seen as suspect, untrustworthy and 
damaged. This core stigmatization is the result of a comparison that individuals make 
between the organization’s core activities or attitudes and their own values, belief 
systems and ideologies, in one word with existing institutions. So the more is the 
difference between audience values, beliefs, and ideologies and the core attributes of the 
organization, the more is the likelihood of being stigmatized. 
As an implication, core-stigma is related with sociocultural aspects and historical 
periods because the same organizations may be stigmatized in a specific social 
environment or context while in another not as they could be now stigmatized (e.g. as 
the discovery of negative environmental impacts of a company’s activity) while in the 
past they were not.  
Singe the core stigma seems to do not leave space to organizations’ survival, how do 
organizations release themselves from this negative attributions ordeal with them? 
Organizational responses identified by Hudson (2008) to core-stigma attribution and 
impact are divided in three combinable strategies: strategic responses, structural 
responses and network level responses. The aim of these three responses is surely that 
of fostering the long term living through the overcome or coexistence of the core-
stigma. 
 Strategic responses are put in practice with three sub-strategies which are: 
o Specialist strategies, whose aim is to bypass stigma operating as special-
ists rather than generalists. This means operating as a single business 
specialized in one or few of their units, instead of expanding their busi-
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ness because diversification is complex to achieve because of the threat 
of transferring stigma to new lines of business. 
o Hiding strategies, whose aim is to operate by using dislocate or not much 
visible locations, architectures or advertisement in order to avoid a great-
er exposure to stigmatizing audiences. 
o Challenging strategies, whose aim is to cope with negative evaluations 
deriving from the stigmatizing audiences. Her the organization tries to 
“fight” against these who formulate a negative judgement, publicizing 
their activity. 
 Structural responses deal with core-stigma by acting on the structure and size of the 
organization. Usually, highly stigmatized companies keep a small structure and di-
mension in order to follow hiding strategies. 
 Network-level responses, finally, deal with core-stigma by focusing efforts in order 
to avoid transferring stigma to network partners because this may cause negative 
economic consequence. 
Coping with core-stigma is really important for the acceptance and legitimization of 
organizations, since it is a chronic and persistent condition that the organizations which 
are classified as controversial experience. The analysis of these organizations will be 
analysed in the next subparagraph. 
3.3.2 Controversial organizations defined 
Previous paragraphs concerning the problem of legitimacy and stigmatization with 
respect the institutional context in which an organization operates, have been pivotal in 
order to understand the research conducted on the Tobacco shops. In fact legitimacy and 
stigmatization problems mainly concern those firms which are not socially accepted 
because they operate in controversial industries or because their mission or the activities 
they perform are not related to the values and beliefs proper of a specific institutional 
context. However the categorization of controversial industry sectors, industry or 
organization is not so easy, since this categorization (as for stigma) strongly depends on 
the time period in which the organization operates and on the culture which 
characterizes a specific industry, so what is controversial today or in a specific region, 
was not controversial in the past or is not controversial in another region. Reast et al. 
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(2013) defines controversial industries as those who “relate to products, services or 
concepts that for reasons of delicacy, decency, morality, or even fear, elicit reaction of 
distaste, disgust, offence or outrage when mentioned or when openly presented, such as 
alcohol, gambling firearms, pornography, or tobacco”. Since stakeholders evaluate 
organizations’ legitimacy on the basis of how much their mission and actions are distant 
from their values, culture or beliefs, these organizations are strictly scrutinized, thus 
making the legitimization problem really chronic for them. Even if we adopt an 
institutional logic perspective, it seems to be difficult to track which are the prevailing 
logics that give legitimacy to these controversial organizations and, through the 
application of the institutional logics approach in family run tobacco shops, I try to 
explain and understand the legitimizing effects that institutional logics have on the sale 
of more (less) controversial products. 
 
3.4 A focus on a controversial industry: the tobacco industry 
3.4.1 The tobacco industry worldwide. 
Since its early discovery, tobacco represented an important element of Native 
Americans’ culture. Later, thanks to the colonization process started by Europeans 
toward the America, form the new continent tobacco started to spread also in the Old 
Continent. Tobacco represents an important resource for different countries since it is 
the main source of wealth and also because it fosters employment, thus making its 
production and its related activities significant for them  (Warner, 2000). The main 
tobacco producers are reported in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Study of Family Firms: context and theories 
90 
Table 10    Leading tobacco producing Countries 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the world today over 1 billion of smokers can be counted and they smoke 6 billions 
of cigarettes in a year. So on average each smoker smokes about 6.5 kg of tobacco per 
year, with a consumption of about 1600 cigarettes per year. However this trend is 
increasing in the developing countries since 1970s (where the tobacco consumption is 
increased of the 64%) where surely anti-smoking campaigns are not as strong as those 
in Europe, thus allowing multinational tobacco companies to have a stronger presence 
in there (Warner, 2000). As also illustrated in the previous table, the main tobacco 
producer remains China, where about three thousands millions of smokers consume 
1.880 billion of cigarettes per year, meaning that one smoker on four is Chinese 
(www.smettere-di-fumare.it). This trend is confirmed by Figure 7 which shows that 
from 2005 to 2013, the Asian Pacific region market increased its percentage of the 
global cigarette market from 54% to 64%, while Western European and North 
American markets reduced respectively from 12% to 8% and from 8% to 6%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY PRODUCTION IN ONE THOUSAND METRIC TONS 
China 2.995,4 
Brazil 862,4 
India 720,7 
United States of 
America 
379,5 
Indonesia 196,3 
Pakistan 129,9 
Malawi 126,3 
Argentina 119,4 
Zambia 112,05 
Mozambique 97,08 
 Source: www.statista.com 
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Figure 7    Global cigarette market by region 
 
 
 
 
However that fact that the global cigarettes market is changed in this way,  mostly 
depends on the strict regulations that different countries have imposed to cigarettes and 
on the tobacco industry in general. At the basis of these regulations there is the 
necessity to mitigate the negative effects deriving from smoking cigarettes, so 
regulation acts as a way of monitoring and creating incentive to reduce the consumption 
of smoking.  
For this reason, companies which produce this good, as well as retailers who sell it, are 
always subject to laws and state interventions, which differ from Country to Country.  
The main problem is that the intervention of the State in almost countries through the 
development of monopolies (Wettenhall, 2011) may create a problem of legitimacy for 
the state itself and this is because it acts as “victim and also as butcher”. This is due to 
the fact that on one side the state must take care of the community and so it acts against 
tobacco industries in order to reduce the consumption of tobacco products, but on the 
other side the state is not able to fight against these products because they are a secure 
and big source of its revenues, given the monopoly. The only way to fight is though the 
health care spending.  So some people criticize the state intervention and others instead 
regard positively this intervention. 
Source: Euromonitor International, 2013, qtd. in global.tobaccofreekids.org, 2014
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In fact in Italy, for example, according the fifteenth Nomisma Report on tobacco 
industry, the state in 2010 earned, from cigarettes and tobacco associated products, 13,7 
billions of euros of which 10,62 billions derived from “accise” duties. 
Before analysing the Italian tobacco market, it is necessary to underline that only few 
multinational companies dominate the cigarette market, as showed in the figure 8. 
Ordering them according to their market share, they are: China National Tobacco 
Corporation (43%); Philip Morris International (14%), which owns Marlboro, the most 
recognized cigarettes brand; British American Tobacco (12%), whose main labels are 
Pall Mall and Lucky Strike; Japan Tobacco International (9%), the one that produces 
Winston cigarettes; and Imperial Tobacco (5%), which has among its key brands 
Davidoff, West and Rizla. 
Figure 8    Tobacco company shares of global cigarette market, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 A closer look at the Italian tobacco Industry. 
In Italy, the tobacco economy is in the hands of the Autonomous Administration of 
State Monopolies (AAMS), born in 1927 (Wettenhall, 2011). 
Today smokers in Italy are around 11,5 millions which means that the 22% of  the 
Italian population smokes and is addicted to cigarettes: 6,9 millions of males (the 27,3% 
of the total male population) and 4,6 millions of females (representing the17,2% od f 
the whole female population). Non smokers are 33,8 millions and they represent the 
64,4% of the Italian population, while ex-smokers are 7,1 millions, thus representing the 
13,5% of the entire Italian population. 
Source: Euromonitor International, 2013, qtd. in global.tobaccofreekids.org, 2014 
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 It can be observed a small increment in 2016 of the prevalence of smokers with respect 
to the 2015males pass from the 25,1% to the 27,3% while females pass from 16,9% of 
2015 to the17,2% in 2016. 
The average consumption of cigarettes among smokers amount to 13 per day for each 
smoker. The 71,1% of smokers have lighted their first cigarette when they were 
between 15 and 17 old: and this age is really critical for people to start smoking. 
However these numbers support an Italian tobacco market, which according to the study 
of Federazione Italiana Tabaccai (2010), since the middle of the twentieth century the 
value of the sales of tobacco related products hasn't stopped growing; while, the 
quantity sold has not ever more gone over the peak of the middle 80's, with around 110 
millions of kilos, as showed in Figure 9. In fact during 80s many tobacco shops were 
opened since it was a very profitable business, thus leading to the really capillary 
network that today tobacco shops represent: 55thousands of shops are distributed within 
the entire Italian territory.  However the progressive increase in the price of these 
products, which is more more than doubled from the one of the middle 80's, has lead to 
a decrease in the quantity sold. 
Figure 9    Tobacco sales trend in the  Italian market (1946-2006) 
 
 
This trend of the tobacco sales in Italy is also confirmed by the analysis resulting from 
the Nomisma Report of 2010, which affirm that the Italian production of cigarettes have 
decreased from 1975 to 2010, where starting from 80s we have a negative peak in 
Source: Adapted from Federazione Italiana Tabaccai, 2010
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production. In contrast to this, the imports of cigarettes have started to increase in order 
to bridge the minor Italian production.  
Figure 10  Import and export trends of Italian market 
 
 
For what concerns the tobacco products consumption the Italian tobacco market is 
interested by a decrease in the cigarettes consumption while other products consumption 
as cigars, small cigars and fine-cut (rolling) tobacco is increasing 
 
Figure 11  Tobacco products consumption in Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since this market in Italy have a great importance – as showed by data – a great 
attention has been given by the Italian state through different legislative interventions, 
in order to lessen the negative impacts of smoking, both on who actually consumes the 
Source: Pantini and  Lunati, 2009  
Source: XV Rapporto Nomisma: la filiera del tabacco in Italia  
Cigarettes Little Cigars Cigars Rolling tobacco 
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product, but also on those who are around him as well as on society at large. After the 
great smoking regulation given by the antismoking law in 20031, in Italy a new path of 
change has been followed thanks to the introduction of the Legislative Decree. N. 6 of 
12 January 2016 transposing the European Directive 2014/40 / EU. This new decree has 
introduced many changes, of which the main ones are listed below: 
 Writings on packages. Sentences Threatening phrases which have been for long are 
long on packages, now will be more precise explicitly describing the effects of 
smoking on one’s own health. Moreover shoking images will be put on packages. 
 Minor and sanctions. Tobacconist will receive a higher sanction if they sell ciga-
rettes to minors which goes from a fine to the  suspension or revocation of the  li-
cense. 
 Places where smoking is forbidden. In the car, in the presence of minors or pregnant 
women. 
 Packages of 10 and flavoured cigarettes. Packages of 10 cigarettes are not sold an-
ymore since costing less they are more appealing for young guys. It is also severely 
restricted the sale of aromatic cigarettes (menthol, vanilla) that cover the bad taste of 
smoking and therefore stimulate the habit. The amount of loose tobacco contained in 
a package is also limited: a maximum of 30 grams. 
With these measures, aimed especially to reduce tobacco consumption among young 
people, it has been estimated by the EU Commission that this intervention may lower 
consumption by 2% in 5 years (Perrone, 2015). 
For what concerns tobacco shops, it is necessary to highlight that, according to 
Federazione Italiana Tabaccai (2011), this sector is experiencing some kind of 
transformation of the services offered, and this can be seen both in a positive and in a 
negative sense. In fact, over the years there has been a common trend towards 
diversification for tobacco stores, selling products exchanged according to market rules, 
and not only goods subject to State Monopoly. So, besides commercializing traditional 
products, such as cigarettes, cigars and revenue stamps, most of them now include 
among their offer slot machines and other games (i.e. lotteries, soccer pools and other 
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betting games), tickets for public transports, stationery products, foodstuffs and, 
according to the more recent trend, financial services, such as paying bills, topping up 
credit cards and cashing in vouchers.  
The main emblem of the evolution of the tobacco shops has been the creation of an on-
line bank (ITB) completely created for the category of tobacconists thought to allow 
them to offer banking services tailored to the needs of retailers of monopoly Genres. 
Collection and payment services designed to meet the needs of clients can be 
implemented in the tobacco shop thus allowing them to offer new services such as the 
payment of the F24, the issuance and payment of vouchers INPS, the RAV discount 
service and payment of all postal and banking Bulletins. Recently this platform has been 
acquired by Banca Intesa and the aim of this acquisition is to pass more bank services to 
tobacco shops, and this on one side slims down banks from traditional services and 
gives new opportunities for diversification to tobacco shops 
Another particular feature of these shops is their capillarity: they are widespread in 
almost all Italian territory and it is estimated in Italy that there exists a tobacco shop 
every 1.000 people. This makes them the widest network of stores in the country. 
Nevertheless, they are slightly decreasing in Italy in recent years. The peak was reached 
in the middle 80's with nearly 62.000 tobacco shops, against the reduced amount of 
55.000 of today. 
Another aspect which is the most important for this study is that they usually are family-
run businesses.  This is due to the particular nature of the license which is necessary to 
run a tobacco store: it requires that its owner personally runs the shop. However since 
this is not always possible, usually the owner avails himself of someone among his 
closest relatives (e.g. his son or wife) which most of the times will inherit the enterprise. 
This original duty of the owner to personally manage his shop has been lessened in the 
last few years, from the first law of 1957, and now three kinds of people can work 
inside a tobacco shop: 
 Coadiutore familiare: Up to two people can be appointed to assist the owner in the 
management of the store and they need to be owner’s close relatives. 
 Assistente: It’s an employee (assistant), who can also be a non-family member, but 
when he works, the presence of the owner or of the coadiutore is required. 
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 Rappresentante; when the owner cannot manage his shop for long periods of time, 
can appoint an agent who acts on his behalf. The agent can be a coadiutore, an em-
ployee or even an external person. 
Tobacco shops can be seen as a particular form of franchising, in which the franchisor is 
the State, which grants them the exclusive right to sell some products, in exchange for 
royalties and other duties. 
Italian tobacco stores have to be distinguished among ordinary and special stores (i.e. 
those inside train and bus stations, malls and gas stations) in addition to highly attended 
bars which require a special license, called “patentino” to distribute tobacco products 
bought from the closest tobacco store. The license necessary in order to run a tobacco 
shop have to be requested to the State Monopolies, but it cannot be completely sold by 
the State, which owns it and only grants a concession regime. It lasts nine years, after 
which it can be renewed, and it can be transferred only according to special rules: for 
instance, it is often given to sons, close relatives or employees of the former owner. 
There exist norms which impose, for example, that ordinary stores must be distant from 
200 to 300 m each other, depending on the population of the town, and that there must 
be one store every 1.500 citizens in those towns which have up to 10.000 inhabitants. 
Their licence lasts two years and may be renewed only if a certain amount of money is 
earned through the sale of tobacco products (www.agenziadoganemonopoli.gov.it, 
2017). 
According to the survey made by FIT (2014), tobacconists are deemed to be informed, 
trustworthy and reliable people, who comply with the law. Moreover, customers tend to 
go always to the same tobacco shop for convenience, but also for the politeness of the 
tobacconist. Finally, they don't perceive it as a tainted place, but as a reference point for 
the entire neighbourhood, in which a lot of social relations take place. These findings 
are surprising, as tobacconists actually sell harmful and sinful products, but they are not 
stigmatized as expected, according to the literature review examined in the previous 
paragraph. They have also public and economical roles, due to the particular products 
and services they sell; for example, they also collect taxes on behalf of the State. 
Moreover, contrary to common wisdom, tobacconists make very low margins on most 
of their goods. Table 12 shows the percentages of what a tobacconist effectively earn on 
10€, which is the average amount of money spent inside a tobacco shop by a customer 
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Table 11    Tobacconists' margin over 10 euros spent 
 
 
From the previous table it can be seen that, on 10€ spent by a customer, the tobacconist 
earns only 0,78€.  
 
Figure 12 Products' contribution to final profits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the contribution of each type of product to this margin; the more profit-
able ones are tobacco products, followed by games and lotteries, while the less 
profitable ones are services and this is in line with what has been confirmed by the 
tobacconists interviewed for our case study, even if they have evidenced a decrease in 
tobacco porducts’ profitability and an increase in that of games. This is one of the main 
drawbacks of this job, highlighted by many tobacconists, as they sell a product on 
behalf of the State, but the State itself takes great part of the earnings. Therefore, if a 
 AVERAGE INCOME 
(CUSTOMER EXPENSE) 
MARGIN 
(%) 
MARGIN 
(€) 
Source: Adapted from Federazione Italiana Tabaccai, 2010 
TOBACCO PRODUCTS 3,40€ 
(34,0%) 
9,52% 0,32€ 
(41,6%) 
VARIOUS PRODUCTS 0,20€ 
(2,0%) 
48,13% 0,10€ 
(12,2%) 
GAMES AND LOTTERIES 3,97€ 
(39,7%) 
7,52% 0,30€ 
(38,3%) 
SERVICES 2,45€ 
(24,3%) 
2,53% 0,06€ 
(7,9%) 
 10,00€ 7,78% 0,78€ 
Source: Adapted from Federazione Italiana Tabaccai, 2010 
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tobacco shops wants to be profitable it has to focus on the quantity of the products sold, 
not on the single sale, and this is the reason why many of them include different 
products in their shops, preferably those ones that are not subject to the State 
Monopolies intervention (such as candies, stationery products and costume jewellery). 
Another important negative aspect associated to this job is the huge risk of robberies to 
which tobacconists are exposed. This happens because in these stores circulates more 
and more cash, due to the increasingly high number of services they offer, in particular 
financial ones, which is making them more and more similar to post offices, or even 
banks. But, differently from these two, a tobacco shop does not have advanced security 
systems like they have, and this makes these shops an attractive target for thieves. 
Moreover the presence of slot machines in certain tobacco shops increases the 
likelihood of repercussions since problematic people tend to spend much time in the 
shop. One particularly negative aspect of this kind of economic activity is the fact that 
tobacconists do not have many levers through which increasing the profitability of their 
store, which depends a lot on its location. Since prices of many products are fixed by 
the State (i.e. cigarettes and revenue stamps), the single entrepreneur makes money only 
through a low margin on these products and often feel frustrated since he invest much 
money but is not free to take personal entrepreneurial initiatives. The only possibility to 
increase margins is by introducing in its product/services portfolio products not related 
to tobacco which may even be controversial (as slot machines). 
Table 12 summarizes all the strengths and weaknesses of the tobacco shops network 
together with the risks and opportunities of the Country’s market 
Table 12   Swot analysis of tobacco shops 
THE MARKET THE TOBACCO SHOPS NETWORK 
RISKS (THREATS) OPPORTUNITIES STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
- Consumption con-
traction 
- Anti-smoking regula-
tions 
- Robberies 
- Inelastic demand with 
respect to price increas-
es for the non-
substitutable good 
- Innovate by enlarging 
offering through contro-
versial and non-
controversial products  
- Any new innovation de-
riving from the State in-
tentions 
- Protected market, 
both for the network 
and the single tobac-
conist (low competi-
tion) 
- Trustworthy customer 
relationships 
- Link with the State 
enforced by the exclu-
sivity 
- No marketing levers 
can be used 
- Low margins on Mo-
nopoly products 
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3.4.3 Italian Tobacco Shops as Family firms 
As said before, for the particular nature of the licence necessary to run a tobacco shop in 
Italy and also because of trust aspects which will be analysed later, this kind of 
companies are often family run and, for this reason, some considerations about family 
businesses have to be made. Moreover it is necessary to specify that tobacco shops are 
not big corporations, and this implies that, as they are simple retailers and for this they 
do not have any degree of stock ownership, thus best fitting also with the analysis of 
agency theory on SMEs described in the first chapter. 
There exist a variety of definitions of family businesses in the literature. Poza's one 
(2010) synthetizes most of them, as it defines these businesses as "a unique blending of 
family, management, and ownership subsystems to form an idiosyncratic family 
business system"  
According to the author, family businesses incorporate: 
 Ownership control by two or more family members 
 Strategic influence by family members on company management 
 Attention to family relationships 
 The dream of continuity across generations. 
However in the application of the SEW approach the previous listed elements, which 
are incorporated by family business, are also at the basis of the family run tobacco 
shops which from this point of view are not an exception, and this is confirmed also by 
this definition of the main exponent of the socioemotional wealth approach and which 
considers family firms those where family owner influences and controls the company's 
business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  
Taking into account all this, in this study the SEW construct is helpful because it can be 
used as the basis of (or to understand) the family logics within the tobacco shops’ 
sector. In fact one way to understand why family run tobacco shops act in a specific 
way in terms of innovation followed and in terms of organizational aspects, is to 
understand the prevailing logics that influence these small enterprises. So what I do is to 
enlarge the concept of family institutional logics prescribed by Friedland and Alford 
(1991) in order to adapt it to the context of family business which is mainly rooted in 
the SEW construct. Ideally, these kind of tobacco shops are shaped by more than one 
logic (the family one), since they have to face struggles related to the presence of 
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controversial industry logics in which they operate and deriving from the fact that they, 
almost always, tend to offer products related to non-controversial industry logics. This, 
however, creates an overlap between logics: between family and business logics on one 
side, and the overlap between controversial and non-controversial industry logics on the 
other side since, as said before they offer within their shop both type of products. The 
way in which these two overlaps interact will be analysed in the next chapter.  
According to what has been said until now, I propose which are (ideally) the main 
logics which are present within the family run tobacco shops, through the table 13 
 
Table 13    Ideal logics simultaneously present in family run tobacco shops 
 
 FAMILY BUSINESS OVERLAP 
CONTROVERSIAL AND  
NON-CONTROVERSIAL OVERLAP 
DIMENSIONS LOGIC OF FAMILY 
LOGIC OF 
BUSINESS 
LOGIC OF NON- 
CONTROVERSIAL 
INDUSTRY 
LOGIC OF 
CONTROVERSIAL 
INDUSTRY 
MISSION 
(ROOTED IN 
GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES OF 
ORGANIZATIONA
L GOALS) 
- Sustain the well-being 
of family members; 
- Desire to exercise fami-
ly authority; 
- Enjoyment of family in-
fluence. 
- Maintenance of the clan 
membership within the 
firm; 
- Appointment of trusted 
family members 
- Strong family identity; 
- Continuation of the fam-
ily dynasty. 
Achieve and in-
crease profitabil-
ity also exploit-
ing  market op-
portunities 
Gain customer 
loyalty 
Avoid stigmati-
zation and gain 
customer loyalty 
in order to gain 
customer loyalty 
BASIS 
OF LEGITIMACY 
(ROOTED IN 
GUIDING 
PRINCILPLES 
ABOUT SHOP 
CONCEPTUALIZ
ATION) 
- Offer a job to family 
members 
Offer quality 
products and 
services 
Offer “useful” and 
“socially 
accepted” 
products or ser-
vices. 
Offer 
“stigmatized/ 
controversial” 
products or ser-
vices, exploiting 
demand inelas-
ticity 
SOURCES OF 
LEGITIMATION 
(ALLOWED BY 
REFERENT 
AUDIENCE) 
- Family members’ ac-
ceptance; 
- Positive evaluation by 
customers and communi-
ty 
 
Market 
acceptance 
 
Market 
recognition 
Community/ 
proximate 
audience recog-
nition 
Source: Personal elaboration   
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The table is mainly divided in two sections which are the two overlaps existing in 
family run tobacco shops: between family and business and between controversial and 
non-controversial industry logics. Then for each logic it has been defined the mission 
which refers to the principles that guides the organization’s goals following that specific 
logic, the basis of legitimacy which refers to the guiding principles that determine the 
shop conceptualization according to that specific logic, and finally the sources of 
legitimation which refers to who allows for legitimacy according to each logic. As it can 
be obvious, the family and business logics proposed have been enlarged with respect to 
those proposed by Friedland and Alford (1991) and this is because as stated in the 
paragraph 2.6 in family firms the co-existence of these two logics enlarges those 
proposed by the authors and this is because some socioemotional aspects have to be 
taken into account. 
This table will be helpful during the analysis of the results obtained by the semi-
structured interview proposed to the three tobacco shops, objects of this study and one 
of the main point is to understand how the relationship between these two overlap 
works. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter is to provide some general theoretical insights, useful to help to 
understand the particular context in which tobacco shops operate. 
These stores are part of a controversial industry as they commercialize unmentionable 
products, as tobacco and games for this reason it has been necessary to give a definition 
of stigmatized and controversial industries, and to understand also how they relate to the 
external environment.  
The main contributions analysed in this field are those of Suchman (1995) and Reast et 
al. (2013) and, they allow having a clear definition of the concept of legitimacy and 
stigma.  
As it can be intended, the explanation of the concepts of legitimacy and stigma is 
important in order to better understand tobacco shops system in general and why some 
of them present more controversial traits than others. However since these concepts are 
strictly related to the open system view of firms and to institutions, the contributions of 
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the aforementioned authors can help us to better understand the role that institutional 
logics have in shaping tobacco shops’ controversial orientation. 
After the first general part, dedicated to the explanation of the characteristics of the 
controversial industries, the chapter in the second part focuses on the analysis of the 
tobacco industry at global level and then, in particular, at the Italian level in order to 
start to approach with the tobacco shop sector and so understanding more deeply the 
target of this study. 
It can be said that in general the situation of the tobacco industry presents very 
particular aspects, especially in Italy, since in additions to the aspects of stigmatization 
of its companies, there is a pervasive intervention of the State (for what concerns both 
the regulation and the appropriation of part of the income from tobacco products) and 
there are family businesses-related aspects. 
As analysed in the chapter, tobacco sales volumes are declining in recent years and this 
happens both at global and at Italian level. The biggest cigarette market is in the Asian 
Pacific region, while in Europe and North America, this market is decreasing.  
For what concerns the Italian market, the cigarettes production is decreasing, in favour 
of rising imports. The tobacco industry in this country is very bounded by the 
regulations imposed by institutions as the State. 
However, tobacco shops are a widespread network of companies in Italy and for this 
reason it is interesting to analyse them from different theoretical approaches. This job 
has some positive aspects related to the nature of the goods, which always guarantee 
some work and to the link to the State, which grants some degree of protection. But 
tobacconists have to deal also with some negative aspects, like the very low earnings on 
the single products and the absence of marketing levers that can be used to increase 
profits. 
The analysis of tobacco shops then focuses mainly on the identification of some 
elements of these businesses that for their very nature can make us to define them as 
family firms. Then, since the analysis of the institutional logic within tobacco shops 
perspective is important from the point of view of stigma and legitimacy, it has been 
necessary to identify ideally what are the main logics which are within these types of 
organizations. According to the theoretical aspects analysed, four logics have been 
deemed to co-exist in family run tobacco shops which, in their turn, create two 
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institutional overlapping situations. The first institutional overlap is that which 
characterizes all family businesses that is to say the overlap between family and 
business logics. The other overlap is strongly present in tobacco shops and is due to the 
compresence of the logics of controversial and non-controversial industries which 
guides their products portfolio and services offering. However the definition of the ideal 
family logic within tobacco shops cannot neglect to take into account aspects related to 
Socioemotional wealth, whose main elements (as the desire to exercise family authority, 
enjoyment of family influence, maintenance of the clan membership within the firm, 
appointment of trusted family members, strong family identity and continuation of the 
family dynasty) are at the basis of the family logic. 
  
4. CHAPTER 
THREE CASE STUDIES ABOUT ITALIAN 
TOBACCO SHOPS: THEORIES APPLICATION 
4.1 Premise 
This chapter focuses on the empirical part and on the observations and findings that are 
the result of the semi-structured protocol of interview proposed to some tobacconists. 
The use of a case study methodology is helpful in order to try to build some novel 
theoretical intuitions from case studies, as stated by Eisenhardt (1989), mostly in a field 
which is so atypical in the family businesses’ field. However the possibility to conduct 
an analysis of the theories analysed in the first and in the second chapter (respectively 
agency theory and Institutional logics approach), and to understand their implications in 
the field of family businesses (and in the tobacco shop sector in the specific case) 
represent an important challenge mainly because analysis on this field have not been in 
the spotlight. An important aspect is the fact that this analysis has been developed 
taking into account the socioemotional wealth (SEW) construct since this is a pervasive 
and all-encompassing construct that cannot be ignored when family businesses are 
analysed irrespective if tobacco shops are more or less controversial. The SEW 
approach mainly represent the way through which family logics can be understood. 
The framework followed in this chapter is based on the objective to allow the reader to 
understand how the case selection has been developed, the description of the case which 
is important to understand what we are talking about, and finally the main results and 
some propositions are reported in order to determine what are the conclusions of the 
work developed, taking in to account the theoretical background analysed in the first 
chapters. The main areas in which the study has been conducted are: 
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 The institutional overlap between the family and the business and the weight of each 
logic in deciding to invest in a controversial industry 
 The role that the co-existence of business and family logics (institutional overlap) 
have on product and services portfolio and innovation path pursued. 
 The institutional logics effects and function in fostering the legitimacy of the contro-
versial products and services offered. 
 Legitimacy and stigma issues toward the external environment. 
 Agency theory consideration about costs, risk and about the loss aversion concept. 
After these findings some conclusions and key propositions are derived from the 
examination of the different cases. All of the analysis developed in this chapter is 
divided in the different sections previously mentioned and, moreover, is going to be 
supported by many sentences taken from the interviews made and accompanied by per-
sonal perceptions. 
 
4.2 Case selection 
The possibility of conducting an analysis of the theoretical approaches explained in the 
first and in the second chapter (agency theory and institutional logics approach) on 
tobacco shops has been guided for mainly two reasons: a) the possibility to understand 
why these kind of businesses act in a certain way, why they adopt certain decisions on 
products (being more or less controversial) and why they are patterned in the way they 
are. So the aim is to understand what is the prevailing logic that makes them to act in a 
more (less) controversial way; b) the possibility to analyse agency elements such as 
agency costs and risk preferences in family run SMEs, best fitted with the nature of 
tobacco shops since they are, despite being a specific retail sector, both family run - 
because of their very nature - and small businesses. So according to these two reasons, 
Italian family run tobacco shops, represent a good case study in order to understand the 
points of views adopted in this thesis, and the fact that in Italy this kind of retail is so 
capillary widespread and many families are employed in these retails, represent a good 
point in order to develop family business studies in the tobacco industries, thus 
enlarging the theoretical contributions of Agency and Institutional logics approach to 
family businesses. For the case study of this thesis, I selected 4 tobacco shops in order 
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to deeply understand firstly their reality since, as already said, this is a sector which has 
been rarely studied from the theoretical approaches adopted in this thesis. The criteria 
used for the selection of the cases were essentially three: a) all tobacco shops had to be 
family owned and managed, b) they had to be located in the area of Padua; c) they had 
to present different controversial degrees (inclinations) in their products and services 
offering. 
Since the pilot case did not present the first characteristic, I decided to leave it aside in 
the cross case analysis. However from this case many findings have been obtained 
which have been useful to better understand the Italian tobacco shops’ sector reality. 
As analysed in the third chapter when talking about the Italian tobacco shops dynamics, 
there exist many kinds of retail stores in the Italian context: from the ordinary classic 
one, which sells tobacco products, revenue stamps, telephone charge cards and few 
games like “Gratta e Vinci” (scratch and win) and “Lotto”, to the one which in addition 
to the already mentioned products offers also services as bar, news-stand, betting centre 
for sports events, telematics services, voucher and F24 payments or also offers the 
possibility to play at Slot machines. So, we tried to interview shops of various types, 
assuming that some of them are more controversial than others because even if for the 
agency theory analysis the product offering was irrelevant, it played an important role 
for the analysis of the institutional logics approach and the analysis of the institutional 
overlap which interests family businesses. 
In order to identify the most controversial or non-controversial tobacco shops, I tried to 
follow the hiding strategies adopted by controversial firms to respond to the core-stigma 
defined by Hudson (2008). In fact by supposing that it exists an intrinsic controversial 
nature of tobacco shops, by seeing on the city maps where they were located and their 
shop’s sign/name I could understood if they adopted a hiding strategies to cope with 
stigma thus meaning that they were more controversial. Fortunately, this intuition with 
the exception of the pilot case has helped me in the research. 
By considering all these elements, the following list of three case studies, plus a pilot 
one which is not included in the analysis of the results, where the various tobacco stores 
are written, according to the order in which they were interviewed. 
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Table 14    List of the tobacco shops interviewed during our study 
 
The shops which are highlighted in bold in Table 14 are those which, according to the 
products and services offered, and to the perception I had within the shop, have been 
                                                 
 
2-3
 Each of the shops that were object of our study sold cigarettes, lighters, fine cut tobacco and other typi-
cal products belonging to this category, together with revenue stamps, cell phone charge cards all the to-
bacco shops that had been visited included at least some sweet and a cigarette vending machine. 
For this reason, all of these products are not included in our list, even though they were actually sold by all 
of the interviewees. 
 
 LOCATION NON-CONTROVERSIAL 
2
 
PRODUCS AND SERVICES 
CONTROVERSIAL
3
 
PRODUCTS AND 
SERVICES 
STYLE OF THE 
SHOP 
TOBACCO 
SHOP 
PILOT 
Padua 
(Arcella district), 
not so much   
hidden 
- Western union 
- Ticket One ticket 
- Bulletin payments 
- Poste pay recharge 
- Tickets for stadium 
- Stationery 
 
- Betting services 
- 2 Slot machines 
- Sisal and Lottomatica 
games 
-instantaneous win 
games 
- Vast assortment of 
gratta e vinci  
Classic and lit-
tle. Slot ma-
chines are sep-
arated by a 
panel 
TOBACCO 
SHOP A 
Padua 
(Arcella district) 
not hidden 
- Bar 
- Souvenirs 
- Various telematics ser-
vices 
- Financial services 
- Western Union 
- F24 payment 
- Bulletin payment 
- Beauty products , ac-
cessories 
- Shaving products 
- Household products. 
- Sisal and Lottomatica 
games 
- Gratta e vinci 
Modern and 
quite big. Given 
its dimensions it 
resembles more 
a Bar with a 
Tobacco shop 
inside 
TOBACCO 
SHOP B 
Padua (Mortise), 
hidden 
- Cell phone recharges 
above 25 euros 
-Pipes 
-Particular- rare Lighters 
- Cigars boxes 
- Electronic cigarettes 
and related recharges 
 
-  Cuban and other par-
ticular types of cigars 
- Lottomatica and Sisal 
games 
- Fine alcoholic bottles 
- Vast assortment of 
gratta e vinci 
Vintage- classi-
cal style. Quite 
big and elegant 
shop 
TOBACCO 
SHOP C 
Padua 
(Sacra Famiglia 
area) hidden 
- Costume and fashion 
jewelry. 
- Chips and other  food 
products 
- Beverages and ice 
creams. 
- Stationery articles 
- Financial services 
- Sisal and Lottomatica 
- 3 Slot machines 
-instantaneous win 
games 
- Vast assortment of 
gratta e vinci 
 
 
Classic style but 
not so little. Slot 
machines are 
not divided from 
the tobacco 
shop 
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marketed as the more controversial ones (tobacco shops B and C). Since they exhibit 
different controversial inclinations due to the products and services offered, they can be 
categorized as partially controversial (B) and very controversial (C). However since 
both can be deemed to be more controversial than the tobacco shop A, they are going to 
be highlighted also in all of the following tables of our analysis without making a pre-
cise distinction about their controversial propensity when propositions will be formulat-
ed. In Figure 13 can be seen the photos of each tobacco shop in which I conducted the 
interview.  
 
Figure 13  Tobacco Shop A (Less controversial) 
 
Figure 14  Tobacco Shop B (Partially controversial) 
 
Figure 15  Tobacco Shop C (Very controversial) 
 
 
4.3 Case description and method 
The case study analysis has been conducted  by adopting a qualitative approach since 
the possibility to use a standard protocol for semi-structured interviews would have 
allowed to understand aspects that maybe a more quantitative approach would have not 
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made possible. However, the qualitative analysis is the one that better conforms to the 
necessity to analyse tobacco shops by combining different elements of the 
organizational theories (agency and institutional logics approach) which are the focus of 
this study. Moreover, many of the paper examined used a qualitative approach for their 
case study mostly for those concerning the Institutional logics approach. In order to 
fulfil all that has been said, a protocol of interview composed by 35 questions was 
proposed to the owners of the tobacco shops selected for the analysis. 
Since some of the question were open – and the reason of this choice was based on the 
possibility to collect many complementary and secondary answers that would have 
allowed finding elements related to the two theories- the interviews lasted from 40 to 60 
minutes, also because tobacconists were often occupied with clients. 
In order to verify the effectiveness of the format and to establish the pertinence of the 
questions – and of the answers as a consequence – a pilot interview was conducted that 
gave many insights on the sector, and thanks to which the final framework of the 
protocol was edited. All the conversations were recorded (with the expressed consensus 
of the interviewed) and they have been transcribed, and integrated with some notes 
about the impressions that the shops gave me and on the people with whom I spoke. 
Before starting the interview, the subjects were informed that all the information given 
by them would have been treated anonymously, with respect to the privacy law and this 
has always been made in order to make them feel more confident when questions were 
proposed. 
The aim of the questions was mainly related to the understanding of the points/aspects 
in which the elements of the theories analysed in this study (Agency and Institutional 
logics) appeared in a tobacco shop. Surely also other elements emerged during the 
questions, even if they are not related to the aforementioned theories, but which have 
allowed me to understand the sector and its evolution or to understand, for example 
which products and in which manners contributed to the average turnover of a tobacco 
shop. 
The protocol’s questions were divided according to four main themes: 
 The tobacco shop 
 People working inside the shop 
 Relationship between the business and the family  
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 Environment 
Inside each of the four topics there were several questions, aimed at giving insights on 
information about the main theories object of this study. The protocol proposed can be 
seen from Appendixes A and B, which is the English version. In particular, the first 
section (the tobacco shop ) included questions about the product and services offered, 
the influence of the family on their introduction and when they have been introduced, 
and questions about goals at the basis of the choice of investing in a tobacco shop thus 
understanding as a consequence the family-business overlap. The questions on people 
working inside the shop are mainly thought in order to understand agency within these 
kinds of family businesses and to understand if family is present in the conduct of the 
business (directly involved). Questions on relationship between the business and the 
family are mainly based on understanding how family values relate to the introduction 
or non introduction of slot machines and finally questions on the environment allow to 
understand if tobacco shop perceive a stigma and if they feel to be legitimated by the 
external environment and how its evolution have affected the tobacco shops’ sector. 
For the analysis of the agency elements within family run tobacco shops the only 
questions proposed were sufficient, while for the analysis of the institutional logics 
approach they were not sufficient and for this reason I decided to build and use a more 
creative tool – whose results will be illustrated in the next paragraph – which can be 
defined as the “means-ends cone”. 
 
Figure 16  Tool "means-ends cone" used for the case analysis 
 
 
                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                                                
                          
 
 
 
 
 FAMILY                                     MONEY 
   JOB                                         ETHICS 
A Study of Family Firms: context and theories 
112 
The decision to adopt this tool is related to the possibility of understanding the relation 
existing between the institutional overlap between the family and the business logics, 
and the more or lesser prevalence of controversial and non-controversial industry logics 
within the tobacco shops. This means that by understanding the means-ends relationship 
existing in tobacco shops between family and business elements (which are those 
proposed by the images – Family, Money, Job and Ethics) proper of the business and 
family logics, it can be understood why certain tobacco shops exhibit more or less 
controversial logics (inclinations) and so products in their offer. All this is done under 
the lens of legitimacy of selling certain products, which can derive from the family or 
the business logic according to the means ends relationship existing between the relative 
elements (images) used in the tool.  
All this is based on the assumption that Institutional logics are socially constructed, 
coherent, and integrated sets of ‘‘assumptions, values, beliefs and rules’’ (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999: 804) that give actors ‘‘organizing principles’’ prescribing legitimate ends 
and ‘‘the means by which those ends are achieved’’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248).  
This means-ends relationship is understood by making the interviewed owner put 2 of 
the 4 images within the cone, one at the bottom and one should be left outside. The 
images have been divided according to their reference logic: the image of money and 
job are related to business logics, while ethics (mainly referring to the products offered) 
and family obviously refers to family logics. At the end of their own composition each 
tobacconist was asked to give his personal explanation of the tool composition. From 
this some conclusion about their more (or less) controversial nature will be formulated, 
and insights on if the role of the family dimension in Italian tobacco shops when they 
make certain kinds of “controversial” choices is relevant or not. The results obtained 
will be reported in the next paragraph. 
 
4.4 Cross-case analysis 
The methodology used in this thesis is the cross-case analysis. After interviewing the 
three tobacconists (four with the pilot case which however results are not significant for 
our analysis since it is not a family run business), a comparison of the results of their 
answers is done, by considering the questions proposed and what interviewed tobacco-
nists have answered, in order to determine similarities, differences and identify some 
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key propositions, as required from the cross-case analysis definition given by Yin 
(1994). As already stated, the selection of the three cases has been done from different 
settings, thus providing opportunities to learn from various samples and gather some 
evidences which are explained at the end of each of the following sections. 
4.4.1 The institutional overlap between the family and the business and 
the weight that each logic have in deciding to invest in a controver-
sial industry 
One of the main objectives of the interviews proposed to the tobacconists has been that 
of understanding if there exist a real overlap (as that maintained by Lansberg, 1983) 
between the two institutions (family and business) see Table 13 (page 101), and how the 
co-existence/conflict of the related institutional logics affect the tobacco shops’ 
approach to offer more controversial rather than non-controversial products and vice 
versa, thus determining a more controversial (non-controversial) inclination of the shop. 
This means that according to the relationship between the family and the business 
logics, we understand why tobacco shops tend to be more or less controversial, thus 
engaging in the sale of certain products according to one or the other logic 
(controversial or not). Intuitively one should expect that those businesses in which the 
family logic prevails, should be those which are less controversial (also according to 
SEW considerations) and contrarily, those in which business logics prevail should be 
more controversial in their product offering. But since it is important to take into 
account all the decisions related to the business, it is fundamental to start with the 
understanding of the reasons behind the choice of investing money in order to start an 
activity which is, surely, controversial by its very nature. 
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Table 15    Outlook on the tobacco shops' institutional overlap 
 
 
The owner of tobacco shop A, differently from the other two, has a longer experience in 
the tobacco shop sector – since it is an executive of the union of the category - and when 
he opened the second shop, he did this in order to anticipate the consequences deriving 
from the changes of market conditions. Together with this reason, the possibility to 
 HOW AND IN WHICH MEASURE DID 
YOUR FAMILY HAVE A ROLE IN THE 
CHOICE OF STARTING THIS 
BUSINESS? 
LOGICS 
WHICH WAS THE REASON (GOAL) 
BEHIND THE DECISION TO 
UNDERTAKE THIS BUSINESS? 
TOBACCO 
SHOP A 
 
 
I inherited the first tobacco shop 
from my family. My father dead 
when I was young and since I 
was the adult son, I abandoned 
studies to dedicate my efforts in 
the family business 
 
 
Family logic 
 
I decided to open this new shop 
in order to introduce my sons 
and so to give them a job 
 
 
Business logic 
 
However the decision to open 
this shop is also related to mar-
ket dynamics. That of my father 
was more a food shop and I de-
cided to open a tobacco shop 
when big chains were intro-
duced. 
TOBACCO 
SHOP B 
 
 
 
The willingness of my wife to 
have an easy employment, lead 
me to enter for the first time in the 
tobacco shop sector twenty years 
ago. Later I opened this shop for 
my son. 
 
 
 
Family logic 
 
I have invested in this as in the 
other tobacco shop, in order to 
give a job respectively to my 
wife and to my only son which 
needed a job.  
 
 
 
Business logic 
 
However the decision to invest 
in a tobacco shop has been al-
so guided by the fact that the 
tobacco shop industry many 
years ago was able to generate 
enough stable profits. 
TOBACCO 
SHOP C 
 
 
 
My wife’s desire to obtain a prop-
er source of revenues was nec-
essary to make me invest in a to-
bacco shop. 
 
 
 
Family logic 
 
Essentially I started this activity 
in order to give a job to my wife 
since I already have another 
job. However I help her in run-
ning this business. 
 
 
Business logic 
 
The decision to invest in this 
sector has been done since five 
years ago this sector appeared 
to me the only one less hit by 
the recent crisis. 
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offer to his sons a secure job is at the basis of the decision to open a new tobacco shop 
where they could be willing to work, thus leading the shop to become quite big (seven 
people work inside it). In the case of the Tobacco shop B, despite the owner had not a 
great knowledge of the sector, he decided to invest in a tobacco shop since it was a 
simple and good activity that could generate enough profits despite it was a second 
source of earnings for the family (the owner had another job), mainly thought for his 
wife. Later, motivated by this experience he decided to open another shop, focused 
mainly on smoking products and more innovative than the first one, to give a job to his 
son. The Tobacco shop C case is similar from this point to the first investment done by 
the owner of the tobacco shop B that is to say to give a job to his wife. In this case the 
tobacco shop at the basis of the analysis is their first and only experience. 
Analysing what they answered for first, it can be stated that despite these three tobacco 
shops present some differences in terms of dimensions and different degrees of 
“controversial engagement or inclinations” in terms of products offered, it can be 
underlined that the decisions to open a tobacco shop is mainly influenced by the 
possibility to give employment to family members which represent one of the elements 
which reside in our ideal logics which are present in a tobacco shop. 
PROPOSITION 1a: In family run businesses operating in a controversial 
industry the decision of starting the activity is mainly influenced by fami-
ly-related reasons so the family logics seems to prevail in this circum-
stance. 
Even if it can be observed that in all of the three cases, the family logic have an im-
portant influence in determining the reasons at the basis of the decision to open and  
invest money in a tobacco shop, this does not mean that business logics, that is to say 
those related to the possibility of making an investment considering the likelihood of 
this last to generate a profitable return, cannot be neglected. In fact for the interviewed 
tobacconists (mainly for B and C), the decision of investing exactly in this sector was 
also based on the idea that the tobacco shops’ sector seemed to be one of the few which 
ensured a certain degree of profits stability since it was (and it is), form a market per-
spective and by its very nature, protected and strictly regulated by the State intervention. 
Moreover the profits stability, in the opinions of tobacconists, could be determined also 
by the fact that the presence of these shops is constrained by area limitations, thus not 
implying a strong competition. According to this, and also to the possibility to have a 
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secure and safe economic return deriving form a relatively easy activity, investing in a 
tobacco shop seemed to be the best investment compared to others. 
PROPOSITION 1b: Despite the family logic carry weight in the decision 
of investing in this particular activity, business logics have also an im-
portant role in the decision of employing family efforts in this controver-
sial sector. 
4.4.2 The role that the co-existence of the business and family logics (in-
stitutional overlap) have on product and services portfolio and inno-
vation path pursued. 
This sector is strongly bounded by the presence of regulations and mainly by the 
presence of the State which represent the most important counterpart to which 
tobacconists have to confront with. Surely the fact that they are constrained to make 
monthly minimum orders for the gaming and betting products and they have to sell a 
minimum of these products (mostly in the case of scratch and win) they usually 
innovate by following the evolution of the tobacco industy – as the case of the 
electronic cigarettes – and also the evolution of the betting and gaming industries. This 
means that from a certain point of view the innovation related to the introduction of 
controversial products is (in a certain sense) stimulated by the launch of new products 
by gaming companies and by the state which obliges tobacco shops to do a minimum of 
orders. Another innovation path that tobacco shops follow is that related to the 
telematics/ financial services offered and this however is related to the historical 
evolution of the tobacco shops, since the willingness of the state is to make them as a 
reference points for different kind of services which are mainly offered by the Italian 
post offices and the creation of a bank for tobacco shops (ITB) witnesses this 
willingness. However, since the objective of this study is to analyse the role of the 
family and the business logic in determining a higher or lesser degree of controversial 
inclination of tobacco shops, it has been necessary to ask to tobacconists which products 
and services they have introduced in the shop to innovate, why and if the family had a 
influenc in the introduction of products and services related (or not related) to the 
tobacco in stricto sensu, since it is the core activity of tobacco shops. 
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Table 16   Outlook on institutional logics' influence on product and service offering 
 HAS THE SHOP OFFER ALWAYS 
BEEN THE SAME, OR HAVE YOU 
INTRODUCED NEW PRODUCTS OR 
SERVICES? 
WHY HAVE YOU INTRODUCED 
PRODUCTS OR SERVICES 
RELATED (OR NOT RELATED) TO 
THE TOBACCO? 
HAVE YOUR FAMILY 
MEMBERS HAD AN 
INFLUENCE IN THE 
DECISION TO INTRODUCE 
THESE NEW PRODUCTS?  
 
 
 
 
                
                        
TOBACCO 
 SHOP A 
 
- At the beginning the shop was 
only a tobacco shop but, then 
we took the decision to open the 
bar.  
- Then we have also extended 
the services offered – by joining 
the ITB – thus offering more 
telematics/financial services 
- we have introduced also new 
products related to games (Lotto 
and Sisal) 
- we have introduced beauty for 
both man and women. 
- we do not have slots (even if 
we had them for a brief period) 
because we together have 
thought that they are not in line 
with the image of the bar that we 
want to give 
 
- The decision to open the bar 
is related to the possibility to 
offer a service which could al-
low to innovate the shop.        
- However, despite the intro-
duction of new services and 
games have followed the nat-
ural evolution of the tobacco 
shops, we have decided to in-
vest in them in order to avoid 
remaining backward with re-
spect to the market and thus 
creating also movement within 
the shop to foster the sales of 
the bar.  
- The same reason has been 
applied to the complementary 
beauty. In line with this rea-
soning now the shop follows 
the bar working  time. 
 
At the beginning the 
shop was only a to-
bacco shop, but then 
when my wife decided 
to stay at home and 
so to not working an-
ymore, I decided to in-
troduce in business 
something that could 
have been interesting 
for my sons so, to-
gether with them, we 
took the decision to 
open the bar. Howev-
er I want to underline 
that today the shop is 
like this because I was 
helped a lot by my 
family. If my family 
had not supported me, 
today the shop would 
have  been a simple 
and basic tobacco 
shop. 
TOBACCO 
SHOP B 
 
- Initially, the shop we acquired 
was a tobacco shop specialized 
in smoking products. However It 
was specialized mainly in pipes. 
What we have done has been to 
reduce pipes and to introduce 
and increase the variety of ci-
gars. 
-we have introduced the elec-
tronic cigarettes and the related 
flavoured recharges 
- we have also introduced fine 
alcoholic bottles that can be 
combined with different cigars 
- At the same time we have in-
troduced cigar boxes that have a 
certain price   
-our tobacco shop do not offer 
telematics services because 
they are not convenient from an 
economical point of view since 
 
- We have decided to intro-
duce new products related to 
the tobacco, in order to face 
the negative trend which is af-
fecting the cigarettes which is 
due to the absurd terrorism of 
anti-smoking campaigns. 
-the same can be said for the 
electronic cigarettes 
- the introduction of fine alco-
hol bottles and the cigar boxes 
has been thought in order to 
complement the sale of cigars 
and to increase margins since 
they are not under the “accise” 
regime. 
- the decision to not offering 
telematics services is related 
to their non convenience and 
to the fact that we want to 
raise up the level of our target 
 
-The decision of intro-
ducing cigars and the 
related products as 
the fine alcohol bottles 
and the cigar boxes 
has been influenced 
by my son. In fact he 
has the knowledge of 
these products, in fact 
I am not neither a 
smoker! 
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From this table and these answers some considerations are clear: tobacco shop A 
increasingly tend to intermesh the two activities, that of the bar and that of the tobacco 
shop. The perception that the shop gave me during the interview, was mainly that of a 
bar with a tobacco shop, and not the opposite, also because outside, the store sign that 
prevails is that of the bar. Despite the fact that obviously the family logic has a strong 
influence on adopting this path of innovation, it cannot be, again, neglected the focus on 
the market/business logic: in fact despite this shop is deemed to be less controversial 
than the others, the possibility to implement gaming products (as for services) is related 
to market necessities. The Tobacco shop B according to our findings is partially 
controversial, in fact they decided to introduce products related to the tobacco because 
of the son expertise  on this field (cigars) and because this is in line with the trend of the 
market. In this case we have a situation in which the business logic prevails since they 
their profit  margin is very low  
- we have introduced new 
games 
-we do not have slots, even if in 
the past we had them 
 
 
customers 
- the introduction of new and 
more games is related to the 
fact that now they are yielding 
more than cigarettes 
- we do not have slots only 
because of the major’s ordi-
nance is restrictive 
TOBACCO 
SHOP C 
 
 
- When we bought the tobacco 
shop, many of the existing prod-
ucts were not present 
-We have introduced sweets, 
candies  
-We have introduced also 
Costume and fashion jewelry. 
-Products related to food since 
we have also the license. 
- We sell beverages and sea-
sonal products as ice creams. 
-We have introduced stationery 
articles 
-We have increased the games, 
mostly those with an instantane-
ous gain since people do not 
want to wait anymore 
- We have enlarged the ciga-
rettes  and telematics services 
offered 
- We have also introduced an-
other slot and now we have 
three slots in our shop. 
 
- The reason behind the intro-
duction of new games, as 10 e 
lotto, slot machines and gratta 
e vinci, is related to the in-
creasing trend in their sell. In 
fact they are performing better 
than cigarettes. 
- The introduction of the other 
products not related to games 
of to the tobacco, is done In 
order to satisfy customers and 
mostly to increase profits de-
riving from non monopoly 
products, which allow grater 
margins. 
- offering additional telematics 
services offer the possibility to 
attract people 
- the introduction of the other 
slot is based on the fact that 
they allows high margin de-
spite they are subject to mo-
nopoly 
 
- My wife wanted to in-
troduce costume and 
fashion jewels as all 
the other products 
which are, howev-
requested by custom-
ers 
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sell products which can yield returns from products different from cigarettes since this 
market is experiencing a sales decreasing trend. But the fact that the son’s influence in 
the introduction of cigars, alcohol and related products is strong and this is supported by 
the fact that the father is not a smoker.  
The same approach is followed by the Tobacco shop C, which however tries to increase 
margins by selling also out of monopoly products which are mainly influenced by the 
decisions of his wife and by including another slot in the shop to increase margins. 
Again the offer of new products and services clearly focuses on the market dynamics 
and on the family willing and enjoyment in exerting an influence within the business. 
According to what has been said the following proposition can be formulated: 
PROPOSITION 2: In family run tobacco shops, regardless they are contro-
versial or non-controversial, the product and service portfolio is enlarged 
by offering products and services which are in line with market and busi-
ness logics but which are mainly introduced because of the knowledges 
and desires of family members. 
As a consequence of the three previous propositions it can be maintained that: 
PROPOSITION 3a: In family run tobacco shops the logics of the family 
and the logics of the business are nested since tobacco shops introduce 
new products and services which satisfy both the two logics thus rendering 
difficult to track a boundary between the two logics.  
PROPOSITION 3b: The overlap between logics exists since the decisions 
related to the business are self- reinforcing: satisfying the business logic 
has consequences on family logics’ satisfaction and vice versa. 
This last proposition may be not so intuitive so it is necessary to give an explanation. 
The self-reinforcement of the two logics is given by the fact that since we have the 
overlap between these two logics, it seems that in family run tobacco shops the family 
logic is satisfied by the business since the family can influence the business deciding 
which products to offer according to their knowledge (as in the case of Tobacco Shop 
B), according to their desires (as in the case of Tobacco Shop A) or according to their 
style and preferences (as in the case of Tobacco Shop C). However these logics are not 
related to the mere profit maximization but are related to affective reasons (SEW). 
Furthermore, the business logic (achieve and increase profitability) is reached through 
the family logic thus creating an overlap which works. 
Again, the findings underline the clear overlap that exist between the family and the 
business logics, thus allowing to offer products which clearly focus on the market 
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dynamics and on the family willing and enjoyment in exerting an influence within the 
business. The possibility to exert a relevant influence is given also by the possibility, 
allowed (forced) by the regulation and the very nature of tobacco shops as family firms, 
to have more members of the family within the business. 
4.4.3 The institutional logics effects and function in fostering the legitima-
cy of the controversial products and services offered 
Institutional logics are socially constructed, coherent, and integrated sets of 
‘‘assumptions, values, beliefs and rules’’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804) that give 
actors ‘‘organizing principles’’ prescribing legitimate ends and ‘‘the means by which 
those ends are achieved’’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248). As previously said, in 
order to understand the role between the institutional overlap and the more (lesser) 
prevalence of controversial or non-controversial industry logics (propensity), a more 
creative tool has been used to understand how these two overlaps (family and business 
logics on one side and controversial and non-controversial industry logics on the other 
side) interact. The aim of the tool has been mainly that of reproducing the relationship 
between means-ends of the elements of business and family logics (the images 
proposed) for tobacconists in order to understand which is the logic that mainly 
legitimates more controversial rather non-controversial industry logics in their product 
service portfolio. In sum we want to understand  which are the ends (and their logics) 
that allow, as a consequence, the legitimation of the controversial products/services  
offered (means). 
 
Figure 17  Tobacconists' interpretation of the tool 
 
 
 
TOBACCO SHOP A TOBACCO SHOP B TOBACCO SHOP C 
LESS CONTROVERSIAL PARTIALLY 
CONTROVERSIAL 
VERY CONTROVERSIAL 
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The owner of tobacco shop A (left image) put the family and the job within the cone, 
while at the bottom of the cone he put the image of money, the ethics remains outside. 
The description: 
I put the family and the job inside because if you do not have the strength 
deriving from working and deriving from the family which support s you, 
you cannot go further, and this is what happened in my experience since 
the help of my family have helped the business and to increase the money 
creation, which however is important to satisfy family needs. Ethics r e-
mains outside because I intend ethics more on behaviors rather than on 
products sold. 
The owner of tobacco shop B (central image) put money and the job inside the cone 
while at the bottom he put the family, while again the ethics remains outside. The 
description: 
I put money and the job within the cone because in order to survive and 
nurture your family you have to work and gain money. I do not care about 
products sold because there are many other products which are not good 
for the health, maybe more than cigarettes and game addiction.  
The owner of the last tobacco shop C (right image), insert in the cone the image 
representing money and the image of work, while at the bottom of the cone he put the 
family with the ethics left outside. The description: 
The ultimate end is the family. I put inside the job and the money, since 
they are functional to the nourishment of the family. I leave the ethics ou t-
side even if I never put money before the family. However since the ethics 
is about the products offering, I do not care about it, since these “particu-
lar products” yield me money and give a job to my wife, thus allowing the 
family’s needs satisfaction. These products (slot, betting games, sc ratch 
cards, and cigarettes) are not good for the human health but however it is 
not my fault if they are sold. 
What emerges from this creative analysis developed is that, in line with the forecasts, 
that family run tobacco shops, despite they care about ethics in the form of behaviours 
to be adopted within the tobacco shop, they do not intend it (as I then proposed them) as 
ethics in what they sell. In fact when this aspect was specified they directly excluded the 
image representing ethics from the cone and this is mainly because they feel to be 
justified/legitimated by the fact that the state allows the sale of these products (as in the 
case of Tobacco Shop C), because there are also many other products that are as 
dangerous as or even more than cigarettes and games but no one talk about these 
(Tobacco shop B) and because tobacco shops are a guarantee since they offer services 
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under a state concession (Tobacco shop A). Adopting an Institutional logic approach, 
however it seems that those tobacco shops whose main aim was the family nurturance 
and satisfaction (family at the bottom of the cone) are those more controversial (B and 
C) while those whose main aim is to create money through the help of the family are 
those more non-controversial. So according to this the following proposition can be 
stated: 
PROPOSTION 4 a: Those family run tobacco shops whose main end is to 
satisfy and nurture the family, are those which exhibit/adopt more contro-
versial means in order to reach their end. 
Consequently it can be stated that, 
PROPOSITION 4 b: in the more controversial family run tobacco shops, 
the family logic legitimates the sale of controversial products and services. 
4.4.4 Legitimacy and stigma issues toward the external environment  
After having analysed legitimacy by taking into account the family logics, I would like 
to focus on the role that stigma and environmental legitimacy have for tobacco shops, so 
I conduct now a brief analysis of what are the perceptions that tobacconists think people 
have in the regards of the sector in which they operate. The thing here is that 
stigmatization and contestation are very high in an industry like that of tobacco. Thus 
legitimacy becomes a relevant topic for those who work in such controversial sectors 
since they strive to be legitimated by external actors and so to gain societal support 
despite, I have to remember it, they are mainly legitimated by the family logics. 
However, I decided to include some questions about legitimacy and if they perceive or 
not a stigma. In particular, we wanted to know how tobacconists feel about the fact that 
they commercialize controversial and unhealthy products, i.e. tobacco, but also games, 
putting aside the family nurturance as a legitimising reason. 
During the interview it was difficult to touch this delicate point with tobacconists since 
they usually are against the negative (and in my opinion right) opinions that people, 
media and other subjects have in their regards, and this is witnessed by the fact that they 
express resentment toward the new anti-smoke campaigns.  
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Table 17    Outlook on environmental legitimacy and stigma 
 
Through the question proposed the aspect of legitimacy with the environment emerged. 
For the more controversial (Shop B and C) obviously they should perceive more the 
stigma, which, however, is overcome by finding the state a justification or better as a 
legitimising element. This is because the three tobacconists perceived that people 
should see them as they see all other business even if they not always offer healthy 
products, because they are a sort of state employees, since they work under a 
concessionary regime. 
PROPOSITION 5: All tobacco shops, indifferently of their controversial or 
non-controversial nature, feel to be socially accepted since their presence 
is justified by the state concession.  
4.4.5 Agency theory consideration about costs, risk and about the loss 
aversion concept 
 It is now time to analyse what said in the first chapter of this study about the agency 
elements in family firms in terms of costs and risks. Different questions have been 
proposed to tobacconists in order to firstly analyse agency costs related to self-serving 
behaviours and then to analyse the problem related to the agency costs deriving from the 
differences in risk preferences and problems related to the concept of risk preferences 
under the loss aversion perspective. In order to analyse agency costs in family run 
tobacco shops in terms of efficiency reduction, the following questions have been 
proposed. 
 HOW  DO YOU DESCRIBE THE SECTOR OF TOBACCO SHOPS SINCE IT CAN BE SEEN AS A 
PARTICULAR SECTOR BY EXTERNAL PEOPLE? 
 
 
TOBACCO 
SHOP A 
 
Today tobacco shops are able to offer many services and the since these are offered 
thanks to a state concession, this makes people to see tobacco shops in a positive 
way. The same reasoning can be applied  to tobacco products and games. The seri-
ousness is put in evidence thanks to the state concession 
 
 
TOBACCO 
SHOP B 
 
This is an easy and calm activity so it is a good sector to start the first business. How-
ever recently people have bad opinions about this sector and this due to the massive 
anti-smoking campaigns conducted. People is influenced by this and do not cares 
about the existences of other activities which are dangerous for the health. However 
since I sell products of the state to major people, I do not feel a bad person. 
 
TOBACCO 
SHOP C 
 
I think that this sector is highly contested but I am a sort of state’s employee so I sell 
mainly its products so it is the state that should take care about this. But since there is 
a law and a concession that allows me to sell these products I feel ok. It is a business 
like other businesses with each having its own problems of health. 
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Table 18   Outlook on agency considerations in tobacco shops 
 
According to the answers given, it can be underlined that results are consistent with 
what sustained by Jensen and Meckling (1983), that is to say that owner- managed firms 
suffer less agency costs because of the direct involvement of the owners. From all the 
three cases the fact that people stay together most part of the day and since they are 
close, their relationship of trust develops exponentially (even with non-family members 
as in the case of the tobacco shop A) thus creating a sense of “being on the same boat” 
and so for this, there is a compelling reason to believe that small family firms exhibit 
high efficiency due to less agency costs since altruism and opportunism is not present. 
Moreover the fact that in all the three shops each member have the access to the cash, 
 ARE THE ACTORS THAT WORK WITHIN 
THE SHOP FAMILY MEMBERS OR NOT? 
WHY? 
HOW ARE TASKS DIVIDED? DOES EVERYBODY IS 
ALLOWED TO HAVE ACCESS 
TO CASH? ANY FEAR 
RELATED TO MISTRUST? 
 
 
TOBACCO 
SHOP A 
In the shop we are In 7 of which 4 
are family members. When we 
have introduced the bar (and con-
sequently enlarged the shop) we 
needed more people to help us, 
so respectively two works for the 
bar and one for the tobacco sec-
tor. 
As I have anticipated, 2 
of my sons and one ex-
ternal manager manage 
the tobacco side, while 
the other son and the 
two external people are 
interested in the man-
agement of the bar. I 
help them when it is 
possible. 
Yes everybody have the 
access to the cash, since 
the business have to al-
ways run, we cannot 
stop each time to control 
who does what. However 
we do not have any 
problem with external 
since we share most of 
the time together so we 
well know each other 
and we are in close con-
tacts. 
 
 
TOBACCO 
SHOP B 
In the shop we are in two: me and 
my son. We are in two because 
the very nature of the tobacco-
nist’s licence obliges you to be 
helped only by family members 
and also because in this business 
you need trusted people to man-
age the cash. 
My son mainly is inter-
ested in selling all the 
products related to the 
tobacco and the cigars, 
since he has the neces-
sary knowledge to ex-
plain their characteris-
tics to clients.  I do the 
rest and when not busy, 
y son helps me. 
We both accede to the 
cash. This is because I 
cannot not trust my son 
and also because if 
money is missing, it is 
missing for all the family 
so we think two times 
before appropriating 
money unduly. 
 
 
TOBACCO 
SHOP C 
In the shop we are in two: me and 
my wife. This choice is because of 
the regulations applied to the to-
bacco licence and also because 
for the dimensions of the shop. 
However since you do not print 
the receipt for all the products, 
you need trusted people too. 
Me and my wife perform 
all tasks equally. 
We both accede to the 
cash. However it cannot 
not  be like this since this 
is a family ran business, 
so if the business goes 
bad, also the family suf-
fers of this. The two as-
pects run together. 
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means that the risk related to self-serving behaviours are limited, and this is related to 
the fact that family interests are prevailing. However the nature of the tobacco shop and 
the regulations related to the license, allows mainly family members to work in the 
shop, thus eliminating the costs related to monitoring since exits a common sense of 
putting family needs before one’s own interests. However the lack of a formal 
organizational structure, and the fact that people work closely and even with a high 
level of interchangeability, allows for a direct control which have zero costs.  
PROPOSITION 6: In family run tobacco shops the presence of a flat struc-
ture, the nature of the tobacco shop and the time spent in the shop , togeth-
er play an important role in reducing or eliminating inefficiencies deriving 
from agency costs. 
So it can be stated that the findings of our analysis are in line with what affirmed by 
Herrero (2011) who maintains that in family firms there are reduced or inexistent 
agency costs since people work very close and because there is not a complex 
organizational structure. 
If we move our attention to another aspect related to the agency approach and the 
behavioural agency approach (and to sew as a reflection) we can underline the fact that 
in family run tobacco shops we firstly have an alignment between the risk preferences 
among owners since their goals are completely aligned and also because they have the 
same reference point which is the family business pace and consequently that of the 
family. As a consequence of this, a specific question has been made in order to 
understand the loss aversion concept in these particular type of businesses mainly when 
they introduce specific controversial products within their business. In this sense, the 
most part of this analysis is mainly referred to the fact that the tobacco shops have or 
not the slot machines inside them and this because having slots inside for the 
interviewed tobacco shops increases the risk of robberies because of the presence of not 
so good people within the shop. 
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Table 19    Outlook on Agency/SEW risk concept 
 
Before explaining this point, it is important to remember some considerations on the 
risk concept and on the loss aversion. According to the agency and the behavioural 
agency model, the concept of loss aversion is based on a reference point from which 
agents formulate their risk preferences and perceptions. So In general, if a firm’s 
performances are above the target planned – reference point - by the owner (so he 
frames positively problems since he has something to lose), his primary focus is on 
avoiding actions that may place the firm below it. The point is that the dangers of falling 
more below the performance target reached, dominates the attention of the agent. The 
risk perception here determines a risk-averse behaviour of the owner and since there is 
something to loose so he is loss averse. 
For agents who experience or expect firm performances below the target, the desire to 
reach it focuses the attention in a way that leads generally to risk taking behaviours 
(since in this case problems are negatively framed since he is loosing something). This 
is because the opportunities for gaining or reaching the target receive more attention 
than dangers. In tobacco shops, the main risk deriving from the possibility to have slot 
machines inside it, is to have problematic people within the shop which increases the 
likelihood of being subjects to robberies because of higher liquidity in addition to that 
generated by services, and increases the likelihood of the risk of loosing customers 
because of the prolonged presence of this people within the shop. What I have tried to 
do is to formulate questions to analyse this point.  
Since tobacco shops A and B were performing well at a specific moment in time, they 
decided to eliminate slot machines in order to eliminate the possibility that the presence 
 WHY HAVE YOU CHOSEN TO HAVE OR NOT THE SLOT MACHINES? 
TOBACCO 
SHOP A 
We tried slots years ago, but then we decided to take them off because they allowed not good 
people to enter in the shop. However with the introduction of the bar, the presence of slots 
would have lengthen the time spent by these people within the shop, thus increasing the risks 
related to robberies and other any kind of threats to our business and to my family 
TOBACCO 
SHOP B 
We had slot machines until two years ago, but then we decided to take them off the shop. This 
is because they lead misfit people to stay within the business and this increases the possibility 
to have repercussions from these people. It’s a matter of safety together with the limitations 
deriving from regulations 
TOBACCO 
SHOP C 
I had two slots and we introduced another one two years ago. We did this because the busi-
ness at that time was not performing well and since the profits deriving from games are im-
portant in this sector, we took this decision. However since the shop is in a quiet area, this al-
lowed me to feel safe. 
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of misfit within the shop would have led the performances of their business down, or 
even better, fostering the likelihood of repercussions and robberies. So if this situation is 
described according to the agency approach to loss aversion and how agents frame 
problems according to the reference point,  it can be said that the two tobacconists were 
experiencing good firm performances (so they framed the problem positively according 
to the reference point which is the good firm performance) and since they had 
something to loose, they became averse to the risk/loss of lowering/damaging 
performances because of being more exposed to robberies and to the likelihood of loos-
ing customers, so they decided to take slot machines off the shop. 
On the contrary, since the tobacco shop C was not performing well at that time he 
decided to introduce in the shop another slot machine. In view of the fact that the owner 
framed the problem negatively with respect to the reference point which is the negative 
firm performance (because he was already loosing something), he acted with risk 
neutral preferences, thus allowing the improvement of the business performances by 
augmenting the number of slots in the shop, without caring about the increase of the 
likelihood of loosing customers and to be exposed to robberies. 
PROPOSITION 7: Family run businesses tend to be more controversial by 
introducing slot machines when they frame problems negatively with r e-
spect to their business pace, thus expressing risk neutral behaviors. 
Since the concept of loss aversion – in family firms - according to the SEW construct is 
mainly based on the unwillingness of family firms’ owners to loose the stock of affec-
tive endowments that they derive by conducting the business, it could be thought that 
for family run tobacco shops it may be the same, since lowering the firm performances 
can be seen as a threat to the family sew also because, as already seen, the family logics 
is strong in these firms. However, evident effects of this SEW loss aversion cannot be 
seen in these family firms, since this concept is based on the assumption that family 
firms are willing to accept more economic risks on their business (i.e. bad performanc-
es) if this can be helpful to preserve the family affective endowments. In this last tobac-
co shop case, they accept the eventual higher business risks (the likelihood of loosing 
cutomers and of having not so good people within the shop) deriving from the introduc-
tion of slots in order to improve the firm performances (since slots allow good profits) 
and not in order to preserve affective aspects, thus seeming that the economic 
component prevails on the SEW loss aversion concept. For instance in this case in order 
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to preserve sew, they would have not introduced slots – which make the family firm 
more controversial – thus allowing a performance decline that, however would have al-
lowed the SEW preservation (also because the reputational image of the family is also 
rooted within this construct). 
PROPOSITION 8: Family run tobacco shops exhibit a certain extent of 
loss aversion with respect to their business economic performances rather 
than to family socioemotional wealth. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This last chapter was entirely dedicated to the case study analysis made on Italian 
tobacco shops in order to answer to our research questions about the role that 
institutional logics and the overlap between family and business logics play in decisions 
and inclinations of family run tobacco shops, questions about the perception of stigma 
and legitimacy problems with the external environment and finally the presence within 
family SMEs of agency elements (costs and loss aversion), 
About the overlap between the two institutional logics the results of the analysis of the 
study highlight the fact that the overlap is strong, thus allowing families to invest in 
tobacco shops’ sector and to sell and introduce products and services which follow the 
family logics (allowing the enjoyment of the family influence) and the business logics 
(related to the possibility of increasing revenues). Moreover, there is a self-
reinforcement between the two logics which is given by the fact that in family run 
tobacco shops the family logic is satisfied by the business since the family can influence 
the business deciding which products to offer according to their knowledge (as in the 
case of Tobacco Shop B), according to their desires (as in the case of Tobacco Shop A) 
or according to their style and preferences (as in the case of Tobacco Shop C). However 
these logics are not related to the mere profit maximization but are related to affective 
reasons (SEW). Furthermore, the business logic (achieve and increase profitability) is 
reached through the family logic thus creating an overlap which works. 
About legitimacy aspects, the presence of family logics should – also according to 
SEW- foster the non-controversial inclination the family run tobacco shops. Hover 
results showed that this is not like this since the family logic acts as a source of 
legitimacy for those tobacco shops which are deemed to be more controversial. Instead 
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for the stigma and the legitimacy with respect to the external environment, results show 
that tobacconists feel legitimated and do not recognize the stigma because they feel to 
be justified by the concession given by the state. 
Finally, about the agency problem of costs and the loss aversion concept formulated in 
the first chapter, family run tobacco shops seem to have inexistent agency costs since 
there is not a division between ownership and control because the family members are 
those who work within the business and even if there are external people working inside 
the shop, the lack of a formal organizational structure allows them to exert a direct 
control without implying any cost. However, the crucial aspect here is that since people 
spend most part of the day together, they have a common feeling of being in the same 
boat.  
Regarding the loss aversion concept – which has been analysed theoretically from the 
agency/SEW perspective – interviewed tobacco shops express more risk-neutral 
behaviours when they have nothing to loose  because of the poor performances of the 
firm, thus meaning that they frame problems negatively with respect to the reference 
point which is the firm performance. In this case they introduce slots which may imply 
risks related to the increase of the likelihood of robberies because of the presence of 
misfit people. They exhibit risk-averse behaviours when they frame problems positively 
with respect to the good firm performances, because they perceive risks of losing what 
they already have from an economical point of view rather than from an affective point 
of view. 
Concluding, and taking into account SEW considerations, the presence of the 
institutional overlap allows family run tobacco shops to act according to the two logics 
since they are nested, thus satisfying economic and non-economic aspects. However the 
results obtained about the concept of loss aversion allow saying that in these particular 
types of family firms the loss aversion is more toward economic aspects related to the 
business rather than to non-economic (affective) aspects. 
All the cases existing in literature have some limitations and this thesis is not the 
exception to this rule. Limitations surely derive from the fact that these results cannot be 
generalised to all the family run tobacco shops since the analysis has been developed 
only on three tobacco shops even if  it is a deep analysis. However in this sense some 
step forward can be done by continuing the studies of traditional theories (as the agency 
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theory) as of more recent theories (the institutional logics approach and socioemotional 
wealth) in this controversial sector in order to enlarge this first contribution given in this 
field by this thesis. 
  
 
APPENDIX A: 
ORIGINAL INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Le logiche dei tabaccai italiani: 
Famiglia e Business 
 
ll progetto promosso dall’Università degli Studi di Padova (prof. Paolo Gubitta e 
dott.ssa Alessandra Tognazzo) ha lo scopo di studiare in che modo la famiglia e 
l’impresa si relazionano nel settore delle tabaccherie.  
I risultati dello studio saranno utilizzati per comprendere le esperienze e, soprattutto, il 
ruolo che le famiglie hanno nel business delle tabaccherie, la cui industria è fortemente 
caratterizzata dalla presenza della famiglia.  
Le faremo alcune domande per capire le Sue esperienze e le Sue proposte legate a que-
sto tema. 
Se Lei è d’accordo, durante l’intervista effettueremo una registrazione e prenderemo al-
cuni appunti. 
Le assicuriamo che le informazioni da Lei fornite, verranno trattate in modo anonimo 
nel rispetto della Legge sulla Privacy D.Lgs 196/2003.  
 
La ringraziamo per la cortese disponibilità. 
 
Data _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
Firma dell’Intervistato 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
Firma del Ricercatore Universitario 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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Protocollo di intervista semi-strutturata per i tabaccai 
Domande introduttive 
 Mi parli di lei e del suo lavoro… 
 Quando e come ha iniziato questa attività? 
 Quanto e perché la sua famiglia ha avuto un ruolo nella scelta di avviare 
quest’attività? 
 Perchè (goals) ha deciso di iniziare quest’attività? 
Domande sul business: focalizzi la sua attenzione sulla tabaccheria intesa come ne-
gozio. 
 Potrebbe descrivere in breve il suo negozio? Quali prodotti/servizi offre? 
 L’offerta è stata sempre composta da questi prodotti/servizi oppure ha dovuto in-
trodurli in un certo momento storico? 
o Se si… 
 Quali erano le sue aspettative o comunque le motivazioni che 
hanno portato al loro inserimento nel negozio? Ne citi qualcuna. 
 La sua famiglia, l’ha sostenuta oppure no nella scelta di vende-
re/offrire questi prodotti/servizi piuttosto che altri ed in che mo-
do? 
 Il tabaccaio nasce principalmente come rivenditore di sigarette o tabacco in ge-
nerale… pertanto quando decide di introdurre un prodotto nuovo diverso da es-
so, per quale motivo lo fa? 
 Se introduce prodotti non diversi o comunque legati tabacco, perché lo fa? 
 Potrebbe parlarmi della composizione del suo fatturato? In quale misura i diversi 
servizi/prodotti contribuiscono? 
 Quali rischi legati a questa attività vede/percepisce? Ed in quale misura? 
 
Domande su famiglia del tabaccaio: pensi alla sua attività in relazione alla sua fami-
glia ed ai suoi valori 
 Come è coinvolta la famiglia all’interno del negozio?  
o Per quale motivo? 
 Riguardo le slot machine, ha qualche timore? E qualcuno nella Sua famiglia ha 
sostenuto o ostacolato l’idea di metterle? 
 (Se non ha slot machine) Perché ha scelto di non avere nel negozio slot machi-
ne? Qualcuno nella Sua famiglia ha sostenuto o ostacolato l’idea di metterle? 
 Desidererebbe cedere l’attività ai suoi figli o ad altri parenti in futuro? Spieghi il 
perché. 
 
Domande sui dipendenti 
 MI parli delle persone che lavorano all’interno del negozio… 
o Quante persone lavorano all’interno del negozio e da quanto tempo?Ci 
sono membri della famiglia oppure solo persone estranee alla famiglia? 
 Se ci sono membri della famiglia… 
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 Qual è la motivazione alla base di questa scelta? 
 Come viene regolato il rapporto di lavoro fra lei ed i 
membri della famiglia? 
o Se non ci sono membri della famiglia… 
 Qual è la motivazione alla base di questa scelta?  
 Quale tipo di rapporto esiste fra lei e i suoi dipendenti? 
o Come sono suddivisi i compiti? Perché? 
 Chi può accedere alla cassa? Come mai? Effettua dei controlli 
sulla cassa? 
 
Domande su environment: 
 In generale, come descriverebbe il settore delle tabaccherie visto che può essere 
visto come un settore “particolare” dalla gente? 
 Pensa che il settore delle tabaccherie in Italia è cambiato negli ultimi anni?  
o In che modo? 
 Quale pensa sia l’andamento del settore in generale, magari anche confrontando-
si con gli altri tabaccai? 
o Pensa di voler attuare delle strategie per essere in linea con tale andamen-
to? 
- Se si… 
 Quali strategie?  
 E come mai? 
 Ci ha pensato da solo o anche con altri membri della fami-
glia?  
 
Vuole raccontarci qualcos’altro che pensa sia rilevante per aiutarci a capire meglio il 
rapporto tra famiglia e impresa nelle tabaccherie italiane?                                 
La ringraziamo per la Sua disponibilità, l’intervista è finita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
APPENDIX B: 
ENGLISH TRANSLATION 
The logics of Italian tobacco shops: 
Family and business  
 
This project is promoted by the University of Padua (prof. Paolo Gubitta and dott.ssa 
Alessandra Tognazzo) and it has the aim of studying the relationship between the 
family and the business in the tobacco shops’ sector. 
The results of the study are going to be used in order to understand tobacconists’ expe-
riences and, mostly, the role that families play within the tobacco shops, whose industry 
is strongly characterized by the family presence. 
We are going to make you some questions in order to understand your experiences and 
your proposals related to this topic. 
If you agree, during the registration we will record it and we will take some notes. 
We assure you that the information that you are going to provide will be treated anony-
mously with respect to the D.Lgs 196/2003 privacy law.  
 
Thank you for your time 
 
Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
Interviewee’s signature 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
University researcher’s signature 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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Semi-structured interview protocol for tobacconists  
Introductory questions 
 Let’s talk about yourself and your job… 
 When and how did you start this business? 
 How much and why did your family have a role in the choice of starting this 
business? 
 Why (goals) did you decide to start this business? 
Questions about the business: please focus your attention on the tobacco shop 
 Could you decribe, briefly, your shop? Which products/services does it offer? 
 Has the offering always been omposed by these products/services or have you in-
troduced them at a specific moment? 
o If yes… 
 Which were your expectations that have lead you to introsuce 
them? Can you tell us an example? 
 Has your familysustained you in the decision of selling these 
products/services rather than others and in which way? 
 Tobaco shops mainly sell cigarettes or tobacco products in general…so, when 
you decide to introduce a new product not related to it, why do you do this? 
 If you introduce products related to the tobacco, why do you do this? 
 Could you talk me about the composition of your turnover? What is the contri-
bution of  each product/service offered to the turnover? 
 Which are the main risks related to this business that you perceive? In which ex-
tent? 
 
Questions about the tobacconist’s family: your business in relation to your family and 
your values 
 In which way is your family involved in the business management? 
o Why? 
 Concerning slot machines, some fear? Has someone of your family sustained or 
hindered the decision to introduce them i the shop? 
 (If there are not slot machines) Why have you chosen this? Has someone of your 
family sustained or hindered the decision to introduce them in the shop? 
 Would you like to leave the bsiness in the hands of your offsprings? Could you 
tell me why? 
 
Questions about personnel 
 Talk me about people working within the shop… 
o How many people are working in the shop? And How long? Are there 
any members of the family or not? 
o If family members work within the shop… 
 Why this choice? 
 How does your employment relationship regulated? 
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o If family members do not work within the shop… 
 Why this choice?  
 What kind of relationship do exist between you and the employ-
ees? 
o How are tasks divided? 
 Who has the access to the cash? Why? Do you perform some con-
trols on the cash? 
 
Questions about environment 
 In general, how do you describe the tobaco shops’ sectr, since it can be seen as 
particular sector by audience? 
 Do you think that this sector, in Italy, has changed in recent years?  
o How? 
 What do you think is the general trend of this sector? Do you confront yourself 
with other tobacconists? 
o Are you going to undertake strategies to be in line with this trend? 
- If yes… 
 Which strategies?  
 Why? 
 Have also your family helped  you?  
 
Do you want to tell us something else, which you think could be relevant in order to 
help us to better understand innovation in Italian tobacco shops? 
We thank you for your availability, the interview is over. 
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